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ABSTRACT
The extensive use of convertible debt

(in excess of

$1.5 billion annually) has made this type of security very
prominent in financing the activities of modern corporate
organizations.

in addition, as a result of Accounting

Principles Board Opinion No. 15, these securities have a
direct influence upon reported earnings per share.

Con

sidering these factors, it is imperative that the financial
statement presentation of convertible bonds reflect the
economic characteristics inherent in these securities.
In order to determine whether current practice
satisfactorily achieves the goal of reporting the economic
substance of the transaction, this study was designed to
evaluate the acceptability of allocation of value to the
conversion option.

More specifically, the null hypothesis

of this study is that there would be no significant differ
ence for theoretical or predictive purposes under alterna
tive procedures of accounting for convertible bonds.
The testing of the theoretical portion of the hypoth
esis involves an examination of the current literature
together with information obtained from the files of the
Accounting Principles Board.

In addition to these data, an

interview was conducted with the Assistant Administrative
Director of the APB.
x

The empirical research encompasses a retrospective
analysis of the effects of allocation on the use of
accounting data in projecting the movement of common stock
prices.

The data used were obtained from the annual reports

of companies having convertible bonds outstanding from 1961
to 1970.

In addition to this restriction, each company had

to have conducted profitable operations during this period
in order to qualify.

The companies used were randomly

selected from a list of prospective companies prepared from
information contained in Moody's Industrial Manual.
A regression analysis was made with price of the common
stock as the dependent variable and several accounting
ratios as the independent variables.

In the final analysis,

the coefficients of determination for the two sets of data
(one adjusted for valuation of the conversion feature and
the other unadjusted) were compared to determine if there
was a significant difference between them.
The results of the analysis led to the rejection of
the theoretical portion of the null hypothesis and an accep
tance of the predictive aspect.
From a theoretical point of view, it was clearly
shown that the valuation of the conversion option of con
vertible bonds is necessary in order
two economic elements

(1) to account for the

(the conversion privilege and the debt

element) present in the debt-equity package,

(2) to charge

operations of the period with the actual cost of the funds
xi

used, and

(3) Lo comply with the distinction between a lia

bility and owners' equity necessary for proper reporting.
The study also indicates that the valuation problem could be
solved with the cooperation of the financial analysts and
investment bankers.
The empirical test of the null hypothesis indicated
there was no significant difference between the predictive
ability of the information taken directly from the financial
statements and the same data adjusted for valuation of the
conversion privilege at the 95 per cent level of confidence.
The overall conclusion is that the valuation of the
conversion privilege should be made in financial statements
proposing to show the financial position and results of
operations of corporate organizations.
The financial statement presentation of this informa
tion should classify the discount resulting from the valua
tion procedures as a contra account to the face value of the
debt element,

and the conversion feature should be classified

as part of contributed capital.

It was further determined

that the discount should be amortized over the life of the
bonds as additional interest expense.

xii

Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
In the latter 1 9 4 0 's the cessation of hostilities
and the restructuring of a war-time economy created a
tremendous need for capital for regearing industry and to
keep pace with the ever growing problem of inflation.

At

that time the future of the national economy was anything
but certain.

During World War II the Gross National Product

rose above $200 billion, and the populace of the country
wondered whether the end of the war would also bring an end
to economic growth.
The pains of the depression still stood foremost in
the minds of many as the peace celebrations began to draw to
a close.

Economists were predicting everything from "boom to

bu st," and this variant outlook may have been the spark that
kindled the growth of the use of convertible bonds.
These financial instruments held the key to financial
security from an investor's standpoint in that they offered
the speculative element of an equity, which provides somewhat
of a hedge against a rise in price levels, and the security
of a debt instrument.

Since the price levels of equity

securities have a high correlation with inflation trends,
convertibility feature offers some protection against the

the

2
perils of inflation.
perfect protection.

However,

there is no such thing as

During several periods within the last

five years this protective element has not functioned success
fully, as price levels have soared while at the same time
prices of stock were plummeting, but the general trend
exhibited in the past should prevail
should, over the long run,
price level),

(i.e., equity prices

follow the movement of the general

and the exception that has been witnessed in

recent years should not be expected to continue.

Thus, while

equity protection against inflation is not perfect,
present,

at

there seems to be no better means available.
Also concerning the protection of the debt element,

since bond prices vary inversely with the interest rate,

the

pure debt value will fluctuate, but it, too, provides an
element of security— the degree of which will vary with the
business risk of each company.

In addition, there is the

"guaranteed return and redemption" feature of debt that also
has some aspect of security.
Thus these financial instruments seem to offer an
investor as much protection as is presently possible,

and

this, alone, has been an important factor in the growth in
the use of convertible debt.
THE PROBLEM
Use of Convertible Securities
While the convertible security was not an idea
spawned by this economic uncertainty,

it definitely was

3
tailor-made for such circumstances.

The actual orxgin of

convertibles is not known, but there is definite proof of
the use of this type of financing as far back in time as
King Charles I of England

(1600-1649).^

The use of convertible securities in the United
States can be traced back to the 1850's and 6 0 ‘s, but recent
emphasis on the utilization of the securities far overshadows
their initial activity.

From Table 1 (see page 4) it can be

seen that in 1959 a little over one-half billion dollars of
convertible debt was issued and this brought the total out
standing to two and one-half billion.
During the early 1960's convertible debt was used
rather sparingly as compared to the period of 1965-1970.

At

the end of 1965 there was $3.4 billion of this type security
outstanding.

Since 1965 the phenominal growth in the use of

convertible bonds has created the current situation that
exists in relation to the proper accounting procedures that
should be followed upon issuance.
While the final drafts and approvals of Accounting
Principles Board Opinion No. 10

were being compiled, an

^-In this instance King Charles was allowed to convert
his bonds of the London Water Company into stock.
The first
recorded issue of actual convertible securities dates back to
the early 1 7 0 0 's. For an extended discussion of this topic
see C. James Pilcher, Raising Capital with Convertible
Securities (Ann Arbor:
Bureau of Business Research, Univer
sity of Michigan, 1955).
2
Accounting Principles Board, Accounting Principles
Board Opinion Number 10:
Omnibus Opinion— 1966 (New Y o r k :
American institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1966).

4

TABLE 1
ISSUES OF CONVERTIBLE DEBT BY YEAR
(Money Amounts in Millions of Dollars)

Year

Amount

Number of
Issues

Dollar Inc.
(Dec.) Over
Previous Year
—

Percentage
of Dollar
Inc. (Dec.)
Over Previous
Year
—

514.9

79

1960

347.2

94

(167.7)

(33%)

1961

525.1

82

177 .9

51%

1962

325.5

83

(199.6)

(38%)

1963

228.6

50

( 96.6)

(30%)

1964

372.4

49

143.8

62%

1965

1,183.3

61

810.9

218%

1966

1,760.7

96

577.4

49%

1967

4,062.3

230

2,301.6

131%

1968

2,699.0

202

(1,363.3)

1969

2,792.2

135

1970*

1,552.8*

1959

$

41*

93.2
N/A

(33%)
3%
N/A

♦January - August
Source: 1959-1968--Investment Dealers' Digest, 1959-1969,
Cited by Richard A. Stevenson and Joe Lavely, "Why
a Bond Warrant Issue?" Financial Executive. XXXVIII
(June, 1970), 17.
1969-1970— Work sheets provided by Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner and Smith.

additional $1.8 billion of convertible debt was issued.

The

amazing fact is the increase immediately following the Opinion
requiring allocation of value to the conversion privilege.
During 1967 an all time high of $4.1 billion of these securi
ties was issued.

This was a 131 per cent increase over the

amount issued in the preceding year.

It appears that the

allocation requirement did not stop or even hinder in any way
the use of convertible bonds.

Actually there has been a

marked decrease in the issuance of convertible debt in 1968
and 1969 as compared to 1967.

The fact that this is the

period after the suspension of the paragraphs of Opinion No.
10 requiring allocation probably had no effect, but it is an
interesting turn of events.
The figures presented for 1970 can be misleading.
During the first six months of that year $1,462,400,000 of
convertible bonds were issued, but due to the unstable and
overall downward trend of both the bond and stock market
only $90 million was issued in July and August combined.
Thus while there is a definite trend toward the con
tinual use of convertible debt an annual rate of approxi
mately seven times that of the early 1960's,
be little or no chance,
passing 1967.

there seems to

in the near future, of ever sur

Despite this,

$2 billion to $3 billion of

these securities are issued each year thereby making them an
important instrument in the financial world.

Even the

6

issuance of Opinion No. 15^ on earnings per share did not
have a material effect on the use of convertible debt.

It

is clear that these securities play a far more important
role in financial planning than simply a sham to be used to
aid the financial presentation of expanding companies.
This continued heavy use of convertible bonds is one
of the factors that created much of the criticism of Opinion
No. 10, and it is one of the reasons for this study.

A

financial instrument as important as convertible debt must
be accounted for in a manner that discloses its inherent
characteristics in order to present fairly the financial
position of a firm issuing these securities.
Need for More Attention on Accounting for Liabilities
Recently there has been a renewed interest in
accounting for liabilities.

The result of current topics

arising in the areas of income tax allocation, lease
accounting,

and accounting for pensions have focused atten

tion on the need for an autonomous definition of this term
that will coincide with the continuity assumption that is
basic to modern accounting.
The methods of accounting for taxes, for long-term
leases by the lessee, and for pension costs involve
some similar problems, although each has created new
problems and challenges for the accounting profession
and for accounting theory.
The common problems include
the nature and reporting of the related assets and

3Accounting Principles Board, Accounting Principles
Board Opinion Number 15: Earnings Per Share (New Y o r k :
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1969).
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liabilities and the timing of expenses or other income
effects.
In each case, questions arise regarding the
nature of liabilities.
Does a liability exist when
the creditor does not acknowledge the debt? Should
obligations be reported if it is unlikely that they
will be paid in the aggregate?
Regarding the timing
of expenses, questions arise regarding whether emphasis
should be placed on cash flows, assumed or arbitrary
associations with revenues, or on changes in the valua
tion of assets and liabilities. . . .4
In each of these areas those opposed to recognition
have used as their major argument the fact that the liability
aspect of the problem does not fit the definition of a
liability that was in use at the time the problem arose.^
This argument was heavily influenced by a narrow concept
that failed to adequately reflect the economic nature of the
transaction.

The emphasis was on a legalistic approach

where a liability was recognized only when there was a direct
debtor-creditor relationship.
While pronouncements from the Accounting Principles
Board

(APB) have substantially reached a solution to the

various areas mentioned above, the lack of a workable
definition is apparent again in the Opinions dealing with
convertible securities.

Here the Board has changed approach

from one that required allocation of value to the conversion
feature of convertible debt

(Opinion No. 10) to the suspen

sion of this Opinion before it came into effect

(Opinion No.

^Eldon S. Hendriksen. Accounting Theory (rev. ed.;
Homewood:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1970), p. 461.
^For examples of this situation see Thomas M. Hill,
"Some Arguments Against the Inter-Period Allocation of
Income Taxes," The Accounting Review. CIV (July, 1957), 358,
and ibid., p. 477.

1 2 ) and finally to a complete reversal of their original
approach by the issuance of Opinion No. 14^ which prohibits
allocation of value as attributable to the conversion
feature.
Summary of the Significance of the Problem
From the preceding discussion it can easily be seen
that there is a definite need for more research in the area
of liabilities.

At the same time, the specific topic of

convertible debt remains in prominence as a result of the
extensive use of these securities

(see Table 1).

Each year

in excess of $1.5 billion of these bonds are being issued,
and there is no indication of any decrease in use on the
part of the corporate financiers.
The whole situation is complicated by the fact that
the proper accounting treatment of convertible debt is
dependent upon an understanding of the instrument plus a
meticulous distinction between the concept of a liability
and owners' equity.

Thus, the liability problem is closely

associated to the classification of convertible debt, and
the latter cannot be resolved without some attention being
directed toward the concept of a liability.

^Accounting Principles Board, Accounting Principles
Board Opinion Number 12: Omnibus Opinion— 1967 (New Y o r k :
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1967).
A c c o u n t i n g Principles Board, Accounting Principles
Board Opinion Number 14: Accounting for Convertible Debt
and Debt Issued with Stock Purchase Warrants (New Y o r k :
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1969).
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In addition,

the area of convertible debt has also

expanded to earnings per share.

Through the concept of a

residual security and Opinion No. 15, convertible debt can
directly influence the numerator and the denominator in the
earnings per share calculation.

Thus in addition to the

balance sheet treatment of these securities, the concept of
earnings per share and its significance enters the accounting
question.

As such, the proper reporting of convertible debt

is very important in financial accounting.
NATURE OF CONVERTIBLE DEBT
With the use of convertible debt reaching the limits
it has, some questions arise as to the nature of this form
of obtaining funds and the necessity,

if any,

for special

treatment in the accounting records.

The type of convertible

debt referred to in this study is bonds that can be exchanged
for common stock of the issuing company at the option of the
ho l d e r .
While there is no specific pattern of features that
must be included in an issue, practically all of these
securities are unsecured and subordinated to all existing
creditor claims and possibly to all future issues of debt.
In addition,

the nominal rate of interest is usually several

percentage points below the "current market rate" for
similar securities without the conversion option.

The intent

is to offer to the public an issue priced at par— usually

10
$1,000 per bond.®

With the price and the subordination

given factors in the bargaining,

the points of negotiation

center on the coupon interest rate and the conversion

price.^

Since practically all of the recent issues of these
securities carry a conversion price that is approximately
15-20 per cent above the current market value of the related
stock, the major question for negotiation is the coupon rate
of interest.^"0

Of course the major point of contention here

involves a trade-off between interest and capital gains.-*-1
The actual tax aspects of this situation represent a signifi
cant factor that must be considered in the preparation of an
offering by the company and its financial consultants,

and as

8Copies of work sheets used by Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner and Smith covering convertible bonds issued from
January, 1967, through August, 1970, indicate that out of a
total of 522 issues only 9 (1.7 per cent) were sold at a
price other than par.
^The conversion price relates to the number of
shares that can be obtained from converting the bond divided
into the par value of the bond.
Care must be taken not to
confuse this with the conversion value of the security and
the conversion parity.
The former is the number of shares
that can be obtained from conversion multiplied by the market
value of each share.
The conversion parity of the bond is
the current market price of the security divided by the
number of shares of common stock that can be obtained upon
conversion.
10William Schwartz and Julius Spellman, Guide to
Convertible Securities (New York: Convertible Securities
Press, 1968), p. 4.
H-For a more extended discussion of this topic see
Eugene F. Brigham, "An Analysis of Convertible Debentures,"
Readings in Contemporary Financial Management, eds. Keith B.
Johnson and Donald E. Fischer (Glenview:
Scott, Foresman
and Company, 1968), pp. 327-48, and Otto H. Poensgen, "The
Valuation of Convertible Bonds— Part I: The Model," Indus
trial Management Review, VII (Fall, 1965), 77-92.
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such will be considered later in this study.
The conversion feature creates a possible call on
common stock at the option of the holder.

Therefore when

purchasing this type of security two basic rights are
obtained:

(1) the right to hold the security until maturity

(or call by the issuer)

and collect the interest and

(2) the

right to exchange the bond for stock in the issuing company.
Since these are mutually exclusive rights, a great deal of
controversy has arisen over whether or not recognition should
be given to both aspects,

i.e., should the conversion value

be recognized in the accounting records.
be summarized as follows:

The situation can

is the convertible bond a true

hybrid security, or is it, in fact, basically a debt instru
ment?
If the security is a true hybrid

(i.e.,

it contains

incongruous elements), it would be desirous to separate
these different elements on the financial statements.
ever,

How

if the security is only a debt instrument, there is no

need for recognition of anything at issuance except the debt
element.
THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE APB
The current position of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants

(Accounting Principles Board

Opinion No. 14) is that due to the inseparability of the
rights there should be no separate accounting for the con
version feature.

However, this position against allocation

12
seems to be founded,

as a review of the files of the APB

shows, on the difficulty of determining the "straight invest
ment value" of the bonds, the concomitant reduction of
earnings from the discount amortization, and the nondeductability of the periodic write off of the discount for tax
purposes.
THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
Accounting procedures should be predicted upon a
logical base of postulates and assumptions.

While no defini

tive study with any authoritative support has been completed
in the broad area of generally accepted accounting princi
p l e s , ^

the omission of an item from the financial statements

is not justified simply because the data is difficult to
obtain or unfavorable to operations.

Accounting generally

emphasizes the economic substance of events over the specific
legal form used; and, it is important that the same attitude
be established for the accounting for the issuance of con
vertible debt.
With this in mind, it is the purpose of this study

12<rhe APB has recently (October, 1970) issued Number
4 in a series of "Statements" in which they present a hier
archy of accounting principles.
Since a "Statement" does
not have the authoritative support of an "Opinion," it simply
presents the Board's view for educational and developmental
purposes.
See Accounting Principles Board, Accounting Prin
ciples Board Statement Number 4: Basic Concepts and
Accounting Principles Underlying Financial Statements of
Business Enterprises (New Yorks American Institute of Certi
fied Public Accountants, 1970).
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to analyze the data available in order to evaluate the
acceptability of allocation of value to the conversion
option.

More specifically,

the null hypothesis of this

study is that there would be no significant difference for
theoretical or predictive purposes under alternative pr o 
cedures of accounting for convertible bonds.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The proper accounting treatment for convertible debt
will be examined from two approaches:
empirical.

theoretical and

The former will concentrate on determining

whether or not a value should be placed on the conversion
feature from a logical point of view using the theoretical
structure of accounting and finance.

Here the current

literature in both fields together with data obtained from
the files of the APB are used for analytical support.
The empirical research encompasses a retrospective
analysis of the effects of allocation on the use of account
ing data in projecting the movement of common stock prices.
The data used were obtained from the annual reports of com
panies having convertible bonds outstanding from 1961 to
1970.

In addition to this restriction, each company had to

have conducted profitable operations during this period in
order to qualify.

The companies used were randomly selected

from a list of prospective companies prepared from informa
tion contained in Moody's industrial Manual.^-3

Manual

l^Moody's Investors Service, Moody's Industrial
(New York: Moody's Investors Service, Inc.).

14
The actual testing procedure involved a regression
analysis using the price of the common stock as the dependent
variable.

Several ratios that would be affected by allo

cating value to the conversion privilege were used as the
independent variables.

The analysis involved a comparison

of the coefficient of determination
data

(r^) for the two sets of

(one adjusted for valuation and the other unadjusted)

to determine if there is a significant difference between
them at the 95 per cent level of confidence.
The final evaluation of the acceptability of alloca
tion procedures involves an analysis of the results of both
the theoretical and empirical tests.
THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The major subject area of this study is the presenta
tion of the proper method of disclosure for convertible debt
on the financial statements of the issuing company.

While

the particular methods chosen to value the conversion feature
are an important consideration, they are discussed only as a
means of presenting a complete picture of the overall problem.
In addition,

the areas of earnings per share, other con

vertible securities, and debt issued with warrants are all
part of the general problem of financial statement presenta
tion of the complex and often mystifying financial structure
of modern corporations; however, they are of interest here
only in as much as they help provide an insight to the
central problem of convertible debt.
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The empirical portion of this study does not include
the development of a complete model for purposes of fore
casting the movement of common stock prices.

On the other

hand, there was an attempt to use enough data to obtain a
significant prediction of the movement of stock prices; how
ever, the central focus of attention is on the effects of
valuing the conversion privilege of convertible bonds.
In order to be of any value in reaching a conclusion,
the calculation of the more important ratios used must be
affected by valuing
income)

(and subsequently amortizing against

the conversion feature.

must serve two functions.

Thus those ratios selected

First, they must contain elements

that will change as a result of valuing the conversion
privilege,

and second, they must serve some useful function

in the overall evaluation of stock price movements.

As a

result of this condition some other products of the reporting
process that may have a significant relationship _o the
market price of common stock would not be represented in the
final equation.

However,

since these data elements would be

of little value in achieving the purpose of this study, they
may be eliminated without any prejudicial effect on the final
conclusions.

While there are some variables included in the

original equation that were not directly affected by the
allocation process, the intent here was to make the study as
complete as possible without losing sight of the central
purpose.
It is an accepted conclusion that many factors other

than published accounting information have both a direct and
indirect influence upon the market price of a company's
residual security.

Examples of these exogenous causal

factors are such things as the illness of the President;
expectations regarding the future growth of the economy; the
elasticity of the demand for the products of a given company
current and expected economic measures adopted by the Presi
dent and Congress; the structure of interest rates; speeches
by company officers,

security analysts and others; pure

speculation on the part of prospective investors and a host
of other similar factors— the list is probably endless.
Since these exogenous factors affect some companies dif
ferently than others,

a

in addition, because of the nature

of the items, their exact effects cannot be determined.
This is not to say that each of the variables
selected have the same effect on all companies.

Regression

analyses run in preparation for this study often produced
results with one dependent variable having an overwhelmingly
significant relationship with the price of the stock, and
more often than not this variable was different from company
to company.

The point at issue here is that the independent

variables included in this portion of the study are likely
to have an effect on stock price that can better be pre
dicted than those previously mentioned.

In addition,

the

variables used are more adaptable to quantitative measure
ment.

This would hold true even where many companies are

considered and there is therefore a greater

'averaging
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effect" on the analysis than if it were restricted to only
one company.
THE LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
As with any other attempt to limit the operations of
the "real world" to a particular equation or series of equa
tions, the regression analysis is not without limitations
that must be understood before the results can be properly
evaluated.

However, these limitations are not of such import

that they negate any generalizations that are derived from
the results.
One of the limiting factors is that there are many
methods that can be used to estimate the value of securities.
In this study a financial ratio analysis approach is
followed,

and one must recognize the limitations of this

method as there will be other factors that will affect the
value of a s e c u r i t y . ^

In addition, other approaches to

security valuation could be used, the more important of these
being the intrinsic approach and charting.

However, the

nature of a ratio analysis approach is more conducive to the
purpose of this study.
It is also quite possible that some data other than
that selected would influence stock price but was not

l^This method has been used in several studies, one
of the most extensive of which was prepared by Beaver,
Kettler, and Scholes.
See William Beaver, Paul Kettler, and
Myron Scholes, "The Association Between Market Determined
and Accounting Determined Risk Measures," The Accounting
R eview, XLV (October, 1970), 654-82.
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included in the original equation in an attempt to keep the
study at a workable size.

In addition, the combinations of

variables tested may not completely cover the gamut of all
possible selections.

Here the possibility exists that other

combinations of information affected by allocating value to
the conversion feature could have been included, although
those that were employed represent the ratios that generally
are considered to be used by most of the readers of financial
statements.
An additional limiting factor lies in the use of
information projected into the future.

instead of a direct

relationship of current data to current stock prices,

the

information may simply serve as support for the investor's
projections for the particular company or it may require the
adjustment of his expectations.

In either case the effect

may be substantial, but not directly measurable.

Since only

direct relationships can be tested through the methodology
chosen, the indirect influence of many of these factors may
combine to offset the direct effect whether it be statisti
cally significant or not; but by the very nature of the
indirect effects,

it would be virtually impossible to measure

them quantitatively.
Another important factor that must be controlled in
some fashion is time.

No matter what assumptions are made

regarding the timing of published information, certain leaks
and other premature exposures often make the actual distribu
tion of financial information anticlimatical.

Some form of
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lagging procedure can be used to allow for some of this dis
parity, but it would be practically impossible to eliminate
it altogether.

Even if the distribution of this information

could be controlled until a particular time, not all investors
would receive it at the same time, and even more importantly,
not all of them would react simultaneously.
Since both the unadjusted and the adjusted equations
used practically the same information,
detrend these figures.

it was decided not to

The reasoning behind this approach

was that the purpose of the empirical portion of the study
is to measure the relative predictive ability of the two
sets of data and not the absolute value of the coefficients
of determination

(r^) .

As such,

it is not likely that the

presence of any trend would disturb the analysis because it
would have approximately the same affect on both equations.
The probable result of a detrending procedure would be to
reduce r^ for both the adjusted and the unadjusted data, but
it would not change the relative relationship between them.
As in any other communication of information certain
problems result from the simple procedure of coding

(the

summarizing and reporting of the data) and decoding

(the

translating of the data by the reader).

The perspective of

each potential reader of financial information varies from
individual to individual and when this is combined with the
relatively unknown quantity of the investor’s decision model,
there is no way of predicting the precise effect that widely
disseminated information has on a particular variable,
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namely stock price for a particular company.
Despite the limitations of this study, there is still
significant information that it can supply in evaluating the
effects of accounting for the conversion privilege of con
vertible debt.

The major caution that must be observed is

that the conclusions drawn from the results do not overstep
the boundaries as set forth above.
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
In order to logically study the problem of alloca
tion of value to the conversion feature of convertible debt
it is imperative that the security itself and the reasons for
its use be thoroughly understood.

This analysis plus a dis

cussion of the differences between the conversion option and
warrants form the basis of Chapter 2.

In addition,

in order

to complete the task of putting convertible debt in the
proper perspective,

a history of the various Opinions and

background information germain to this study is reviewed.
Once the nature of the conversion feature is under
stood, the next step in analyzing the problem of allocation
involves the study of the concept of a liability in general.
The object here is to develop an independent definition of a
liability that provides the profession with a foundation upon
which it can build in the future.

This analysis is prepared

in Chapter 3.
Chapter 4 presents the case for allocation from both
a positive and a negative approach,

i.e., both the pros and
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cons are analyzed.

In addition there is a study of the

arguments offered as rebuttal material by the opposing sides
of the question.

included in the discussion are materials

obtained from the files of the APB regarding convertible debt.
The actual process of valuation is the subject matter
of Chapter 5.

Here various methods of computation are

studied together with the balance sheet treatment of the
related items:

(1) the bond liability account,

premium/discount account, and

(2) the

(3) the account that would be

used for recording any value allocated to the conversion
privilege.
The empirical portion of the study is found in
Chapter 6.

The testing procedure involves a comparison of

the coefficients of determination of a regression analysis
on the unadjusted and adjusted data with stock price as the
dependent variable and several accounting ratios as the
independent variables.

The purpose is to determine if there

is a significant difference in the "predictive ability" of
the data as presented in the annual reports

(unadjusted) and

the same information adjusted for valuation of the conversion
option

(with the concomitant amortization of the resulting

bond discount)

at the 95 per cent confidence level.

The final chapter represents a summary of the
research methods used and the findings from both an empirical
and theoretical approach.

In addition, the final conclusions

are presented regarding the proper accounting treatment for
the issuance of convertible debt and areas for future study are
discussed.

Chapter 2
CONVERTIBLE DEBT IN PERSPECTIVE
A complete analysis of the accounting for the con
version feature necessarily involves a discussion of the
factors behind the use of these securities.

For only

through a thorough understanding of the instrument itself
and the circumstances surrounding its use can the profession
begin to account for the economic attributes of the conver
sion option.

Therefore, the purpose of this chapter will be

to examine the reasons for the use of convertible debt

(from

both the issuer and the buyer's point of view) and the events
leading to the current status of accounting for these
securities.

Also included in this chapter is an analysis of

warrants and their relationship to bonds with the conversion
feature.

Many of the characteristics presented in this

chapter will form the basis for a later discussion designed
to determine the proper method of accounting for the issuance
of convertible debt.
REASONS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF CONVERTIBLE DEBT
Reduction of interest Rate
One of the reasons for the use of a conversion
privilege was to add a "sweeter" or an additional feature to
22
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the bonds in order to induce some reduction in the interest
rate.-*ment.

That this factor still exists there can be no arguAs evidenced by a review of Moody's Convertible Bonds

2

it can be seen that the interest rate on these securities is
from one-half to several points below the "norm" for similar
securities issued at the same time.

A study of several large

corporations prepared by Eugene Brigham showed that those who
mentioned the alternative issuance of standard debt indicated
that an increase in the interest rate of approximately onehalf to one per cent would have been necessary to maintain
the same issue price.^

Thus it would seem these companies

especially did not seek to issue straight debt securities.
The small decrease in interest cost hardly would be justi
fied to the existing common stockholders in return for a
conversion privilege.
Additional Equity Capital
Recently there appears to be a trend of issuing con
vertible debt merely as a means of ultimately obtaining
additional equity capital.

This has been substantiated by

several empirical studies.

Brigham found that of the 22

\j. Fred Weston and Eugene F. Brigham, Managerial
Finance (3rd ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1969), p. 654.
York:

^Moody's Investors Service, M o o d y 1s Bond Survey (New
Moody's Investors Service, inc., October 19, 1970).

■^Eugene F. Brigham, "An Analysis of Convertible
Debentures," in Readings in Contemporary Financial Manage
m e n t , eds. Keith B. Johnson and Donald E. Fischer (Glenview:
Scott, Foresman and Company, 1968), p. 345.
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large corporations he studied,

73 per cent

(16 companies)

were primarily interested in obtaining equity capital while
the remainder initially wanted to issue debt but found that
the economic and market conditions were such that a straight
bond issue could not be sold at a reasonable rate of
interest.4

C. James Pilcher also came to the same conclusion

from his study of the use of convertible securities made in
1955, the only difference being that at that time about 63
per cent of the 75 companies he studied desired to raise
common equity.^

These results were based on the issuance of

convertible debt and preferred stock during 1948-1953.^

4Ibid., pp. 344-45.
^C. James Pilcher, Raising Capital with Convertible
Securities (Ann Arbor:
Bureau of Business Research, Univer
sity of Michigan, 1955), pp. 60-62.
^Additional support for this position can be found
in a study by Browman (Keith L. Browman, "The Use of Con
vertible Subordinated Debentures by Industrial Firms 194959," Quarterly Review of Economics and Business. Ill (Spring,
1963), 73-74.) and a study by Otto Poensgen.
Poensgen's
findings show clearly that the conversion privilege usually
is set at a relatively low level in order to allow for con
version of the securities long before the maturity date.
The data he studied indicated that the conversion price was
projected to be reached by the common stock in less than
four years, and hardly ever greater than ten (the latter
included two standard deviations from the sample m e a n ) . See
Otto H. Poensgen, "The Valuation of Convertible Bonds:
Part
II— Empirical Results and Conclusions," Industrial Management
Review, VII (Spring, 1966), 95. Thus it is difficult to come
to any conclusion other than that managements' intent in
issuing convertible debt in most instances has shifted to
the desire to obtain equity capital on a delayed basis.
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Brigham also determined that 46 per cent of the com
panies he studied had a policy of actively encouraging con
version through a well-timed call or through increased
common stock dividends.

A relatively high 31 per cent of

these companies indicated they had no plans to force or
encourage conversion at all.
mind here is that these

The important fact tokeep in

were rather large companies who were

not forced into using convertible debentures.

In general

they could have either issued straight debentures or stock
at "reasonable" costs, but instead, they chose convertibles.
The very use of the conversion option indicates,

at

minimum, the willingness of management to raise common equity
capital and the degree of this acceptance can easily be
measured by the relationship between the market price and
the conversion price at the date of issuance.
projected to a definite

This can be

interest to issue equity if the

conversion price is set low enough relative to the current
market price of the common stock and the economic and market
trends.
More Funds Are Made Available
Another reason for issuing convertible debt is that
more funds can be provided on a per share basis than through
a large issue of stock.

By setting the conversion price

15-20 per cent above the current market value of the common
stock, the effective result in most cases would be the
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issuance of equity securities.

The issue price for a large

block of stock will almost always be set below the current
market price of the shares in order to insure the success of
the issue.

Anytime a large block of securities is "dumped"

on the market the price will always fall— if for no other
reason than the supply and demand relationship.

Brigham's

study supports this and indicates the probable reduction in
price would range from two to five per cent of the current
market price.

He also found that small companies and those

requiring large sums of funds met the most adverse condi
tions ,®
An additional aspect of this situation is that the
underwriting commission on new issues of debt is usually
less than the charges on equity securities.
is a prime example of this situation.

Components,

inc.

In 1967 the company

issued both convertible bonds and common stock during the
year and the underwriting commissions on the bonds totaled
about 2 per cent of the total issue price, whereas the cost
of issuing the stock was over 5 per cent of the price of the

^Poensgen, loc. cit.
®The same effect was found by Charles Vinson in his
study of convertible securities (Charles E. Vinson, "Rates
of Return on Convertibles;
Recent Investor Experience,"
Financial Analysts J o u rnal. XXVI (July-August, 1970), 113).
In addition by obtaining more per share through the issuance
of convertible debt them directly issuing common stock,
overall fewer shares will be outstanding, and, therefore,
the dilution on earnings per share will be less. This is
still another factor favoring the common stockholders.
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stock.^

Thus another advantage of issuing convertible debt

would be the lower flotation cost, especially if substan
tially all of the bonds were converted.

In such a situation

the company would pay for issuing bonds, but actually be
issuing stock.

There is, of course,

some administrative cost

involved in the conversion that would offset some of this
advantage, however, the overall results still favor the con
vertible b o n d s .
Lag Time
Management can also make wise use of the lag time
between the issuance of the convertible debentures and the
conversion.

By wisely setting the conversion price a company

can issue convertible bonds and have funds to invest in
construction,

increased inventory levels, and other areas,

and not have actual dilution of earnings until after the
assets were acquired and generating revenue.

In order for

this to be effective the reader of the statements must be
able to understand the difference between potential and actual
dilution.^®

^Prospectuses issued by Components,
February and July, 1967.

Inc. in

^ S i n c e the issuance of Opinion No. 15. requiring
the inclusion of most convertible securities in earnings per
share, this factor has been somewhat diminished in impor
tance, but there is still a clear distinction between actual
and potential dilution.

28
Other Reasons for Issuance of Convertible Debt
Still another advantage of convertible debt is the
call provision that is included in each issue.

This allows

management to virtually replace the debt with equity securi
ties at almost any time that is profitable to the company.
It also gives management more flexibility in determining the
capital structure of the company.
In order to make the issue more attractive the con
version privilege has often been used as an offset to
limitations of the issue that would normally make it unattrac
tive to prospective investors, e.g., subordination, lack of a
sinking fund, and the presence of a call provision.

Actually

the various covenants included in the bond indenture serve
the many and varied interests of the purchaser and the
issuer.

What may be important to one may be totally imma

terial to another.

Thus, the entire package must be

examined in light of the circumstances of the individual or
company buying or issuing the securities.
Convertible bonds have also been used in mergers and
acquisitions.

In these types of situations convertible debt

is issued in exchange for a company whose stock has a high
dividend yield.
Despite the many reasons for the use of the con
version feature with debenture bonds, a vast majority of the
evidence indicates the primary intent of management is to
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issue equity securities on a delayed b a s i s . ^
REASONS FOR THE PURCHASE OF
CONVERTIBLE SECURITIES
Two-Way Protection
One of the major reasons for purchasing convertible
debentures is the two-way protection offered by these
securities.

Many analysts feel these debt instruments give

the investor the best of two possible worlds.

The infla

tionary factor is covered by the growth of the market value
of the common stock and the resulting improvement of the
investor's position through an increasingly more "valuable"
conversion option.

When the purchaser of the convertible

debt desires to convert,

it will usually be for his immediate

gain.
On the other hand, should the market fall, interest
rates usually fall, and the down side protection as to the
principal and interest through a fixed maturity date and
preference position

(in relation to the common stockholders)

in the event of liquidation should offer support to the
market value of the bonds.

Brigham refers to this lower

valuation as follows.
. . . the conversion value and the stock-debt value
combine to establish a lower bound for the price of the
bond.
Logically, the bond would not sell for less than
its value as straight debt . . . and if it would fall
below the conversion value . . . arbitragers would

^ S e e studies by Brigham, Pilcher,
were previously cited.

and others that

30
enter the market, short the stock, and cover their
short positions by buying and converting bonds.
This latter process would continue until the market
price of the bond is drawn up to its conversion v a l u e .
The higher of these two floors dominates . . . forming
the effective market value floor.12
In addition to this "floor" protection, the investor
can share in company prosperity by electing to convert.

Two

of the major factors that would influence this decision are
the dividend yield as compared to the interest rate on the
bonds and the future outlook for company profits.

Thus the

purchaser of a convertible debenture can profit from an
increasing market that simply pushes up the related common
stock and/or from a favorable outlook for future profits.

in

either situation the purchaser can convert and sell the
stock at a profit or he can sell the bonds before they are
called.

The latter would probably also yield a handsome

profit because the market value of the bonds would tend to
fluctuate closely with the stock into which it can be
converted.
Leverage
In addition to this two-way protection the investor
can get a better leverage factor with convertible debentures.
Since most convertible bonds sell at or above the equivalent
value of the shares under option, this creates an unfavorable
price disparity and therefore precludes the use of "built in"
leverage as can be found with common stock warrants.

■^Brigham,
op. cit., 329.

But an

"An Analysis of Convertible Debentures, "

31
artificial leverage factor is created by the Federal Reserve
System through its margin requirements.

As of April 21,

1972, an individual may purchase convertible debt with a
cash payment of only one-half of the total cost.

This

financing of 50 per cent of the total price is compared to a
maximum financing of 45 per cent of the cost in a stock
purchase.
If an investor purchases ten $1,000 bonds

(at par)

convertible into ten shares of common stock each, he need
only "put up" $5,000 in cash.

On the other hand if another

investor purchased 100 shares of stock selling at $100 per
share he would have to pay a minimum of $5,500 in cash when
the sale was consummated.

Assuming the stock rises 10 per

cent and then it is sold, the second investor will show a
profit of about 15 per cent

(before interest and taxes).

Assuming the bond holder converts and sells his stock, he
will show a profit of 19

per cent

Since the taxes would be

the same and the interest differ

ential would be nominal,

the investor who purchased the bond

initially will have earned a

(before interest and taxes).

greater return on the original

cash invested.
Antidulition Clause
Since speculation through the conversion aspect is
probably the main reason for the success of these debentures,

1^
JThese figures represent the margin requirements as
set by Regulation T of the Federal Reserve Act.
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one other provision should be mentioned here— the anti
dilution clause.

This factor protects the original invest

ment in its relation to the common stock equity outstanding
against events such as stock splits, dividends,
;t low prices.

and issuances

Therefore some of the uncertainties the

investor must face are reduced during the period of time the
convertible debt is outstanding.
Fewer Restrictions on Purchase
The fact that the issuing company is actually placing
bonds on the market will attract some institutional buyers
who for one reason or another are prohibited from purchasing
common stock.

By purchasing a convertible bond, the institu

tion usually will be able to benefit from an increasing
market for either stock or bonds.

Since these markets

usually work opposite each o t h e r , ^ versatility would be a
definite reason for purchasing convertible bonds.

The

widening of the potential market would also be an advantage
to the issuing company.
WARRANTS vs. CONVERTIBLE DEBT
The same economic conditions led to a rebirth of both
detachable warrants and the conversion privilege in associa
tion with debt securities.

The reactivation of these

^ J e r o m e B. Cohen and Edward D. Zinbarg, investment
Analysis and Portfolio Management (Homewood: Dow JonesIrwin, Inc., 1967), p. 43.
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financial instruments, under similar conditions
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and with

each having a like effect on corporate capital, has led to a
great deal of confusion in the accounting profession.

Since

these similarities are combined with the inherent difference
of separability from the basic debt instrument, many account
ants have come to the conclusion that each should be accounted
for under different procedures.
The problem is that these instruments are not judged
separately upon their inherent characteristics, but rather,
upon a comparison of these characteristics.

Usually the

writer will attempt to determine the proper accounting pro
cedures for whichever one he feels is more evident

(because

of separability this is usually warrants) and then imputes
the accounting procedures for the other based upon whether
he sees a difference or similarity between the two.

In

essence the Board has taken this position and decreed that
warrants should be valued when issued in conjunction with
lfi
debt, but not so for the conversion feature. °

The line of reasoning behind this type of thinking
is that the detachable warrants and the debt securities are
two separate instruments,

and, therefore, upon issuance

l^In each case the decreasing attractiveness of pure
debt securities was a major factor in the phenominal growth
of these financial instruments.
^ A c c o u n t i n g
principles Board, Accounting Principles
Board Opinion Number 14; Accounting for Convertible Debt
and Debt Issued with Stock Purchase Warrants (New Y o r k :
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1969).
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there is an obvious package the buyer is purchasing.

The

separability combined with the separate market that develops
for the warrants leads to the natural conclusion of different
accounting for each.

However,

there is no separate market

for the conversion feature, therefore, many accountants have
taken the position that there should not be an allocation of
value to this feature when the bonds are issued.
The subject of convertible debt actually came up
during a discussion of warrants at a meeting of the APB, and
since that time there has been much confusion as to the true
nature of the conversion privilege.

While the object of this

study is to determine the proper accounting procedures that
should be followed for convertible debt, warrants are con
tinually being brought into prominence in current literature,
thus it becomes necessary to briefly examine this type of
financial instrument.
Purpose of Warrants
The warrant differs mainly from the conversion option
in two significant aspects:
instrument
and

(1) separability from the debt

(nondetachable warrants are not considered here)

(2) usually the warrant plus a payment of cash is neces

sary to obtain the common stock.

Like convertible debt,

warrants were used in the past as an added inducement to make
the security marketable.

It compensated for a lower interest

rate or a low credit rating and was used where the issuer was
primarily interested in debt financing.
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. . . The terms oi the warrants— i.e., the number
issued, the period over which they may be exercised
and the relationship between exercise price and the
market price of the related stock at date of issue—
are generally influenced by the desire of a successful
debt financing rather than to make the warrant issue,
itself, attractive and are limited to those considered
necessary for that purpose.17
Unlike convertible debt, warrants have hardly changed
from their original use and still represent a provision of a
debt issue.

John Raben points out that there must be an

inherent difference between warrants and the conversion
privilege because there were very few of the former issued
in 1966-67, whereas there were a considerable quantity of
issuances of convertible debt

(see Table 1, page 4).

The

reasoning here is that if there were no differences between
1Q

the two, there would not be such extreme variations in use. °
Winthrop Lenz further differentiates between the two by
stating that warrants are used by second- and third-rate
companies and second- and third-rate underwriters.

19

l^Draft A of the position taken by the APB during
the early discussions of the suspension of paragraphs 8 and
9 of Opinion No. 1 0 . p. 4.
(The actual draft was circulated
among the members of the subcommittee on convertible securi
ties in the form of a memorandum.)
^ S u m m a r y of the discussion at the convertible
security subcommittee meeting on October 13, 1967.
(This is
part of a summary circulated among the members of the APB.
Mr. Raben was a representative from Sullivan & Cromwell.)
^ I b i d . , Mr. Lenz was the representative from Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith.
A different view was held
by a representative from M o o d y ’s Investors Service at a con
vertible securities subcommittee meeting on August 22, 1968.
He felt that since warrants are being used in acquisitions
there is somewhat of a tendency to consider them as part of
an overall equity financing.
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Obviously such a castigation can not apply to convertible
debt.
. . . [In addition,] the two types of issues are
not often used to achieve the same purpose.
Con
vertible securities are of course very common and in
many, if not most, instances are in essence an issue
of common stock in a form more attractive to investors,
while the issuance of debt with warrants is rela
tively rare for large companies and is largely confined
to special situations.20
The Tax Viewpoint
The Internal Revenue Service has also recognized the
difference between these two types of securities in that they
allow the amortization of a discount on bonds due to debt
warrants as additional interest, but not so with convertible
securities,

i.e., the amortization of the resulting discount

is not an acceptable deduction. 3 1
Flexibility
While the conversion privilege offers some flexibility
to the issuing corporation, the use of warrants places the
corporation at the "mercy" of the holders of the securities.
Management can not force the use of warrants nor call them in
and retire them.

A possible exception would exist for

warrants with a limited life, but during that time management

^ P o s i t i o n Paper submitted to the APB by the United
Aircraft Corporation prior to a meeting between the subcom
mittee on convertible securities and "various interested
parties." The meeting was held on October 13, 1967, p. 1.
^ Internal Revenue Code Regulations 1.1232-3(b)(2)
(i) , (ii) •
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is virtually helpless to encourage the exercise of the war
rants.

This can create problems for the management of the

issuing company because outstanding warrants reduce borrowing
capacity while the potential equity dilution reduces the
attractiveness of future common stock issues.
Other Differences
The investor also recognizes other differences
between these two types of securities.

Warrants are more

attractive to the speculator because they represent a smaller
capital investment.

In addition,

institutional investors who

are prohibited from buying stock can purchase convertible
debentures, but not warrants.
Therefore it can easily be seen that there is a
definite difference between debt with warrants and convertible
debt.^

This difference is so apparent that it has caused

many accountants to arbitrarily argue that the two should
not be accounted for in the same manner.

Since it is easier

to agree that warrants and the related debt securities
should be separate than for the conversion feature and the
related debt instrument, many accountants have accepted
allocation for warrants but not for the conversion feature.
The logic of accounting for convertible debt as its
nature indicates has been disregarded and the simpler
approach that it is different from bonds with warrants and,

22jn addition to the preceding arguments, an over
whelming majority of the correspondence between the APB and
non-Board members supports this approach.
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therefore,

should be accounted for differently is prevalent.

Now that the two securities have been differentiated,

this

study will investigate the accounting for convertible debt
on its inherent characteristics and the substance of the
transaction— not merely its legal form.
BACKGROUND OF THE SITUATION LEADING
TO APB OPINION NUMBER 14
The AICPA was reorganized in 1959 in order to provide
for the advancement of a written code to take the place of
the vague and often misunderstood concept of generally
accepted accounting principles.

The Accounting Principles

Board was promulgated by a Special Committee on Research
Program in a report issued in late 1958, and adopted by the
Institute in early 1 9 5 9 . ^
. . . One of the objectives of the reorganization
was to be able to attack the broad problems of financial
accounting at four levels:
(1) the establishment of
basic postulates; (2) the establishment of broad princi
ples; (3) the setting up of rules or other guides for
the application of principles in specific situations;
and (4) research. . . .24
Inherent in these objectives is the need for narrowing
the areas in which alternative procedures are acceptable.
addition,

the official pronouncements of the Board are

supposed to be based on a thorough researching of the topic

2 2 "Report to Council of the Special Committee on
Research Program," Journal of Accountancy, CVI (December,
1958), 62-68.
24Elden S. Hendriksen, Accounting Theory
Homewood:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1970), p. 73.

(rev. ed.;

In
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and the final position should reflect a logical extension of
the research.

The force of these Opinions lies in the fact

that they are assumed to have "substantial authoritative
support," and thus material deviations must be noted in the
auditor's opinion or in footnotes to the financial statements.
APB Acceptance v s . General Acceptance
To date the Board has had some problems achieving
the limitation of alternative procedures— probably their most
glaring defeat lies in Opinions No. 2

and 4 ° (these deal

specifically with the question of accounting for the invest
ment credit).

Originally the Board required the credit to

be recognized over the life of the asset, but as a result of
considerable pressure and by open violation by some of the
national CPA firms, the Board backtracked on its original
decision and allowed the use of an alternative method which
recognized the full benefit of the credit in the year of
incurrence.
This was a clear example of a violation of the origi
nal charge to the APB.

The merits and demerits of either

approach are not of importance here; but rather, the fact

^ A c c o u n t i n g Principles Board, Accounting Principles
Board Opinion Number 2; Accounting for the "Investment
Credit" (New York;
American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, 1962).
^ A c c o u n t i n g Principles Board, Accounting Principles
Board Opinion Number 4: Accounting for the "investment
Credit" (New York;
American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, 1964).
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that the first real authoritative statement issued by the
Board led to the creation of another acceptable alternative
accounting procedure.

An attempt to eliminate the flow

through method in the Opinion on accounting for income tax
was again thwarted by the general membership of the institute.
While the requirement to allocate the investment credit over
the life of the asset was included in the exposure draft, it
never appeared in the formal version of the Opinion.

Thus

it seems the Board is "allowed" to "require" certain pro
cedures as long as they are consistent with current practice
or are favored by the practitioners.

Such a pragmatic

approach to accounting theory will continue to stifle the
development of a broad theoretical base for accounting
thought.^

Actually this whole problem can be summarized as

a lack of distinction between acceptance by the Board and
general acceptance of accounting principles.

This is sub

stantiated by the following statements included in each

^ statement No. 4 issued by the APB is a nonauthoritative codification such as the type the Board was originally
charged to create, but the problem lies in the data presented.
As stated in the body of the Statement (p. 2) "It [the State
ment] identifies and organizes ideas that for the most part
are already accepted."
In other words, a codification of
current practice.
And as summarized by George Catlett in
his dissent (p. 105) " . . . this statement— by providing a
conceptual basis for, and by giving authoritative status to,
current accounting practices— will represent an unfortunate
deterrent to the achievement of improvements in practice."
See Accounting Principles Board, Accounting Principles Board
Statement Number 4: Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles
Underlying Financial Statements of Business Enterprises (New
York: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
1970).
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Opinion since 1965 in a concluding section entitled
"Notes."2®
(a) "generally accepted accounting principles"
are those principles which have substantial authori
tative support.
(b) Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board
constitute "substantial authoritative support,"
(c) "Substantial authoritative support" can
exist for accounting principles that differ from
Opinions of the Accounting Principles B o a r d . ^
[Italics not in the original.]
It must also be remembered that any departure from a
Board Opinion must be disclosed ". . . i n

footnotes to the

financial statements or in independent auditors' reports when
the effect of this departure on the financial statements is
material.This

really means that if an alternative has

"substantial authoritative support" it is acceptable to
follow it, but if the Board has approved another approach
this fact must be disclosed in the statements.

Here the

Institute has formally acknowledged the possible difference
between a procedure acceptable to the APB

(a position

declared to have "substantial authoritative support") and
another acceptable to the practitioners and/or their clients.
Situations such as this are the primary reason for
the lack of success on the part of the APB to substantially

28y/hile the exact wording is not still used, the
basic implication is there, the only difference is that the
Board has chosen to somewhat disguise it.
^ A c c o u n t i n g Principles Board, Opinion No. 1 4 . op.
cit., p. 211.
30Ib i d ., p. 212.
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lessen the quantity of alternatives currently acceptable.
Patrick Kemp draws the following conclusions as the result
of the current predicament:
. . . The AICPA council could not have designed a
more effective device for undermining the confidence
of the public in financial statements and in the
reports of CPAs on these statements if it had tried to
do sol 31
Opinion Number 10
Thus the stage is set for the issuance of Opinion
No. 10.

32

Paragraphs 8 and 9 required the allocation of

value to the conversion feature upon issuance of convertible
debt and to warrants issued in conjunction with debt securi
ties .
Originally the Board had decided to include warrants
and earnings per share as one issue; but the quantity of
material in these areas proved to be an unworkable task, and
therefore, they were divided into two separate topics.

The

actual allocation prescribed in Opinion No. 10 was originally
intended for use in accounting for bonds with detachable
warrants.

Then the question of convertible debt was raised

at a Board meeting,

and after some discussion it seemed

logical to use the same procedures in accounting for both

31patrick S. Kemp, "The Authority of the Accounting
Principles Board," The Accounting Review. LX (October, 1965),
786-87.
^ A c c o u n t i n g Principles Board, Accounting Principles
Board Opinion Number 10: Omnibus Opinion— 1966 (New Y o r k :
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1966).
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types of instruments.

At that time there was no indication

that any serious problems would result.

The growth of the

economy and the financial markets historically had produced
some discounts on the "investment value" of convertible debt,
but there was no evidence that would suggest the large dis
counts that resulted from the actual application of the
prescribed procedures.
The usual predraft exposure process and the actual
exposure draft produced no reasonable concern over the allo
cation procedures or the results produced thereby.

The few

unfavorable comments that were received dealt with disap
proval of "as if accounting,"

but there was no indication

of any widespread dissatisfaction.

In fact the Securities

and Exchange Commission approved of the procedures as pre
scribed by the

O p i n i o n .

^3

Thus Opinion No. 10 became effective for fiscal
periods beginning after December 31, 1966.

The intent of

the Board in using the omnibus type of Opinion

(the type

used for Opinion No. 10) was to consider several items that
are not of the nature that would necessitate a separate
Opinion and were not controversal— and this seemed, at the
time, that type of topic.
Opinion Number 12
The problems began when the provisions of the Opinion

^ R o b e r t n . Sempier, Assistant Administrative Direc
tor, Accounting Principles Board, private interview held
during visit to the AICPA offices in New York, November 25,
1970.
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were applied to specific situations.

Rumblings of disfavor

from the Investment Bankers Association

(IBA), some lawyers,

and corporate officials then began to create a wave of disap'
proval.

This resistance reached a considerable level when

the financial market began to reflect the tremendous infla
tionary spiral then present in the economy.

No longer was

the discount recognized by allocation an insignificant
amount, and the accounting began to reflect the charge of an
item that was not deductible for tax purposes, thus creating
a "double deduction" in the determination of net income.
In addition some members of the APB led by George
Catlett began to apply pressure on the other members to
approve a resolution to reconsider the original

p o s i t i o n .

^4

After several attempts to have a review of the Opinion
passed, the Board agreed in August, 1967, to restudy the
situation.

By that time the IBA had organized their resis

tance and presented a considerable wealth of information
attacking allocation.

At the same time the investment

bankers, whose cooperation and help was needed to determine
the amount of the discount, were reluctantly supplying the
necessary data, and their attitude created considerable con
cern among the practitioners.

This plus the significant

difference between the expected discounts and those
resulting from the actual application of the provision for

August,

^^Letters written by George Catlett during May and
1967, and distributed to the members of the APB.
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allocation, and the other internal and external pressures
exerted on the Board finally led to the suspension of the
H

allocation provision in December,

1967.

This was before

Opinion No. 10 came into effect.

Unless earlier application

was instituted by a company or its auditors, the earliest
published reports that would have had to use allocation
would have been those dated December 31, 1968.
At the time of the issuance of Opinion No. 10 there
was no opposition or qualifications by any of the members of
the Board that were considered substantial enough to pub
lish with the Opinion and the IBA and others now complaining
had no comments on the exposure draft.

Thus it would have

seemed that, at least accounting wise, there was no serious
opposition to the theoretical aspects of allocation of value
to the conversion feature of convertible debt.
After the Board agreed to restudy the situation
there was still considerable disagreement as to exactly what
should be done with the allocation provision in Opinion No.
10.

A subcommittee formed to review this matter could reach

no agreement as to the method of handling the situation.
The positions of the members of the subcommittee covered a
complete spectrum from leaving the Opinion as it was to a
complete suspension of the related provisions until all

■^Accounting Principles Board, Accounting Principles
Board Opinion Number 12: Omnibus Opinion— 1967 (New Y o r k :
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1967),
pp. 190-91.
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aspects of the situation could be considered.

36

In addition,

some members of the Board raised the problem of a retroactive
Opinion when and if a solution was reached.

Thus the "new"

decision of the Board could be carried back to the effective
date of the original Opinion.
The Board finally voted for " . . .

temporarily sus

pending the effectiveness of paragraphs 8 and 9 of Opinion
No. 10 retroactively to their effective date."

37

Allocation

was still considered to be an acceptable practice and the
door was left open for the retroactive application of a
future Opinion on this topic.

In addition, the Board chose

to require a dual presentation of earnings per share reflec
ting the effect of conversion of those securities whose
accounting would have been affected by paragraphs 8 and 9 of
Opinion No. 10.

This additional disclosure applied only to

those companies who chose not to follow the original
Opinion.38

It seems here that the Board felt a definite

need to forewarn the statement reader of the possible effects
of convertible debt.

This is further emphasized by the fact

that disclosure of earnings per share was only "strongly
recommended" in Opinion No. 9, whereas it was required

(in

certain instances) by Opinion No. 12.

38Letter dated October 17, 1967, for P. L. Defliese,
chairman, to the members of the subcommittee set up to
examine the situation that developed after the issuance of
Opinion No. 1 0 .
37Accounting Principles Board, Opinion No. 1 2 . op.
cit., p. 191.
38Ibid., pp. 191-93.
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The exposure draft of Opinion No. 12 had a limited
distribution.

The usual broad circulation was not followed.

In general only those who were underwriters of convertible
debentures and debentures with warrants and those who com
mented on Opinion No. 10 received copies of the draft.
There was considerable dissatisfaction with the warning of a
possible retroactive Opinion issued in the future and the
apparent discrimination upon those companies issuing con
vertible debt through the required disclosure in earnings per
share.

Still, the Opinion was issued, but this time with

some dissension.
Opinion Number 14
In an attempt to gather more information on the
allocation topic, the subcommittee,

formed to study the data

already gathered and to begin working on a new Opinion,
arranged for a symposium on convertible debt and earnings
per share to take place on January 14, 1969.
While no minutes were kept at the symposium, the
position papers
meeting)

(submitted by each participant prior to the

and the follow-up letters sent in by those attending

the conference provided the subcommittee with a wealth of

3% h e comments of the members of the Board published
with the Opinion ranged all the way from concurrence with
publication, but disagreement with certain paragraphs, to
complete dissension.
The questions raised were those of the
possibility of retroactive application of a future Opinion
and the earnings per share disclosure.
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material on the

t o p i c s .

issued Opinion No.

14

Later, in March,

1969,

the Board

which required allocation of the issue

price between bonds and detachable warrants, but not for
convertible bonds.

The symposium mentioned above was con

ducted after the issuance of the exposure draft of Opinion
No.

12,

and it seemed to reinforce the position taken by the

Board which was expressed in Opinion No.

14.

SUMMARY
As indicated in Chapter 1, the increase in the use
of convertible debt over the past seven years has been
phenomenal.

An examination of the advantages this type of

financing has,

for both the issuer and the investor, clearly

indicate the reasons for its popularity.

From the point of

view of the issuing company there are two major considera
tions:

(1) a reduction in the coupon interest rate and

(2)

the possible issuance of equity capital on a deferred basis.
Convertible bonds usually carry a stated interest
rate that is approximately one-half to one per cent

(or in

some instances as much as several points) below that of
similar debt without the conversion feature.

When this

difference is approximately a percentage point or more, the
savings to the issuing company could be quite substantial.
However, a recent trend has been developing whereby the

4®The information supplied by these reports and the
follow-up letters will be used in later chapters involved
in the discussion of the allocation concept.
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interest saving is considered secondary to the issuer, and
the delayed issuance of equity capital has become the primary
reason for using convertible debt.

Several independent

studies have verified the existence of this trend, and it
seems the decision of management to use convertible debt
must,

at a minimum,

indicate some desire to raise common

equity capital.
Since most conversion prices are set approximately
15-20 per cent above the market value of the stock at the
time the bonds are issued, the effect of using convertible
debt

(if converted) would be to obtain more funds on a per

share basis than if the stock had been issued instead of the
bonds.

in addition, by wisely setting the conversion rate,

and by inclusion of a call feature, management can also have
more flexibility in determining the capital structure.
The investor is assumed to have a more secure posi
tion with convertible debt than many other forms of invest
ment.

If the stock market declines, the investment value of

the bonds as straight debt forms a lower level for the market
value of these securities.

On the other hand, if the stock

market rises, the conversion feature increases in value and
the investor can convert and realize a profit on the stock
if he elects to sell.
The Federal Reserve System also currently requires a
lower down payment on the purchase of convertible bonds than
is required for common stock.

This allows the sophisticated

investor more leverage and a greater return on his investment.
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Since most of these securities include an anti-dilution
clause in the indenture,

additional protection is afforded

the investor.
As a result of these advantages it is easy to under
stand the recent surge in the use of convertible debt and
the importance it has as a financial instrument.
Like convertible bonds, debt issued with warrants
has also become a very popular method of obtaining capital.
The similarities between these two instruments have led to a
considerable amount of confusion, however, a close examina
tion of these securities clearly indicates an inherent dif
ference that must be understood before the proper accounting
procedures for either can be determined.
Warrants are generally used as support for a success
ful debt issue rather than as a means of obtaining equity
capital.

The terms of the agreement are specifically devised

with this intent, and when this is combined with the fact
that detachable warrants usually develop a market separate
from the bonds,

it is difficult to understand how they can

be confused with the conversion feature.

However, confusion

does exist, and when it is combined with the separability
factor

(a feature absent from convertible debt), many

accountants assume that warrants should be valued and the
conversion feature should not.

Additional support for this

position is usually found in the tax treatment which allows
a deduction for the amortization of a discount created by
valuing warrants, whereas, there is no such provision for a
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discount resulting from valuing the conversion option.
The background of the accounting treatment of con
vertible debt involves a conflict between the Board and some
outside pressure groups.

Originally the APB required alloca

tion of value to the conversion feature, but as a result of
the lack of "general acceptance" on the part of the profes
sion, the provision was suspended before its effective date.
Thus, before there was an extensive use of the allocation
procedures they were temporarily suspended.

This action

drastically limited the ability of the members of the Board
to study the actual effect of the allocation requirement on
the financial statements of companies with convertible debt.
In place of empirical evidence the Board relied on
letters,

statements of the opinions of various groups, and

other information received from "interested parties."

This

information plus the results of a symposium held in January,
1969, provided the support for the issuance of a third
Opinion dealing with convertible debt, but this time alloca
tion was deemed unacceptable.
The relevance of these facts to this study will be
contained in future chapters, however, before the question
of accounting for convertible debt is examined,

it is

imperative that a workable concept of a liability be estab
lished .

Chapter 3
THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF LIABILITIES
The lack of theoretical work^ that is currently
being done in the area of liability accounting results,
part,

in

from the clash between the legal and the economic

approach.

Due to the very nature of the information which

accounting must deal with, each of these approaches has had
some influence in the development of accounting theory.
Keller and Zeff have even gone so far as to label the rela
tionship between the legal and economic approach as
schizophrenic.

However problematical this predicament may

be, there has been some progress in recent years in expanding
the particular situation under review.

But, until an inde

pendent theory of liabilities is developed, the Board or any
other accounting authority will have to use "brush fire"
techniques when specific problems arise.
In order to properly account for convertible debt it
must first be determined whether the security represents a

^-A review of the current literature will clearly
exhibit the lack of writing on this area in that there are
only a very few articles written in this area in the last
five years.
^Thomas F. Keller and Stephen A. Zeff, eds.. Finan
cial Accounting Theory II:
issues and Controversies (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969), p. 365.
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hybrid combination of various covenants

(part liability and

part equity) or basically a debt instrument
only).

(a liability

This can be resolved only by a thorough examination

of the concept of a liability.
Since the convertible debt problem cannot be properly
studied without a complete analysis of the underlying aspects,
it is the purpose of this chapter to examine the theoretical
factors involved and to use these to develop a definition of
a liability that would help to alleviate some of the prob
lems that exist in this area.

Once this has been done, the

question of the measurement of liabilities can be discussed.
APPROACHES TO CORPORATE EQUITY
Practically all of the current writings on convert
ible debt fail to examine the concept of a liability, and
consequently attempt to build upon a weak or nonexistent
foundation.

As a result, the discussions presented in the

literature by the authors do not penetrate the surface of
the problem,

instead, they merely shuffle the various argu

ments in a different order or present them from a slightly
different point of view.

Due to this lack of an in-depth

study of the liability aspect, there is a noticeable
deficiency in examining the basic theory behind this subject.
Nowhere has any one attempted to present an analysis of the
real problem,

i.e., the conflict between the entity and the

proprietary approaches to corporate equity.

For herein lies

the real reason for the lack of agreement upon procedures for
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accounting for convertible debt.

The arguments usually pre

sented are superficial to this primary issue, and for some
reason many of the theorists and practitioners have chosen
to ignore this area.
In order to develop a definition of a liability that
will be relevant to the problem of convertible debt it is
important that a sharp distinction be made between the con
cept of a liability and owners' equity.

In an attempt to

accomplish this task, a review of the basic accounting theory
in this area is necessary.
Entity Theory
The entity theory centers on the separate existence
the firm has apart from the owners and other equity holders.
The underlying basis for this approach can easily be seen
through the equality that exists between assets and equities
(more formally, 2A = 2L + 2 0 E ) .

The basic difference this

approach doer recognize between liabilities and stockholders'
equity is that the former can be directly measured whereas
stockholders' equity represents " . . .
stockholders [as]

the rights of the

. . . measured by the valuation of assets

originally invested plus the valuation of reinvested earnings
and subsequent revaluations.

But the rights of the stock

holders to receive dividends and share in net assets upon
liquidation are rights as equity holders rather than owners
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of the specific assets."

3

The entity concept focuses the attention of the
accountant upon the activities of the enterprise as a whole,
in fact, Paton and Littleton felt that

. . i t has become

almost axiomatic that the business accounts and statements
are those of the entity rather than those of the proprietor,
partners,

investors, or other parties or groups concerned.

This places an artificial screen between the owners and the
firm that is not recognized at law for all forms of business
activity.

There is, of course, limited liability

and the

separation of ownership and management for most large corpora
tions, but it does not hold true for small business organiza
tions— partnerships and proprietorships

Thus the owner is

viewed as a supplier of funds in almost the same terms as a
creditor with the matter of repayment being dependent upon
the proprietor's own wish rather than by any accounting or
legal restriction.
In this matter of use of the entity concept, Gilman
offers a test of applicability— the maintenance of double

^Eldon S. Hendriksen, Accounting Theory
Homewood:
Richard D. Irwin, 1970), p. 498.

(rev. ed.;

Sf. A. Paton and A. C. Littleton, An Introduction to
Corporate Accounting Standards (Iowa City: University of
Iowa College of Business Administration, 1940), p. 8.
^This distinction may not be present for all corpora
tions because in actual practice many owners of small cor
porations and closed corporations are forced to include
restrictive covenants in loan and other agreements that
effectively avert such a limitation.
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entry records.
endeavor

Here he suggests that if any form of business

(no matter how simple) keeps a separate set of

double entry records, there is an implied entity approach.^
While this is probably too inclusive for practical purposes,
the entity approach to the equity of an organization is
deeply ingrained in accounting thought.

Examples can be

found almost everywhere.

The use of cost as a valuation for
7
assets is a natural extension of this approach.
In addition, the entity concept emphasizes an
analysis of the detail items that constitute net income.
This approach to periodic earnings is an alternative to the
proprietary theory which uses the change in net worth

(net

of proprietary adjustments) over the period as the basic
measuring device.

There are many other specific applications

of the entity concept, but these serve as prime examples of
the tendency of the AICPA to follow the entity approach.
The very emphasis of the AICPA on the selection of
an inventory costing method that best measures income is an
overt action supporting the entity theory.

But even the

Institute must yield to the existence of an opposite approach
to the equity of an organization.

Here the obvious lack of

^Gilman also goes as far as challenging Paton in his
statement regarding the nonapplicability of the "artificial
personality" of a separate entity for a pop vendor at a
football game.
See Stephen Gilman, Accounting Concepts of
Profit (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1939), p. 53.
7Hendriksen, op. cit., p. 500.
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Q

an approval of LIFO over FIFO,

the importance placed on the

virtual all-inclusive income approach to income in Opinion
No. 9

Q

and the importance placed on earnings per share

(Opinion No. 15)^® all give recognition to the proprietary
point of view.
Proprietary Theory
The proprietary approach to equity places the owner
at the center or hub of all enterprise activities.

Every

thing is viewed in light of its ultimate effect upon owners'
(proprietors') equity.
as the 2A - £L = OE.

In equation form this is summarized
Under this approach to enterprise

equity the separation of the individual items of revenue and
expense have no particular relevance as such, instead, they
merely stand as increases or decreases in proprietorship not
involving proprietary investment or withdrawals.

Thus the

balance sheet and not the income statement becomes the most
important single financial statement.
The very computation of earnings per share implies
the importance of the owners to the organization and the fact

®Glenn A. Welsch, Charles T. Zlatkovich and John
Arch White, Intermediate Accounting (3rded.; Homewood:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1972), p. 14.
^Accounting Principles Board, Accounting Principles
Board Opinion Number 9: Reporting the Results of Operations
(New York:
American Institute of Certified Public Account
ants, 1966).
l°Accounting Principles Board, Accounting Principles
Board Opinion Number 15: Earnings Per Share (New Y o r k :
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1969).
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that the business functions for the proprietor(s).

unlike

the entity approach, the proprietary theory considers pay
ments to creditors in the form of interest and taxes as
expenses rather than a distribution of profits.
the entity theory is dominant in accounting,
means exclusive.
quite influential.

Thus while

it is by no

Actually a proprietary approach has been
in addition to those areas previously

mentioned, the equity method of recording investments in
consolidated subsidiaries is supported by this approach.
The all-inclusive method of measuring income centers on the
change in net worth from period to period
capital

transactions).

This concentration on the

result as opposed to the detail
.include

(exclusive of
final net

causes of the change would

all sources of revenues and expenses.
The theoretical problem

that inhibits the

acceptance

of a proprietary approach to equity theory lies in the fact
that it is best suited for a partnership or a sole proprietor
ship form of economic organization.

This results from the

common law view of these organizations and the relationship
between management and ownership.

The close adherence to

the proprietary theory in these types of organizations can
easily be seen by the closing entries whereby all items of
revenue or expense, gain or loss are transferred directly to
the personal equity account of each owner.

The Internal

Revenue Code also fosters a similar approach in taxing the
income of a proprietorship and a partnership as opposed to
that of a corporation.
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In order to realistically view a corporation in terms
of the proprietary theory one must look past the artificial
veneer of the corporate structure and concentrate on the
equity of the stockholders.

Under this circumstance the

proprietary approach to the equity structure of a corporation
would be reasonable.

But even if this is accomplished it is

still difficult for many theorists to accept the results and
their implied circumvention of a legal entity.
Other Equity Theories
Despite the several major areas in which the pro
prietary theory has current recognition, the entity theory
is by far the most influential for corporate accounting.
This results from the fact that the latter is more closely
related to the economic organizational aspects of the cor
poration.

Add to this the growth in size and complexity of

the modern corporation and it is easy to see how the popu
larity of the entity theory developed.

However, the emphasis

on the corporate form of organization is not a limiting
factor because the entity approach is also dominant in
general proprietorship and partnership accounting.
While the two preceding theories of accounting
equities are the dominating force behind current accounting
theory, there are several others that deserve brief men
tion."^

Hendriksen refers to one of these, the residual

^ A l l of these theories are discussed in more detail
in Hendriksen's book on accounting theory.
See Hendriksen,
Accounting Theory, op. cit., Chapter 17.
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equity theory,

as a subdivision of the entity theory.

The

basic distinction is that under the former all investors
other than capital stockholders are thought of as outsiders
as opposed to all investors being outsiders under the pure
entity approach.

The overall objective here is to provide

information for common stockholders to use in making investment decisions.

12

The opposite of such a narrow approach to equity is
the enterprise theory.

Here the role of the corporation is

viewed as a social institution with all of society as the
recipient of the benefits of the organization.

This, of

course, extends the span of the reporting responsibility of
management,

and to a great extent offers a picture of the

trend in corporate theory.

Current social problems such as

wage negotiations and the effects of price changes are
relevant in this approach to the corporate equity.

The

approach to income is that of a value-added concept.

Thus

economic theory is carried to its fullest extent in that
income is the excess of the total value of goods and services
produced over the value of the goods and services acquired
(including dividends,

interest, and taxes).

The idea of stewardship is carried to its fullest
extent in the commander theory as proposed by G o l d b e r g . ^
Any thought of ownership is abandoned and the role of

12I b i d ., p. 501.
^ L o u i s Goldberg, An Inquiry into the Nature of
Accounting (Iowa City:
American Accounting Association,

1965).
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accounting is to report what management has done with the
assets entrusted to them.
sized.

Thus the control aspect is empha

This is the approach taken in cost accounting and as

such is greatly emphasized for internal purposes, but there
has been little or no acceptance of the commander theory for
external reporting.
Outside of the entity and proprietary theories, the
fund theory probably has achieved the greatest acceptance
for external reporting, while limited to governmental and
other nonprofit institutions.

Vatter defined a fund as

". . . a collection of service potentials that have been
brought together for some functional purpose— administrative,
entrepreneurial, or s o c i a l . H e

further defines equity as

". . . restrictions that apply to the assets in the fund,
which therefore condition the operations of the fund as
dictated by the management."^-5

Corporate accounting also

has been influenced somewhat by this approach, witness the
accounting for branches, estates, trusts, and sinking funds.
Here as in all aspects of fund accounting income plays a sub
ordinate role to maintenance of capital.

^^William J. Vatter, The Fund Theory of Accounting
and Its Implications for Financial Reports (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1947), pp. 18-19.
15Ibid., p. 19.
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EFFECTS OF EQUITY THEORIES
Since the central focus of this study is based upon
accounting for the issuance of convertible debt, the various
approaches to corporate equity are important in their ulti
mate effect on the concept of a liability.

The major reason

for considering the allocation of value to the conversion
feature is for a proper accounting for both the liability and
the equity elements involved.

Therefore these concepts will

be explored under each theory in order to determine which
best fits the needs of this study.
Entity Theory
The entity theory does recognize the existence of
liabilities as apart from owners' equity, but each is viewed
as a claim against the entity and its assets.

This can

easily be seen by an illustration related to the topic of
this study.

Suppose $100,000 of convertible bonds were

issued for $102,000.

The bonds have a ten-year life and can

be converted into 1,500 shares of $50 par common stock.

Five

years from the date of issuance the bonds are converted by
all of the debt holders.

Accordingly, omitting any reference

to the valuation of the conversion feature, and using cur
rently acceptable procedures for accounting for convertible
debt, under the entity theory the following entry normally
would be made:
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Bonds Payable....................
100,000
Premium on Bonds Payable . . . .
1,000
Common Stock ..........................
Premium on Common Stock...............

75,000
26,000

The influence of the entity theory can be seen in
that the change from creditor to owner equity has no effect
on the total of the equity side of the balance sheet nor the
retained earnings.

The transaction is simply viewed as a

switch of types of equity,

it matters not whether the item

is a part of owners' equity or creditors' equity.

Thus

while there is a concept of a liability in connection with
the entity theory, there is no real distinction between it
and owners' equity.

This seems to be the path chosen by the

APB in Opinion No. 14.

16

The decision not to require alloca

tion of value to the conversion privilege is obviously based,
in theory, on the entity concept.

Since under this approach

the corporation does not recognize any real distinction
between the sources of funds, there is no need to consider
the possibility of a package deal upon the issuance of con
vertible debt.

It would seem though that even allowing for

the inherent differences between warrants and the conversion
feature, the same logic would hold for bonds issued with
detachable warrants.

17

^ A c c o u n t i n g principles Board, Accounting Principles
Board Opinion Number 14: Accounting for Convertible Debt
and Debt Issued with Stock Purchase Warrants (New Y o r k :
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1969).
■^This approach to recording the issuance of bonds
with detachable warrants was suggested by several accountants
replying to the publication of the Exposure Draft of Opinion
No. 14.
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Proprietary Theory
On the other hand, the proprietary approach would
require the accountant to look at the above transaction in
terms of its effect upon the owners' equity in the business.
Since this theory views liabilities as obligations of the
proprietors,

the conversion of the bonds and the issuance of

the stock would be considered to have separate effects due
to the two different types of equity involved.
Ideally the consideration for the stock should be
measured at the fair market value of the debt instrument
when converted

(if this is not available, the fair market

value of the stock would suffice).

Thus the common stock is

deemed to have been issued at its fair market v alue.

There

fore if the common stock in the preceding example was
selling for $70 per share

(the market value of the bonds

would be approximately 105)

and the conversion transaction

would be recorded in the following manner under the pro
prietary assumption:
Bonds Payable.................... 100,000
Premium on Bonds Payable . . . .
1,000
Loss on Conversion of Bonds. . . 4,000
Common S t o c k.............................. 75,000
Premium on Common Stock.................. 30,000
While the contributed capital of the business is greater,
the total stockholders' equity would be the same as under
the entity concept.

The overall effect amounts to a capi

talization of retained earnings.

The clear distinction

between o w n e r s ' cind creditors1 equity made by the proprietary
theory would require the recording of a loss when stock
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valued at $105,000 is issued upon the conversion of bonds
carried on the books at $101,000.
Other Equity Theories
The funds approach to equity views the situation
similarly to the entity concept.
"the real significance of equities

Using Vatter's definition,
. . . is to be found in

the restrictions they impose upon the asset fund, not the
quasi-legal or equitable considerations that may be involved."

18

Thus there would be no real difference between the

restriction placed on assets by the creditor or owner claims,
and the same accounting procedures as used for the entity
concept would hold true.
The commander theory in emphasizing stewardship
requires the manager

(commander) to account for the net

assets entrusted to him.
. . . A shareholder . . . is not basically con
cerned with the assets or the liabilities of the
company of which he is a member; his concern is with
shareholders’ funds.
He is not basically concerned
with profit but with dividends, not with the rate of
profit to sales but with return on capital.
Any
interest he may evidence in assets, liabilities or
profits is secondary.
The commander, however, is
concerned with all these as a matter of basic and
primary interest for they are the resources over
which he has command or the results of his handling
them. . . .19
As a result, the change in equity relationships brought

lQVatter, The Fund Theory of Accounting and Its
Implications for Financial Reports, op. cit., p. 20.
^^Goldberg, An Inquiry into the Nature of Accounting,
op. c i t ., p. 173.
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about by the conversion would be of importance to the com
mander,

and, in order to fully disclose the results,

an

approach similar to the proprietary theory would probably be
used.

This would best disclose the results of the commander's

decisions and give the stockholders a better measure with
which to evaluate the effectiveness of management.
The enterprise theory approaches the subject from a
point of reference similar to that of the entity theory.
The only basic difference being a much broader concept of
the unit of account— that of the whole society.

20

defines the capital of a corporation as the " . . .

Ladd
stock of

money or monetary equivalents of other resources which has
flowed into the corporation from creditors,

stockholders,

profitable operations, or other s o u r c e s . I n

this view

the enterprise approach would require the same entry for the
conversion of the bonds as does the entity theory, again
making no real distinction between different sources of
c a p ital.

^ H e n d r i k s e n compares the two as follows:
"While in
the entity theory the firm is considered to be a separate
economic unit operated primarily for the benefit of the
equity holders, in the enterprise theory the corporation is
a social institution operated for the benefit of many
interested groups." See Hendriksen, Accounting Theory, op.
cit., p. 502.
2 Dwight R. Ladd, Contemporary Corporate Accounting
and the Public (Homewood:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1963),
p. 52.

67
DEFINITION OF A LIABILITY
The emphasis that has been placed on income measure
ment has created an atmosphere where the income statement
has predominated over the balance sheet.

Probably the most

glaring statement to this effect is presented in Accounting
Research Bulletin No. 43 where the Institute has stated that
the major objective in inventory accounting is the proper
determination of income through the matching process.
addition,

22

In

accounting literature is replete with references

substantiating this hypothesis.

Therefore if this approach

is projected on the accounting for convertible bonds,

the

important element becomes the proper determination of the
annual charge for interest.

Since this figure is determined

partially by the rate of interest stated in the bond indenture
and partially by the amortization of the premium or discount
on the issuance of the bonds,

the valuation of the conversion

feature takes on added significance.

The presence or absence

of a value for this right will directly affect periodic
income.

Thus, the proper valuation procedures should be of

utmost importance to the Board,
liability,

and any definition of a

in order to be acceptable, must allow for the

proper accounting treatment of the proceeds upon issuance of
convertible b o n d s .

22committees on Accounting Procedure and Accounting
Terminology, Accounting Research and Terminology Bulletins
(final ed.; New York: American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, 1961), p. 28.
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The Legal Approach
The epitome of the legalistic approach to liabilities
lies in the definition supplied by Eric Kohler:
. . . liability:
1. An amount owing by one person
(a debtor) to another (a creditor), payable in money,
or in goods or services:
the consequence of an asset
or service received or a loss incurred; particularly,
any debt (a) due or past due (current liability), (b)
due at a specific time in the future (e.g., funded
debt, accrued liability), or (c) due only on failure to
perform a future act (deferred income; contingent
liability).23
For many years this approach, or a similarly restric
tive one, was followed by the accounting profession.^

The

results of this have already been explored in Chapter 1, and
while many current definitions,

if literally followed, would

lead to this same narrow concept, the overall trend is to
use the term "obligation" as the key point of reference.

The

usual definition of this term emphasizes "a binding require
ment as to action;
a promise,

. . . [or] the binding power or force of

law, duty, agreement.

. . ."25

This, of course,

^^Eric L. Kohler, A Dictionary for Accountants (2nd
ed.; Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1957), p. 291.
2^The support behind this type of approach can be
found in an article by Moonitz:
"Lawyers, in the nature of
their profession, must be concerned primarily with what
happens if participants do not live up to their agreements
or, what amounts to the same thing analytically, disagree as
to the meaning of the contracts made.
As a consequence, the
law (to the extent that it is influenced by this attitude)
tends to recognize debts only when a rather rigorous set of
conditions has been satisfied."
See Maurice Moonitz, "The
Changing Concept of Liabilities," The Journal of Accountancy.
CIX (May, 1960), 42.
ary

25c . l . Barnhart, ed., The American College Diction
(New York:
Random House, 1964), p. 835.
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opens the door to any interpretation the reader or writer
wishes.

It can be broad enough to encompass the "normal,"

legalistic approach and the peripheral area necessary to a
workable definition, or it can be limited to the legalistic
approach.
For purposes of this study the former approach will
be taken and a liability will be viewed as an obligation in
the broadest sense of the word.

In addition it will be

defined in terms of the continuity assumption, where the
emphasis will be placed on the future both in terms of con
tinued operation and the use of management expectations in
so far as future plans are concerned.
Characteristics of Liabilities
In order to properly define a liability the general
characteristics or identifiable qualities of these items
must be determined.

Moonitz studied the use of the term

from an issue of Accounting Trends and Techniques and sum
marized the following list of attributes.
1.

A liability involves a future outlay of money,
or an equivalent acceptable to the recipient.

2.

A liability is the result of a transaction of
the past not the future.

3.

The amount of the liability must be the subject
of calculation or close estimation.

4.

Double-entry is taken for g r a n t e d . ^
Wendell Trumbull listed the "leading features" of

liabilities as:

^Moonitz,

op. cit., 44.
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1.

They are nonowner equities, claims,
or asset reservations.

interests

2.

They generally involve future asset expenditures
for their settlement.

3.

They should relate to assets already recognized.2?

Professor Trumbull further concluded that these characteris
tics should be broadly interpreted in order to develop the
proper atmosphere for liability accounting.
Of course every author writing on this subject will
have a separate list of characteristics he feels are the most
significant, but a review of the current literature will show
that they are simply repetitious of those mentioned above.
The wording may vary, but the overall intent is the same.
Therefore,

since these characteristics are essential for a

proper accounting for liabilities, they will be used as the
basis for the definition used in this study.
Definition of a Liability as Used in this Study
Proper accounting for liabilities should specifically
involve the separation of liabilities and owners' equity, and
in addition it should be sufficiently broad to allow for the
proper accounting treatment for the economic substance of
complex corporate transactions.

In order to achieve the

former, the proprietary approach to equity must be accepted
as the dominant force in liability accounting so that the
various elements of corporate equity may be placed in their

2?wendell P. Trumbull, "When Is a Liability?"
Accounting Review. XXXVIII (January, 1963), 46.

The
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proper perspective.

To follow an entity approach would not

preclude a further division of equities into liabilities and
owners' equity, but it would not emphasize the difference
enough to properly segregate each; and without this separa
tion there can never be a proper accounting for the issuance
of convertible debt, or for that matter,

any liability.

Evidence of the insufficiency of the entity approach
is presented in Chapter 1.

During the time when tax alloca

tion, pensions and other problems arose, the Board was
following a strict entity approach in defining liabilities,
and it is clear that this was not sufficient for accounting
for the economic effects of the transactions.

It is hoped

that by using a proprietary approach more emphasis will be
placed on a liability as a separate classification,

and

thereby improve accounting in this area.
Therefore, with the characteristics previously dis
cussed and with an approach that will enable the accountant
to not only properly measure income, but also aid in present
ing a more usable balance s h e e t , a

liability should be

defined as follows:
Liabilities . . . [are] economic obligations of
an enterprise that are recognized and measured in con
formity with generally accepted accounting principles.

^®Many accountants agree that under the limitations
of the balance sheet it has decreased in usefulness.
Moonitz
has even gone so far as to call it a "post-closing trial
balance." Thus in order to aid in presenting the economic
position of the organization, some changes are necessary.
The area of liabilities is just one segment that must be
modernized, but it would be a start in the right direction.
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Liabilities also include certain deferred credits
that are not obligations but that are recognized
and measured in conformity with generally accepted
accounting p r i n c i p l e s . 29
This, of course,

is the definition as proposed by

the APB in Statement No. 4.

It is felt, however, that if a

sufficiently broad interpretation is followed that it will
be satisfactory for the stated purpose.

While this defini

tion has some limitations, there is such a proliferation of
definitions

(practically every text book and other reference

work has developed one) that the addition of another would
not in any way improve accounting in this area.

Since this

particular definition has been published with the approval
of the Board, there is a certain amount of authority already
supporting it, whereas a definition suggested in this study
would not have any of this "built-in" support.

This is a

practical approach that has some disadvantages, however the
current state of theory in this area needs changing,
support for a beginning is necessary.

and some

What is needed is the

application of a definition that would be sufficiently broad
to be workable in dealing with modern corporate problems,
and it is felt that this could be accomplished with this
definition.
In addition, the accounting practitioners must
recognize the need for emphasizing the concept of a liability

29Accounting Principles Board, Accounting Principles
Board Statement Number 4: Basic Concepts and Accounting
Principles Underlying Financial Statements of Business Enter
prises (New York:
American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, 1970), p. 50.
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as a separate element in accounting theory.

However, without

the overt support of the theoreticians this would be impos
sible.

In other words, more work needs to be done in the

current literature on the part of the academicians in order
to increase interest and point out the problems that exist
in this area.
There could be some discussion over the use of this
definition when it has already been established that a pro
prietary approach should be followed.

An analysis of this

definition reveals that it has some characteristics of both
the entity and proprietary approaches.

However, the impor

tant point to be remembered here is that it does achieve the
desired separation of liabilities and owners' equity that is
necessary for the proper accounting for convertible debt,
and if this definition is interpreted from a proprietary
approach, this separation will be emphasized more than if an
entity approach is followed.

When this emphasis factor is

combined with the "built-in" support previously mentioned,
the chances for achieving the proper accounting for con
vertible debt are increased.
In order to have a workable definition,

it must be

remembered that the term "obligation" should be taken in its
broadest possible sense, and not the narrow legalistic
approach.

Therefore, as previously mentioned, the term

"obligation" is intended to mean a binding requirement to
action,

and not merely a debt in the legal sense.
While this definition does not institute any new
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ideas nor require any radical changes in currently accepted
accounting procedures,

it does specifically state what has

been "understood" by many, but actually practiced by few—
the full implementation of generally accepted accounting
principles.

And it must be remembered that included in this

mythical list is the continuity
(This, of course,

(going concern)

assumption.

assumes the continued operation of the

business into the foreseeable future.)

It is hoped that by

making this an explicit part of the definition that account
ants will accept its ramifications,

i.e., the full implemen

tation of all contracts currently in force and other effects
of continued profitable operations.
In an earlier chapter it was pointed out that there
was a distinct difference between acceptance by the AICPA
and acceptance by the practicing accounting populace.

Thus

there must be a concerted effort by the staff of the Insti
tute, the Board,

and all others interested in accounting

theory to influence the practitioners to implement to its
fullest extent the application of this approach to liability
accounting.

It will be this implementation that will guaran

tee the successful differentiation between liabilities and
owners' equity.
may be,

No matter how good a concept

if it lacks general acceptance,

eventually pass on to oblivion.

(of any type)

it will stagnate and

This has been proven in the

past, and it will continue to be the case until some change
is made in the enforcement of decisions of the APB or any
other governing body.

And since not only proper accounting

75
for convertible debt, but the development of an independent
theory of liabilities is at stake, the profession has much
to gain from its success.
This definition will also more than adequately satisfy
the other characteristics or attributes as previously pre
sented that generally are associated with liabilities.
example,

For

it definitely will involve an outlay of some accept

able means of satisfaction of the obligation.
this line of thought,

Continuing

it is important to remember that the

definition restricts liabilities to those obligations where
management's initial intent is to satisfy them through the
disbursement of assets, the performance of services, or the
incurrence of other liabilities.

The intent to use any other

method of satisfaction would preclude classification as a
liability, and therefore, require the item to be classified
as some other type of equity.^®
is required,

Since some form of payment

there is, in addition, the implied assumption

that the item can be valued and that some transaction has
preceded its recognition.
A normal extension of this concept of a liability
would require a separate definition of owners' equity.

In

order to continue to emphasize the distinction between the
two sources of corporate equity, the definition of owners'

3°This is already ingrained in accounting theory,
witness the definition commonly accepted for current liabili
ties and the treatment of dividends payable in the company's
own stock that remain unpaid at the end of the year.
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equity that would coincide best with the above analysis of
liabilities would be residual in nature,
assets over liabilities.

i.e., the excess of

Incidentally, this approach is also

followed by the APB in Statement No. 4.

31

If this is

exploited by the Board and followed by the populace, the
future may provide some interesting changes in accounting
principles and procedures.

As previously stated a review of

the current literature will indicate the scarcity of work
that is being done in the area of a theory of liabilities,
however,

if the Institute follows up what was started in

Statement No. 4, the situation could very well change in the
near future.
If the preceding definition of owners' equity is
placed into an equation format, the results would be some
thing like the following:
Assets - Liabilities = Owners' Equity
(ZA - ZL = OE)
This, of course, is the implementation of the proprietary
theory as defined in the beginning of this chapter.

Thus,

it would seem that to properly draw a distinction between
liabilities and o w n e r s ' equity it will be necessary to
follow the proprietary approach to corporate equity as
opposed to the entity theory.

It would also be possible to

follow the commander theory since it is similar to that of
the proprietary approach, however,

it has already been

31-Accountinq Principles Board, Statement No. 4 ,
o p . c i t ., p . 50.
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pointed out that this approach is better adapted to internal,
as opposed to external, reporting.

Therefore, this study

will adopt a proprietary theory for liability and owners'
equity definitional purposes.
Using somewhat similar definitions,

Sprouse and

Moonitz segregated two major features distinguishing liabili
ties from owners' equity.
. . . The o w n e r s ' equity is distinguishable from
liabilities on two grounds:
first, the amount of the
o w n e r s ' equity is residual in nature while the maturity
values of liabilities are independently determined.
Whenever a change in assets is not exactly offset by a
change in liabilities, or vice versa, the difference
is automatically reflected in owners' equity as the
residual interest.
Second, liabilities are in a con
tinuous and irresistible process of maturing while the
o w n e r s ' equity matures only at the volition of the
owners of the business enterprise or their representa
tives or upon ultimate liquidation.
Thus, liabilities
are obligations, the amounts and maturities of which are
not solely within the control of the business enter
prise.
The owners' equity does not constitute an
obligation because, ordinarily, the business enterprise
is not legally or equitably compelled to provide pay
ments or services to owners other than by the decision
of the owners or their representatives. Only in the
final stages of liquidations, as owners' equities may
be converted into obligations of known amounts with
impending maturities, do they completely disappear as a
class of interests having separate and distinct signifi
cance from that of liabilities.32
The necessity to accurately account for these two
elements of equity requires a definite distinction to be made
between them in the financial statements.

As such, the

^^Robert T. Sprouse and Maurice Moonitz, Accounting
Research Study Number 3: A Tentative Set of Board Accounting
Principles for Business Enterprises (New York:
American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1962), p. 38.
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proprietary approach to corporate equity would be the logi
cal extension of the preceding discussion whether or not the
subject of convertible debt was under consideration.
MEASUREMENT OF LIABILITIES
The problem of measurement in accounting has recently
O *5

received considerable attention. J
price-level adjustments,

The use of current values,

imputed interest, and many other

deviations from historical cost have been seriously studied
by many leading theoreticians.

While this is not new in and

of itself, the systematic fashion and broad scope of atten
tion that has been directed toward this subject is certainly
at variance with the scattered instances of study that were
exhibited in the past.

While much of the current literature

has focused attention on net income, and therefore, asset
valuation,

some interest is being generated in the area of

liabilities, more specifically long-term liabilities.

The

APB has recently issued an Opinion requiring that an element
of interest be recognized in recording noncurrent receivables
and payables.

And it further requires that if the interest

3^in addition to many references throughout the
current literature, the AAA has made quantifiability one of
the basic standards for accounting information (see American
Accounting Association, A Statement of Basic Accounting
Theory (Evanston: American Accounting Association, 1966),
p. 7) and the Graduate School of Business at Stanford has
given recognition to the current importance of this topic
in a seminar held in March, 1965 (see Robert Jaedicke, Yuiji
Ijiri, and Oswald Nielsen, ods.. Research in Accounting
Measurement (Iowa City:
American Accounting Association,
L966.
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*5 J i

is not explicitly stated, that it be imputed.
The important factor to be remembered in valuing
long-term debt is that the instrument consists of two ele
ments— principal and interest— and any acceptable valuation
procedure must take this into account.

This is basically

the position taken by the Board in Opinion No. 21.

In

essence the suggested valuation procedure would require the
recognition of the time value of money through discounting
both elements of the obligation back to the present time.
The resulting difference

(if any) between the face value of

the bonds and the discounted value will be recorded as a
premium or discount.
This approach represents a direct
indirect) valuation of the liability.

(as opposed to an

Such a procedure is

possible because the obligations usually take the form of a
determinable stream of cash payments at specified future
dates, and as such do not pose any special theoretical or
practical problems.

The valuation of these securities is

considerably less uncertain than the valuation of items such
as goodwill,

and as a result provide a more stable basis for

the accountant to work with.

35

•^Accounting Principles Board, Accounting Principles
Board Opinion Number 21:
Interest on Receivables and Pay
ables (New York:
American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, 1971).
^ A n extended discussion of this topic can be found
in Moonitz and Jordan in Chapters 5-18.
See Maurice Moonitz
and Louis H. Jordan, Accounting;
An Analysis of its Prob
lems, Volume I (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, inc.,
I‘)b3) .
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While the basic balance sheet disclosure will not
change, there is somewhat of an element of controversy con
cerning the applicable rate of interest that should be used
in discounting the principal and interest.

The Opinion

specifies the use of the current rate of interest on instru
ments of similar companies with similar credit ratings.

The

use of the market rate of interest at the date of issuance
is supportable under the historical cost basis.

Since this

has long been the accepted method of accounting for assets,
the Board's preference for the use of this rate is under
standable, but there is another approach that is currently
being mentioned in academic circles.

This involves the

recognition of the term structure of interest rates in the
accounts.

As such, the expense for the period would be the

rate of interest in existence during that period multiplied
by the carrying value of the bonds.

Any difference between

the periodic charge and the amount of interest actually paid
would be an adjustment to the carrying value of the bond much
as the premium or discount amortization is now treated.^6
In general most of the theoreticians favoring the
use of a varying interest rate associate this method of

^ B i e r m a n has developed an approach where the esti
mated interest rates over the life of the bond would be
projected to an average to be paid each period.
This average
rate would be used for the payment of interest and as a base
for the annual adjustment to the carrying value of the debt.
One stipulation or limitation to his observations is that the
bonds must be sold at par.
For an extended discussion see
Harold Bierman, Jr., "The Term Structure of Interest Rates
and Accounting for D e b t , " The Accounting Review. XLII
(October, 1 9 6 8 ) , 6 5 7 - 6 1 .
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valuation with the use of current values for assets.^7
While such a radical departure from generally accepted
accounting principles is viewed by many to be in the far
distant future, two notable publications of the AICPA should
be mentioned here.

In Accounting Research Study No. 3

Sprouse and Moonitz stated that:
In the general reports, plant and equipment should
be restated in terms of current replacement cost when
ever some significant event occurs. . . . Even in the
absence of . . . [such an event] the accounts could be
restated at periodic intervals, perhaps every five
years. . . .38
In addition, the APB has " . . .

tentatively agreed

that investments in readily marketable stocks which are
carried as current assets be accounted for at market value
rather than cost.

. . . The Board plans to give high priority

to the development of an Opinion on this subject.

. . .

Thus it can be seen that the presence of current
values in the balance sheet is gradually being accepted as
the norm.

While there is still much ground to be covered,

the acceptance of the Board's proposal will mark an important
change of attitude of the practicing accountants.

Whether or

not this will lead to recognition of the term structure of

37

Ibid., 660 and Cecil Dollar, Jr., "Measurement of
Liabilities," The National Public Accountant. IX (July,
1964), 9, 29.
3®Sprouse and Moonitz, Accounting Research Study
Number 3 . op. cit., p. 34.
^ B a r b a r a J. Shildneck, ed., "APB Acts on Fundamen
tals, Equity Accounting, Marketable Securities, Long-term
Transactions," The C P A . L (October, 1970), 2.
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interest rates in the accounts is a matter of speculation,
but it certainly should be given consideration.

However, at

this point in time it does not seem that a broad departure
from accounting for historical cost will be adopted in the
near future.

Therefore, this study will follow the approach

of valuing liabilities at the present value of the principal
plus interest using the market rate of interest that was in
existence at the time the securities were issued.^®
SUMMARY
After reviewing the theory behind accounting for
corporate equity,

it was determined that a proprietary

approach would lead to a better distinction between liabili
ties and owners' equity than an entity approach.

This led

to a residual type of definition for owners' equity— one
that exactly fits the current approach supported by the APB
in Statement No. 4.

Since the definition of a liability

used in the Statement seems to fulfill the characteristics
of a liability as determined in this study, and also care
fully distinguishes them from owners' equity,

it was deemed

to be acceptable for the purpose of this study.

The fact

that a pronouncement of the Board carries some influence in
the accounting profession played an important part in the
use of these definitions.

^®A more detailed discussion of the actual application of this concept to convertible debt can be found in
Chapter 6 of this study.
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Once a liability had been defined, the next step in
the process was to measure the debt element.
the Board has issued a pronouncement
in this area.

Here again,

(in this case an Opinion)

in this Opinion the Institute specifically

requires the use of present value techniques to value
receivables and payables, and if no interest rate is stated
in the contract, an imputed rate must be used.

In general

the acceptance of present value as a measure of the liability
on the balance sheet is somewhat of a departure from a strict
interpretation of historical cost that had been previously
followed.

However,

a cost approach was followed in that the

Board recommended the use of the rate of interest that
existed when the security was issued

(for discount purposes)

as opposed to recognition of the term structure of interest
r a tes.
In the next two chapters the data developed in the
preceding discussions of liabilities and convertible debt
will be applied directly to convertible bonds in order to
determine the proper accounting procedures that should be
followed upon issuance of these securities.

With the pre

ceding theoretical base to act as support for the conclusions
reached in this study, the final results will produce a logi
cal solution based on currently accepted accounting theory,
and not one that was developed to fit the needs of a certain
segment of the financial world.

Chapter 4
THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF VALUATION OF THE
CONVERSION PRIVILEGE
A convertible bond consists of two components,

a

debt element and a call upon the common stock of the issuing
company.^

Since these two provisions are inseparable, the

security is not solely debt, nor is it entirely an equity
security;

instead,

it represents a combination of features

unlike either debt or equity in their purest forms.

And, it

is this inseparability that can be singled out as the key
stone of the problem.

If the elements were separable, e.g.,

like detachable warrants, the problem would not exist, there
would be some disagreement, but none of any magnitude.
ever, separation is not physically possible,

How

and the problem

begins when an attempt is made to fragment the security and
divide it into two distinct and measurable parts.

It is here

that the controversy develops, and it is at this point where,
in addition to the economic,

financial, and accounting theory,

^Letter written to Clifford V. Heimbucher (Chairman
of the APB) by George Catlett (APB member and partner in
Arthur Andersen & Co.), August 7, 1967, p. 2. Statements to
this effect can also be found in practically every article
written in this area, and this generalization was accepted by
a vast majority of those corresponding with the APB in one
form or another (both for and against allocation) relating
to the three Opinions under question (Numbers 10, 12, and
14) .
84
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the problems of implementation have taken over, and the
theoretical analysis has been forced into a secondary posi
tion.

This is further emphasized by the fact that many

accountants believe that, except in extreme cases, the call
portion represents an element of shareholders' equity.

2

From the time of the issuance of Opinion No. 10J
there developed a continuing controversy over the allocation
of value to the conversion privilege of convertible bonds.
The detailed events that took place from that point to
March,

1969, when Opinion No. 14^ was issued, are traced in

Chapter 2 of this study.

The purpose of this chapter is to

examine the support offered by the opposing sides together
with the respective counter arguments in order to develop a
logical conclusion based upon accounting and financial
theory.
The respective concepts will be discussed in terms
of the principles involved, with implementation being
mentioned only because it represents one of the arguments
against allocation.

The actual measurement problem together

^Leroy F. Imdieke and Jerry J. Weygandt, "Classifica
tion of Convertible Debt," The Accounting Review. XLIV
(October, 1969), 802.
3Accounting Principles Board, Accounting Principles
Board Opinion Number 10: Omnibus Opinion— 1966 (New York:
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1966).
^Accounting Principles Board, Accounting Principles
Board Opinion Number 14: Accounting for Convertible Debt
and Debt Issued with Stock Purchase Warrants (New Y o r k :
American institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1969).
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with the financial statement presentation aspects are the
topic of the next chapter.

The purpose of this organization

is to prevent measurement difficulties from clouding the
theoretical issues, or, what is even worse, being confused
with defects in the underlying theory.

In order to achieve

this, value judgments and vague accusations like "true,"
"fictional accounting," and other such terminology will not
be considered as valid arguments.^
THE CASE FOR ALLOCATION
In many instances the proponents of allocation fall
into the same "labelization" type of arguments of which they
accuse their opponents.

It is not uncommon to see a letter

in the Board's file with the major point that allocation
will reflect the "true" nature of the transaction.

While

the person corresponding with the Board may feel this is
true, it is analogus to the counter arguments such as a
"fictitious" charge.

As such this study will avoid this

approach by analyzing the arguments that should be used in
place of this vague generalization, more specifically,

how

50ne of the reasons for adopting the present system
of determining acceptable accounting procedures dealt with
the need for adequate research facilities for the Institute.
As such, the Board has accumulated a wealth of information
(primarily letters from interested parties and position
papers submitted by companies participating in the symposium
held in January, 1969) which will serve as the major source
of data for this chapter.
in addition, other information
included in the file of the APB was gathered by the sub
committee appointed to study this issue: Philip L. Defliese,
chairman, John c. Biegler, George R. Catlett, and Frank T.
Weston (all members of the Board).
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allocation actually reflects the "true" nature of the trans
action.
Substance vs. Form
One of the basic accounting principles which is
generally interpreted as being critical to external readers
is full disclosure,

i.e., the proper reporting of any fact

that could influence the decision of an informed investor.
This more than any other single "principle" has played the
major role in influencing financial accounting.

The need to

disclose enough information for a fair presentation of the
operations and financial position of a business has led to
extensive and rather detailed procedures for statement
preparation,

and it is along this line of reasoning that the

topic of allocation of value to the conversion feature of
convertible bonds came up.
Accountants have strived to achieve the recognition
of the substance of a transaction in the financial state
ments.

This is done in order to recognize the economic facts

of a situation instead of the particular legal format used.
Attempts to accomplish this have sometimes been met with
strong opposition.

This is the result partly of the con

servative nature of the profession,

and, thus, the resulting

hesitancy to deviate from the legalistic norm that has gained
acceptance over the years.

The main problem is that this

legalistic basis that was sufficient in the past no longer
is acceptable in the modern world of the multifaceted busi
ness organization.

The authors of today's business trans-
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actions have to contend with complex tax and other legal
restrictions that did not exist in the past.

Future minded

accountants, then, have attempted to look past the legal
veil to analyze the economic effects of a transaction before
attempting to record it.

Naturally this means change, and

naturally it will be met with opposition.

However, the

substance aspects of a transaction must be used for analyti
cal purposes, or else accountants will leave themselves open
to the claim of inaccurate reporting.

The formalization of

accounting procedures for capitalization of leases, tax
allocation,

imputation of interest on receivables and pay

ables, and many other recent Opinions represent the triumph
of substance over form.
bonds,

But in the case of convertible

the Board succeeded with Opinions 12^ and 14 in

reversing an otherwise apparent victory for substance that
was contained in Opinion No. 10.
After the issuance of Opinion No. 9

7

the Board saw a

need for additional disclosure in so far as the effect of
the equity element in convertible bond issues.
that Opinion No. 10 was issued in the same month
1966)

The fact
(December,

as Opinion No. 9 is proof that the Board felt the

presentation of earnings per share using the residual

6Accounting Principles Board, Accounting Principles
Board Opinion Number 12: Omnibus Opinion— 1967 (New Y o r k :
American institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1967).
A c c o u n t i n g Principles Board, Accounting Principles
Board Opinion Number 9: Reporting the Results of Operations
(New Yorks
American Institute of Certified Public Account
ants, 1966).
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security concept would not adequately reflect the effects of
the economic substance of the issuance of convertible bonds.
The absence of any valuation being placed on the capital
element

(the call) must have disturbed the Board or else

paragraphs 8 and 9 of Opinion No. 10 would never have been
published.
One of the reasons discussed in Chapter 2 for the
issuance of convertible debt is the lower cash interest rate
that can be obtained as a trade-off for the
privilege.

Thus the call must have somevalue or else it

would have no effect on the security,

i.e., the interest

rate would have to be increased in order
near par.

conversion

to sell anywhere

As previously mentioned, this is a generally

accepted fact.

As a result, the issuance of a convertible

bond in actuality represents the issuance of two rights:
(1)

the sale of a debt security and

issuer's stock.

(2) a call option on the

The accounting procedures prescribed when

ever a package deal is issued is always allocation of value
to each element.

However, the Board, after considerable

external pressure, has chosen to ignore the substance of the
transaction and let the legal form influence their final
decision.
One possible reason for this action could be a m i s 
understanding of the basic nature of the value allocated to
the conversion feature.

The fact that this value has been

labeled an imputed cost and thereby something that does not
really exist seems to stem from the journal entry that is
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usually proposed to record the issuance of the bonds and the
call option

(the debt-equity package).

Assume,

for example,

that a convertible bond with a face value of $100,000 is
issued at par® and that the conversion privilege has been
valued at $20,000.

The standard entry would be either;

C a s h ......................... 100,000
Discount on Convertible Bonds . . . 20,000
Convertible Bonds P a y a b l e .................. 100,000
Contributed Capital ........................ 20,000
or
C a s h ......................... 100,000
Convertible Bonds P a y a b l e .................. 100,000
Discount on Convertible Bonds . . ..20,000
Contributed Capital ........................

20,000®

There is absolutely nothing inherently incorrect with
this procedure, however, at the same time, it does nothing to
erase the misconception that only one transaction has taken
place.

Another, possibly clearer, approach would be to

assume an allocation of the proceeds as follows;
Amount paid for the bonds
Amount paid for the call option
Total proceeds

$ 80,000
20.000
£^£0^00

This would then be recorded as follows;
C a s h ................................. 80,000
Discount on Convertible Bonds. . . . 20,000
Convertible Bonds Payable.................

100,000

C a s h ................................. 20,000
Contributed Capital........................

20,000

®Most convertible bonds are issued at or near par
v a l u e . For a complete discussion of this fact see Chapter 1
of this study.
®Allen Ford, "Should Cost be Assigned to Conversion
Value," The Accounting Review. XLIV (October, 1969), 818.
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This procedure would emphasize the separate element
that the conversion privilege represents in the transaction.
And according to Imdieke and Weygandt would state clearer
the fact that the value of the call feature is a computed
cost rather than an imputed cost.^®

This alone would circum

vent the arguments of many of those corresponding with the
Board on this subject.

And as such, it would show that a

considerable portion of those against allocation object only
as a recourse to form; and that analogus arguments which
were advanced with respect to lease contracts and other
areas are as unpersuasive in that context as in this one.^^
The American Accounting Association has come to this
same conclusion through a somewhat different approach.

In

their formal statement of position, the committee charged
with studying this topic determined that the debt-equity
package could be viewed as one of four items:
debt,

(b) solely equity,

(a) solely

(c) part debt and part equity, or

(d) a new balance sheet classification,

"dequxty.

12

10Leroy F. Imdieke and Jerry J. Weygandt, "Accounting
for that Imputed Discount Factor," The Journal of Accountancy.
CXXIX (June, 1970), 57. This approach was also taken by
Robert Hampton and John McClare; see Memorandum submitted to
the APB subcommittee on convertible debt by Robert Hampton,
III, and John K. McClare (partners, S. D. Leidesdorf & Co.,
CPAs, and at one time members of the APB), September 22,
1967, p. 3.
^ H a m p t o n and McClare, Memorandum submitted to the
APB, ibid., p. 1.
^ A m e r i c a n
Accounting Association, "Statement of
Task Force Committee of American Accounting Association on
Exposure Drafts of Proposed APB Opinions on Accounting for
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. . . [The committee agrees] with the draft
Opinion statements that both convertible debt and
debt with warrants possess characteristics of debt
and of equity (Draft, paragraphs 3, 13). Alterna
tives (a) and (b) deny this dual nature and are
unacceptable.
Alternative (d) is intriguing but in
commenting on this exposure draft . . . [the com
mittee] shall not presume to recast or expand the
basic concepts of accounting.
Thus by elimination
. . . [the committee accepts] (c). Stated positively,
alternative (c) accepts the dual nature of each type
of security and measures the magnitude of each aspect.
The measurement difficulties are not the determining
factors (Draft, paragraph 12), and the conclusions of
the earnings per share draft are dependent on the
ability to determine investment value.
[References
to "Draft" refer to the exposure draft on convertible
debt and debt with warrants.]13
The last sentence of the AAA committee's position
brings out another interesting point.
in Opinion No. 15

14

The Board has admitted

that a comparison of yields between con

vertible bonds and similar securities without the conversion
option is possible,

even though difficult,

and a specific

test has been included in the Opinion that they feel accu
rately determines this relationship.

The curious point this

must bring to the mind of the reader is that since both
topics

(convertible securities and earnings per share) were

being studied at the same time, how could an acceptable test
be developed for one use but not the other?

This inconsis

tency in approach was also noted in many of the letters

Convertible Debt and Debt Issued with Stock Purchase War
rants and Earnings per Share," November 6, 1968.
13Ibid., p. 4.
^ A c c o u n t i n g principles Board, Accounting Principles
Board Opinion Number 15: Earnings per Share (New Y o r k :
American institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1969),
p. 229.
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written to the Board, the most notable of which was probably
Philip L. Defliese
George Catlett,

(his reference is to the position of

an opponent to allocation):

. . . we are putting ourselves in an untenable
position if we waive allocation of discount on con
vertible debt on the grounds of implementary problems
in determining an "ex-conversion" value but then, in
the Opinion on EPS, rely on such a value for deter
mining the residual or non-residual status of a
security— which, as I indicated in my other letter,
we are having a hard time getting away from.
(I'm
not happy either).
George's proposal is to take a
position that the addition of the conversion feature
to a debt issue involves no cost to the issuer.
While this gets us away from the apparent posture of
saying in one Opinion that an "ex-conversion" value
can't be estimated while at the same time suggesting
its use in another Opinion, it gives rise to other
problems:
(1) The "no cost" approach appears to apply to
debt-warrant issues equally as well as to
convertible issues.
Therefore, a different
conclusion does not seem to be logical.
(2) I really think there is an element of cost
although present accounting techniques may
not be adequate to measure it or sufficiently
sophisticated to call for its recognition.
As a practical matter, if we did not believe
this, then we should not have issued Para
graphs 8 and 9 fOpinion No. 10].15
[Italics
not in the original.]
Mr. Defliese does attempt to justify this discrepancy
by "falling back" on the implementation question by stating
"I think that at the heart of this problem is whether or not
an amount can be estimated within reasonable limits for allo
cation to the conversion feature for purpose of imputing

15

Letter from Philip L. Defliese to the members of
the Accounting Principles Board, June 19, 1968, pp. 1-2.
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discount."*-6

in addition in a statement of position, George

Catlett continued the defense of this inconsistency by
stating there was less reason for concern over residual
status regarding earnings per share because:
(1) Any differences as a result of residual security
classification are only a matter of timing if the
conversion right continues to grow in value.
In
other words, no permanent errors are built into
the accounting.
(2) Pending residual treatment, the dilutive effect
is fully and accurately disclosed in the pro
forma earnings per share.
If discount is imputed,
however, it affects the income determination and
is not susceptible of self-correction with the
passage of time.^7
The only problem is that Mr. Catlett modifies his
justification by stating that "While the difficulties in
this regard should not necessarily control the accounting
theory, they do present a practical problem."^-®

Again, all

of the criticism that can be generated lies mostly in the
area of implementation,

and even the critics themselves,

admit that this is not sufficient reason to void the princi
ple.

Therefore,

in the words of the opponents, their argu

ments are not of such import as to negate the theoretical
principle of allocation.
Another major counter argument offered by opponents
to allocation centers on the inseparability of the two

16Ibid., p. 2.
^ P o s i t i o n Paper submitted by George Catlett,
April 10, 1968, p. 7.
l®Loc. cit.
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rights.

While there is a complete discussion of this factor

later in this chapter,

it will be sufficient to mention here

that accounting theorists and practitioners have for many
years recognized the need to go behind apparent or real
inseparability in order to properly account for the economic
effects of a transaction,

and to change at this point seems

to be unsupportable.
If reporting the substance of a transaction is one
of the goals of accounting,

and it is difficult to argue

otherwise, then as previously indicated, the conversion
privilege must be valued upon the issuance of the bonds.
Then the only argument that could be advanced against allo
cation would be that even though there are two economic
rights present in the transaction,
reflect what has happened.

separation does not really

in order to analyze this

approach several points must be considered:

management’s

intent upon issuance of the securities, the prospects of
future conversion, the actual cost of borrowing, and the
possibility of a put existing rather than a call.

The

remainder of this section will be devoted to these areas.
Management's Intent Upon Issuance
of the Securities
The data presented in Chapter 2 regarding the reasons
for the use of convertible bonds indicated that in a vast
majority of the cases the intent of management upon issuing
convertible debt was to effect a delayed issuance of common
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stock.

1Q

The reasons for the delay are not relevant to this

topic, however,

if management did intend to effectively

issue common stock but chose convertible bonds, this fact
should have a bearing on the statement presentation of the
transaction.

Since this is not the only reason for the use

of these securities, nor is it always certain that conversion
(even if intended) will ever be realized, both elements of
the transaction should be recorded.
how one would reason otherwise.

It is difficult to see

On the other hand,

if con

version of the complete issue was assured, then, perhaps,
there would be no debt element at all and the entire proceeds
of the issue would be really a prepayment on the common stock.
If the other extreme exists, i.e., that the conversion fea
ture has no value, there are some who would argue that the
proceeds represent the purchase price of the debt issue
alone.
While the extent of conversion will serve as a mea
sure of the degree to which management has realized its
intent upon issuance of the convertible bonds, it does not
in any way alter this original intent.

Management decided

to issue two economic rights and the bonds were selected as
the method of conveyance, and this factor should be reflected
in the body of the financial statements.

After all, manage

ment intent is the basis for many classification decisions,

*"9See studies by Brigham, Pilcher, and others that
were cited in Chapter 2. In addition, the Board made specific
mention of this fact in a rough draft of the Exposure Draft
of Opinion No. 14 dated August 26, 1968, p. 2.
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e.g., marketable securities vs. long-term investments and the
classification of fixed assets not currently in use.

And,

there have been no substantiative arguments that would alter
this procedure when the accounting for convertible bonds is
being considered.
The Prospects for Future Conversion
Many opponents feel that this factor of ultimate
conversion is a key factor,

i.e., if no conversion does take

place, the transaction actually involved the issuance of debt
securities only, and therefore, allocation of value to the
conversion privilege would only serve to misstate the actual
interest cost of the s e curi t i e s . ^

jt seems the point that

all of these critics are missing is whether or not there is
conversion, at the issuance of the bonds the indenture pre
scribed that conversion was possible; and therefore, the call
privilege did have some value.

The extent of this value is

irrelevant at this point.
It must be kept in mind that if this privilege had
no value it would not have been advantageous to the issuing
company to include it in the covenants associated with the
bonds because there would be no reduction in the concomitant

^ L e t t e r s written to the APB by H. N. West (Treasurer,
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.), September 18, 1967, p. 1,
R. L. Barbanell (Leob, Rhoades & Co.), September 11, 1967,
p. 2; memorandum submitted to the APB subcommittee on con
vertible debt by Standard & Poor's Corporation (undated,
approximately September, 1967), p. 1; and many other items
included in the APB file on convertible debt expressed this
position.
An actual discussion of this point is covered
later in this chapter.
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interest rate.

Thus they would be giving up something and

getting nothing in return.

In addition, the possibility

that the bond itself is worthless is an equally ridiculous
assumption.

It must have some value, no matter how small.

Therefore, the possibility that the conversion feature is
valueless or that it is equal to the entire proceeds from the
issuance of the bonds is zero.

Thus, both theoretically and

practically, the situation calls for an analysis where both
elements in the package have some value at the date of
issuance.
Therefore, the probability of conversion should not
influence the decision of whether or not the conversion
privilege should be valued.

?1

Instead of taking a negative

approach the same result could be derived by analyzing the
conversion feature directly.

It has already been stated that

the call privilege is one part of a two-part package that
has value upon issuance of the bonds.

As such the buyer is

clearly paying for this right just as if the corporation had
sold only the right with no bond or any other security to
cloud the issue.

This is what the suggested journal entry

form (see previous discussion)

is trying to convey.

Thus

the corporation is selling two elements one of which happens
to be a conversion right, and the buyer is paying for this
right irrespective of whether or not it is used.

21

The

This approach was also supported by the SEC, see
the letter from Andrew Barr to Philip L. Deliese, October 2,
1967, p. 2.
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probability of conversion as reflected in the conversion
price set by management will definitely affect the amount of
value attributed to the conversion feature, however,

in this

chapter valuation procedures are not the major point of issue.
Subsequent changes in the initial valuation for
accounting purposes is irrelevant.

This is a currently

accepted practice and has worked well enough for other allo
cations in the past so that there is no need to change it
now.

Subsequent economic events should not invalidate

allocations of any sort that were properly made at the date
of the transaction.

To do otherwise would destroy the cost

basis of accounting.
The Actual Cost of Borrowing
The actual interest cost to the borrower of money
represents a comparison of the proceeds received with the
interest that will be paid
for time).

(with an appropriate allowance

This measure is defined as the cash yield of a

security in Opinion No. 15.

22

As such it represents the

interest cost of a security to the issuing company.
the two variables in the computation

Thus

(cash interest and the

issue price) must be measured as accurately as possible in
order to properly determine the interest cost.

^ U s i n g the example as presented in
(Opinion No. 1 5 , op. cit., p. 273) the cash
security with a coupon rate of 4% (on a par
market value of $80 would be 5%.
(This was
follows:
.04 x
100/80 = 4/80 = 5%.)

The cash

the Opinion
yield for a
of $100) and a
computed as

100
interest to be paid can easily be computed as the par value
of

the

security multiplied by the coupon rate of interest.
The second half of the computation is where the

problem begins.

The measurement of the proceeds becomes a

critical element in the calculation.
utable to

If no value is attrib

the conversion feature, then the amount received

for the bonds

(usually par) represents the total proceeds,

on

the

other hand,

if part

of the

to

the

conversion value, then the

issue price is allocated
amount attributable to the

bond is reduced and the effective interest rate will be
increased.

If the preceding arguments regarding the

issuance of two economic elements are accepted,

there can be

no interpretation other than the fact that the value of the
conversion privilege should be deducted from the proceeds
when determining the issue price of the bonds
could be valued directly— see Chapter 5).

(or the bonds

As such the actual

interest cost of the bonds will vary from the coupon r a t e . ^
The recording of the interest cost of bonds other
than those convertible into common stock is handled in a
manner that effectively charges the period with an interest
element that approximates the market rate
ties)

(on similar securi

in effect at the time of issuance of the bonds.

23

If

Since in most instances convertible bonds are
issued at or very near par, the ultimate effect would be to
increase the interest cost over the coupon rate. However,
if the bond is issued at a premium large enough to more than
offset the value of the conversion privilege (a very unlikely
supposition) the actual interest cost may be less than the
contractual rate.
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the conversion privilege is considered to be a separate
element in the original transaction, consistency would require
that the interest charge for the period be measured in terms
of a higher rate than that included in the bond issue.
do otherwise would be to treat similar transactions

To

(the

issuance of debt securities where they can be valued) dif
ferently.^
As such it seems the only logical conclusion that
can be drawn from these facts is that the allocation of value
to the conversion privilege reduces the proceeds applicable
to the debt portion of the package and the resulting discount
(or reduced premium)

should then be accounted for without

relating it in any way to the conversion right.

Once an

allocation is made, the accounting procedures should treat
the debt-equity package as two separate elements.
The opponents to allocation claim that unless there
is conversion of a material portion of the bond issue the
actual interest cost remains at the coupon rate.

Thus, the

only economic cost involved in the conversion feature is the
loss of a possible opportunity to sell common stock at a
later date at a price greater than the conversion price.
The only problem they contend is that this type of cost is
not generally recognized for accounting purposes .^

^^This is essentially the position originally taken
by the APB in Opinion N o . 1 0 . op. cit., p. 148.
^5Rough draft of the Exposure Draft of Opinion No. 14
dated August 26, 1968, p. 4.
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Another view of this same idea was contained in the position
paper submitted by the United Aircraft Corporation.
We view bond discount on convertible debt resulting
from the application of Paragraph 8 as an imputed cost
rather than a real cost, and one which is lacking in
logic as may be seen from consideration of two possible
outcomes:
( i) To the extent that the bonds are converted,
the issuer will have sold common stock (which
was probably his objective in most cases) at
a price higher than that which could have been
obtained at the time the proceeds of the issue
were received.
(ii) To the extent that the bonds are not converted
but are called or retired at maturity, the
issuer will have borrowed at a lesser interest
rate than could have been possible on straight
debt.
Both situations represent a benefit to the issuer,
and do not suggest any cost which he should recognize.
However, Paragraph 8 of Opinion No. 10 would require
him to record a cost [amortization of bond discount
during the periods when the securities are outstanding
as debt], . . .26
George Catlett takes the position that there is no
cost involved but, instead, the conversion privilege repre
sents the consideration the issuer gives the buyer in return
for the right to use the funds from what he calls a refund
able advance without an interest c o s t . ^
While the critics admit the APB is attempting to
develop procedures that will more accurately account for the
cost of money, the arguments tend to circumvent the issue by

26position Paper submitted to the APB by the United
Aircraft Corporation (undated, approximately September,
1967), p. 3.
27

Letter from George Catlett to Clifford V. Heimbucher, May 31, 1967, p. 3.
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failing to distinguish between the two economic rights
involved.

As previously stated, this basic fault underlies

a major portion of the arguments against allocation.
Philip Defliese has taken what is probably the most
supportable stance against this cost idea in a summary from
his position as sent to the members of the APB.
. . . while there obviously is an economic cost to
the company when it sells such a call, its determina
tion is subject to many economic factors which accounting
has not yet undertaken to measure.
To recognize this
cost now would be the same as taking a position that oil
companies should recognize in income immediately the
present value of oil resources upon their discovery.
Accounting is not yet ready to embrace economic theory
to this extent. . . .28
While the major point of Mr. Defliese's statement has
some validity, there is somewhat of a movement in present
accounting procedures into the area of deviation from his
torical cost

(as traditionally measured).

The use of an

imputed interest rate on receivables and payables is already
a reality and the Board is now working on an exposure draft
that calls for the use of market value for temporary invest
ments.

Each of these was unheard of, except possibly in

academic circles, even as recent as a few years ago.

It

would seem that Mr. Defliese may have underestimated the
speed of the movement of this force in present accounting.
However reluctant the Board may be to move into a new era of
accounting it seems that the time has come to make that move,
especially if it means a better presentation of the economic

^ A d d e n d u m to a letter from Philip L. Defliese to
the members of the APB, June 19, 1968, p. 1.
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facts.

And even Mr. Defliese admits this is true.
If the procedures for recording the issue of con

vertible bonds as suggested at the beginning of this chapter
are followed, then ultimate conversion or failure of con
version is irrelevant.

By treating a portion of the proceeds

as a capital contribution in payment for a call privilege,
". . . [a] situation [is created that] is analogous to stock
sold on a subscription basis where there is a possibility of
default and forfeiture by the subscriber of the amount
p a i d . T h i s

substantiates the conclusions drawn earlier

that after the allocation is made the convertible bonds
should be treated like any other debt security in so far as
amortization of premium or discount is concerned.
George Catlett in his personal position statement
states that "imputed discount on convertible debt is based
on the faulty premises that

(1) the greater the equity char

acteristics, the higher the interest cost, and

(2) the

greater the debt characteristics, the lower the interest
cost."

Of)

His statement is basically true, however it is not

illogical as he seems to imply.
basic cause:

His analysis misses the

again, the sale of two economic rights.

With

a fixed value to allocate between the two elements of the
transaction,

a change in the valuation of one must have the

opposite effect on the other.

^ I m d i e k e and Weygandt,
Discount Factor," 57.

This merely presents a clear

"Accounting for that Imputed

^^Catlett, Position Paper, op. cit., p. 4.
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picture of the effects of the transaction,

i.e., the greater

the debt characteristics, the closer the package is to pure
debt and as a result, the more realistic the coupon interest
rate is relative to the market rate for similar securities,
thus a lower discount element.
decline

As the debt characteristics

(a lower coupon rate would usually be the cause) the

coupon rate bears less and less of a reasonable comparison
to other similar debt and a greater value is allotted to the
conversion privilege.

31

The net charge against earnings

(interest plus or minus amortization) will probably not vary
as much as Mr. Catlett suspects.
In George Catlett's statement of his position
against allocation, he attacks the actual interest cost
theory by following the approach that the conversion privi
lege actually represents a saving to the company, and as
such, completely by-passes the cost aspect.

The saving he

speaks of is similar in nature to the many other covenants
that are included in the indenture

(e.g., various forms of

security, dividend restrictions, and subordination)

and

contribute to the development of the coupon rate of interest.
He completely ignores the existence of a cost factor

31

It must be remembered that these bonds usually
sell at or near par.
Since the conversion feature is one of
the main determinants of the price, it is usually set to
allow the bond to sell at the desired price with the existing
coupon rate. However, if the conversion rate is held con
stant and the coupon rate is allowed to vary, the price of
the package will vary with the coupon rate.
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indicating that such a discount would deny the existence of
the savings.

32

In connection with this approach, Mr. Catlett has
attacked allocation by expanding the discussion to include
other provisions of the bond issue.

The counter to his

approach is that he, like most of the other foes of alloca
tion,

fail to distinguish between the two economic concepts

at the issuance of the convertible bonds.

However, this

approach has been used by others to challenge the economic
cost approach by insisting that if value is attributed to
the conversion feature, the other covenants in the indenture
should also be valued.
Imdieke and Weygandt

(supporters of allocation) have

actually concurred with this approach and suggested some
journal entries to recognize these features.

For example, a

restriction on dividends might be recorded as follows:
C a s h ................................. XX
Discount on Convertible Bonds . . .XX
Convertible Bonds P a y a b l e .................. XX
C a s h ................................. XX
Liability for Restrictions on Dividends
One observation that should be mentioned,

. .XX

is the possibility

that if this approach is carried to its logical extreme,
accountants may find the bond has no value at all, but
rather, that each covenant has its own value.

This idea is

32Catlett, Position Paper, op. cit., p. 3.
S^imdieke and Weygandt,
Discount Factor," 58.

"Accounting for that Imputed
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further complicated by the fact that the various provisions
normally included in a bond indenture,

in addition to having

a value, effect the valuation of the other provisions to the
extent that it may not be possible to value any of them
separately.^4
Naturally this argument brings in the forbidden
thought of "normalizing."

If there is one thing accounting

procedures should not do, it is normalize income
directly or indirectly).

However,

(either

it must be considered

that this is one of the arguments that were proposed against
allocation of value to stock purchase warrants,

leases and

practically every other instance where the Board has
attempted to include the economic effects of a transaction
in the accounting statements.-*5
This factor of allocation of value to all of the
features of a bond was presented as support for non-allocation
to the conversion privilege by countless replies to the
Board.

In each case the writer felt that the proper cost of

money for accounting purposes did not include allocation of
value to the conversion privilege.

However, many did

reference what they called the "true" bond discount.

This

was labeled as an "actual cost" because it was an economic

^^Matthew j. Stephens, "Inseparability and the Valua
tion of Convertible Bonds," The Journal of Accountancy,
CXXXII (August, 1971), 58.
Letter written by Robert E. Koehler (Vice-Presi
dent of Finance, Marriott Corporation) to Richard C. Lytele
(Administrative Director of the APB), November 14, 1968,
pp. 1-2.
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fact which demanded accounting recognition, whereas the
value of the conversion right was not.

Again, a major por

tion of the argument was based upon a misunderstanding of
the allocation process with respect to the conversion right.
In the instance of all of the other covenants mentioned,
none of them created an equity element.

In each case if a

breakdown was used, the liability would simply be divided
into separate parts.

The total liability portion of the

debt-equity package would not change, and it is doubtful that
such a breakdown would provide any additional information
for the reader.

The conversion feature differs because it

does create an element of stockholders' equity, and as such
should be segregated for full disclosure purposes.
Another distinction between the two situations lies
in the inherent difference between the two types of covenants.
. . . the so-called "singling out" of the conversion
feature is in fact isolating the one element in con
vertibles that is not a normal inherent aspect of all
debt arrangements but is actually an element of equity.
It is, therefore, neither arbitrary nor illogical to
"single out" the conversion feature, since all interestdetermining factors are inherently related to all debt
contracts, and are afforded all the accounting necessary
or appropriate by merely recording the issuance of debt
and disclosing the restrictions.3o
Thus the conversion feature cannot be combined with
the other covenants in a bond indenture.

The differences

previously described are more than sufficient to distinguish
it from these features and, therefore,

acceptance of the

^^Hampton and McClare, Memorandum submitted to the
APB, op. cit., p. 3.
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total allocation idea is not necessary if one favors alloca
tion of value to the conversion privilege.
It is also possible that if the separate features of
this or any other security be valued and placed on the
balance sheet the financial statement would become a conglom
erate mass of individual items with the end result of not
presenting any understandable information to the reader.
Another interesting point would be that if each element was
valued, would it ever be possible that the sum of the parts
would be greater than the whole?
The Possibility of a Put Existing
Rather than a Call
Throughout this discussion the conversion privilege
has been referred to as a call upon the issuing company's
stock that is purchased by the investor.

The reason for

this approach was that the buyer was investing in two dif
ferent contracts:

(1) the bond and

the bond for common stock.

(2) the right to exchange

While the term "call" usually

refers to "an option to buy a share of stock at a specified
price within a specified period,"

37

the conversion of stock

does not involve an outflow of funds.
concept is still there:

However, the basic

an option to acquire stock at a

given value during a specified period of time.
Some critics,

in an attempt to discredit the call

^ J . Fred Weston and Eugene F. Brigham, Managerial
Finance (3rd ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1969), p. 826.
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aspect, have argued that what has actually been issued is a
"put" option.

The reasoning generally follows that since

most of these debt-equity packages include a call provision,
and since many conversions are actually "forced" through
this call procedure and, the issuer has complete control over
the call of an issue, the corporation is really issuing a
put option.

Following the arguments offered for allocation,

they feel that ". . . if a value is properly assignable to
the

'call,' it would appear equally valid to assign some

value to the

'put' since it has, in fact, real value to the

issuer.
The Investment Bankers Association subcommittee
report continues:
. . . Historically, grounds would support assigning
a greater value to it than to the "call," in fact,
because our research indicates that conversion occurs
in the majority of cases as a result of action by the
issuer.
Accordingly, within the realm of Opinion No.
10 theory, one can argue that the value to the issuer
of the "put" offsets, or perhaps more than offsets, the
value to the purchaser of the "call." In our view, all
of these are more matters of speculation than items
that should be recorded as charges or credits in finan
cial statements.40
The intent of this approach is to confuse the issue by

3®A put is generally defined as "an option to sell a
specific security at a specified price within a designated
period," ibid., p. 833.
^ I n v e s t m e n t Bankers Association of America, Cor
porate Financial Reporting Liaison Committee, "Initial Joint
Memorandum to the Subcommittee of the Accounting Principles
Board ("APB") Appointed to consider Paragraphs 8 and 9 of
APB Opinion No. 10," September 14, 1967, p. 11.
4®L o c . cit.
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adding many aspects of the bond that supposedly have value
and end up with the argument that to value all of them would
only add confusion to the statements.

However, the subcom

mittee seems to have ignored two major points in relation to
this argument:
. . . For the put situation to exist, both of two
conditions must be met:
(a) the conversion price at
the date of issuance must be below the current market
by at least as much as the call premium on the debt,
and (b) the debt must in fact be immediately callable.
Lacking either of those conditions, the put argument
cannot be sustained.
While it is conceivable that a convertible security
might at the date of issue incorporate the features
prerequisite to sustaining such an argument, no con
vertible issues with which we are familiar have done
so to date:
both prerequisites are usually missing,
and we know of no case in which one is not.
Accordingly,
we see no merit in the argument that the conversion
feature is by nature a put rather than a call at the
date of issue. . . .41
Thus, it seems, another argument against allocation
does not have enough substance to withstand close scrutiny.
Admittedly, there is a possibility of the situation described
by the IBA subcommittee existing, however, Mr. Hampton and
Mr. McClare

(both CPAs and at one time members of the APB)

reduce the probability practically to zero.
Position of the Securities and
Exchange Commission
The Securities and Exchange Commission

(SEC) supported

the Board in the issuance of Opinion No. 10 in so far as the

4^-Hampton and McClare, Memorandum submitted to the
APB, op. cit., p. 2.
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principle of allocation is concerned.

Mr. Barr and his asso

ciates felt that valuation of the conversion privilege would
report the actual facts of the transaction in that both the
liability and capital aspect would be properly valued and
the charge against revenues

(including amortization of the

premium or discount) would reflect " . . .

the actual cost to

the borrower of the outstanding debt or the yield to the
holder.Despite

approval of allocation in theory, the

Commission agreed to the suspension

(by Opinion No. 12)

because of the need for further study of the problem.^3
Later Mr. Barr stated that because of the "difficul
ties involved" in the valuation of the conversion feature,
the SEC " . . .

would not oppose the practical result of the

Board's Opinion . . . that

'no portion of the proceeds from

the issuance of convertible debt securities should be
accounted for as attributable to the conversion

f e a t u r e . ' " ^

However, the Commission felt the Opinion should be worded to
indicate that allocation was not necessary, as opposed to
the exposure draft position that it should not be r e c o r d e d . ^
Thus the SEC has always supported the allocation upon

^ L e t t e r from Andrew Barr

(October 2, 1967), op. cit.,

p. 1.
^ L e t t e r from Andrew Barr to Philip L. Defliese,
November 24, 1967, p. 2.
^^Letter from Andrew Barr to Philip L. Defliese,
January 3, 1969, p. 1.
45

Loc. cit.
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theoretical grounds, but in the end it yielded to practical
difficulties in application.

There was a clear reluctance

on the Commission's part, but eventually the position of
Opinion No. 14 was accepted.

This sort of acquiescence

could be forecasted by the actions of the SEC during the
period between Opinion No. 12 and No. 14.

Companies filing

with the Commission during this time had the choice of
recognition or nonrecognition, but some form of disclosure
of the amount of the discount and the annual amortization
was r e q u i r e d . ^

This was usually achieved through footnotes

in both annual statements and prospectuses.

In each case,

however, management included statements to the effect that
allocation was not required, but if it were, the amount of
the discount and amortization was indicated.

It should be

clear, therefore, that the SEC did as much as possible to
require the publication of the discount and related amortiza
tion figures before the issuance of Opinion No. 14.
The Position of the American and New York
Stock Exchanges and the Civil Aeronautics
Board
Both the New York and the American stock exchanges
joined the SEC in endorsing the issuance of Opinion No. 10.

^ S e e prospectuses issued by International Silver
Co., Miles Laboratories, National Can Corporation, and others
distributed during the period of the suspension of Opinion
N o . 10 (paragraphs 8 and 9).
4?sydney S. Traum, "Accounting and Tax Aspects of
Issuing Convertible Debenture Bonds," The New York Certified
Public Accountant. XXXVII (December, 1967), 931.
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However,

the New York Stock Exchange later followed a "no

preference" approach in a letter to the Board. 4®

It would

seem that again the theoretical aspect of allocation is
preferable, but as the practical problems begin to arise,
there is somewhat of a "soft peddling" approach that is
taken.

It almost seems these groups are stating that a

theoretical approach to financial reporting is fine— as
long as it is not too difficult to implement.
The only other agency that took an active stand in
the allocation controversy was the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB).

In an official statement of position, the CAB

specifically waived their accounting rules in order to
permit the recording of value for warrants and the resulting
discount on the debt securities, but their position with
respect to convertible bonds was more restrictive.
Carriers who have accounted for convertible
debt and debt with warrants in accordance with
paragraphs 8 and 9 have violated the provisions
of the USAR.
Ordinarily, we would have required
correction when such violations occurred.
In this
instance, however, such action has been delayed
pending the outcome of our own review of this
accounting in light of the Board's regulatory needs
to determine whether this accounting should be
incorporated into the USAR.49
[Italics not in the
original.]
The reasoning of the CAB is much the same as other

^®Letter from the New York Stock Exchange to the APB,
August 29, 1968, p. 1.
4%jetter from Warner H. Hord (Director, Bureau of
Accounts and Statistics, Civil Aeronautics Board) to Chief
Accounting Officers, Certified Air Carriers (Arthur Andersen
& Co., Subject F i l e . Reference No. UN 5900-60), February 16,
1968, pp. 1-2.
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objections to allocating value to the conversion privilege,
i.e., only one physical security is involved, and the lack
of an "objective" standard of m e a s u r e m e n t . ^
Conversion Privilege vs. Warrants
While a comparison of the conversion privilege and
detachable warrants in Chapter 2 produced the general con
clusion that these two securities are entirely different
both in use and composition, the current literature and the
files of the APB are replete with references to a comparison
of the two for accounting purposes.

The purpose of this

section is not to reiterate the discussion contained in
Chapter 2, but, rather, to take it one step further,
an examination of the conversion privilege
warrant

i.e.,

(alone) and the

(alone).
The preceding discussion has shown that the purchaser

of a convertible bond is actually obtaining two economic
rights— one of which is the option to convert the bond into
common stock.

If this right is compared to the detachable

warrants, then there is but one conclusion that can be
logically drawn:

each represent a distinct element of a

complex transaction.

As such, each of these options must be

valued on the books of the issuing company.

To do otherwise

is to justify inconsistency of recording with arguments that
are rather weak and unsubstantiated.
Other than attacking the two types of securities

-*®Ibid., pp. 2-3.
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from the separability point of view, the arguments against
treating the two options the same generally emphasize the
different characteristics and uses of each.
ferences do exist cannot be argued

That such dif

(these were examined in

Chapter 2), however, the question is should they be allowed
to create artificial differences from an accounting point of
view?
It has already been pointed out that some accountants
see the inherent differences between the two securities and
therefore,
dissimilar.

assume the accounting for each should also be
Allocation of value to warrants is easier to

substantiate, therefore, it is usually assumed by these
accountants that no value should be allocated to the con
version privilege.
substance.

Again,

form wins the battle against

The previously mentioned IBA committee claims to

have studied the two securities from both a form and sub
stance approach, however, a close examination of their pre
sentation indicates that only the "external" or "physical"
characteristics were analyzed and an emphasis was placed
upon separability and m e a s u r e m e n t . ^
Philip Defliese

(an opponent to allocation)

admits

the "basic" differences between the conversion privilege and
warrants are not material enough to require different

51

Investment Bankers Association, Memorandum to the
APB, op. cit., p. 3.
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t i ')

account intj.

First, despite the many differing terms we find
between debt-with-warrant issues and convertible
debt issues, there is sufficient similarity in sub
stance and theory to sustain a position that the
accounting for the two should be the same.
in each
case a "call" on stock is being sold and ordinarily
accounting recognition of that sale should be
given. . . ,53
At this point it seems there is a very strong argu
ment for allocation.

The counter arguments offered against

allocation did not negate the positive advantages of the pro
cedure.

A complete summary and a final decision as to the

correct theoretical recording of the issuance of convertible
bonds will be presented at the end of this chapter.

However

an independent comment from one of the members of the FEI
seemed to summarize the entire situation from the position
of those in favor of allocation:

"This proposed Opinion

[No. 14] would seem to be more the result of pressure by the
underwriting community them a reasoned conclusion based on

33This approach was also supported by some of the
members of the Financial Executives institute.
See Finan
cial Executives Institute, Committee on Corporate Reporting,
"Discussion Memorandum" (Supplement to position paper),
January 9, 1969, pp. 1-3.
(Overall the Financial Executives
institute was in favor of Opinion No. 1 4 .) However, the
American Accounting Association committee assigned to study
this topic agreed with the position that both types of
securities should be treated in the same manner.
See Ameri
can Accounting Association, Statement of Task Force Committee,
op. cit., p. 3 and Imdieke and Weygandt, "Accounting for
that Imputed Discount Factor," 56-57.
53Defliese, Addendum to letter to the APB, op. cit.,
p. 3.
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the facts.

It certainly appears to complicate an already

complicated situation.
THE CASE AGAINST ALLOCATION
The preceding discussion represents the arguments
presented by those who propose allocation of value to the
conversion privilege and the counter arguments offered by
the opposition.

in general, the proponents feel that allo

cation is necessary in order to reflect the ’’true" nature of
the transaction,

and unless it is recorded in the accounts,

the financial statements do not reflect the economic sub
stance of the transactions entered into by the company.
With this in mind it now becomes necessary to
examine the negative side of the question.

While many of

the arguments against allocation were used in rebuttal to
those presented for allocation in the first half of this
chapter,

this section will be limited to those arguments not

yet covered and the counter arguments proposed by those
favoring the procedure.
Inseparability
The case for and against two economic rights existing
at the sale of a convertible bond have already been pre
sented in great detail, however, another facet of this problem
deals with physical separation.

As previously indicated

^ F i n a n c i a l Executives institute, Discussion Memo
randum, op. cit., pp. 2-3.
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there was some question as to whether or not two separate
economic rights existed, on the other hand, there is abso
lute agreement when it comes to the issue of physical separa
bility.

Unanimously all agree that it is not possible for

separation to exist.

If the conversion right is exercised,

the bond must be surrendered,

and if the bond matures, the

conversion privilege expires— neither action can be imple
mented independent of the other.

With physical inseparability

as a given factor, the issue becomes,

is the lack of separa

bility sufficient to prevent allocation of value to the
conversion privilege?
Since detachable warrants usually have a market of
their own

(even when not detachable for a period of time)

many opponents to allocation classify them as a non-refundable advance toward the potential purchase of common s t o c k . ^
This is basically the reason for the recording of a credit
to contributed capital upon the issuance of bonds with these
warrants.

in addition, the separate market aspect allows an

independent valuation to develop for the warrants that does
not exist for the conversion privilege.

This latter feature

is emphasized quite heavily by those opposing allocation.
The primary reason they offer for not valuing all of the
covenants of debt issued with detachable warrants lies in
the inability to determine a value with reasonable certainty.
Thus, they believe they have successfully developed an

^5See especially Investment Bankers Association,
Joint Memorandum, op. cit., p. 2.
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argument against valuing the conversion option, while, at
the same time,

supporting the allocation of value to war

rants .
The inability to separate debt and the conversion
feature leads to the general conclusion that these securi
ties must be viewed as debt when issued

(a legal interpreta

tion) and continued to be reflected as such till redemption
either through retirement or conversion—

. . the fact

that . . . [this] debt may be satisfied with stock does not
increase the issuer's net worth at the outset.

This same

argument of separability is offered as a challenge to the
existence of a call on the issuing company's stock.

Again,

the lack of a physically separate security is the main point
at issue.
Therefore the opponents to allocation feel the debtequity package must be either primarily debt or primarily
equity at any given time
same time).

(it cannot be primarily both at the

Those who oppose allocation feel this in

separability prevents any consideration of a capital element
arising upon issuance or an increase in the cost of the debt
over the life of the bonds.

George Catlett feels so

strongly about this approach that he even goes so far as to
state that even if the conversion privilege does have value,
the lack of separability would prevent the recognition of it

56Ibid., p. 4.
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on the company's financial statements.

57

The Financial Executives institute and many of the
other critics of allocation have labeled "forced separation"
of one legal instrument as "fictitious" or "as if" account
ing.

They feel the legal form should take precedence over

the economic substance of the transaction.

Matthew Stephens

(Associate Professor of Accounting— The University of
Pennsylvania in Philadelphia) carried the argument to the
extent that he calls the separation of the debt and the con
version feature as accounting for form more than sub
stance.^®
Those who favor allocation feel that physical insep
arability is an irrelevant point.

Their approach is that

accounting has recognized the need to allocate value to the
various elements of a transaction where there was an element
of inseparability— whether apparent or real.

The classical

example is the purchase of a building and the land upon
which it stands.

Due to the lack of depreciation on land,

a separate valuation is imperative, even though it may require
the use of appraisals

(estimates by trained experts).

This

is done even though a physical separation would involve the
destruction of the building.

Some accountants feel it is

possible that neither has value without the other.

In this

instance any errors will be reflected in periodic net income

57Catlett, Position Paper, op. cit., p. 2.
58

Stephens, "Inseparability and the Valuation of
Convertible Bonds," op. cit., 58.
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and the asset carrying value on the balance sheet; yet even
though estimates may vary considerably between appraisors,
this has been approved accounting procedure for many years
and there is no real support for a change.
That valuation of the conversion feature is difficult
is accepted by both sides, however, those favoring allocation
feel it is no more difficult than attempting to separate the
land and building previously discussed or the interest fac
tor in a lease set up primarily for financing purposes.
Some of the very same arguments offered against capitalizing
that type of lease are being used against allocation of
value to the conversion privilege

(e.g., legal restrictions,

possible violation of usury laws, and kill the use of these
instruments)To

this date there has been no wide spread

calamity resulting from the requirement to capitalize
financial leases.

In addition, Hampton and McClare draw an

even deeper analogy in their memorandum to the APB.
. . . To state that convertibles are solely debt
until an action takes place to make them solely
equity is as unconvincing and inconclusive as to
state that every lease contract provides rent and
nothing else— no interest, no principal, no equity
in the property.60
The Board has taken this concept and expanded it to

5^John H. Myers, Accounting Research Study Number 4 :
Reporting of Leases in Financial Statements (New Y o r k :
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1962).
^ H a m p t o n and McClare, Memorandum submitted to the
APB, op. cit., p. 2.
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include the recognition of interest as a separate element on
long-term receivables and payables;
exists in the contract,

and if no such interest

it must be imputed.

This procedure

is going much further into "as if" accounting than that pro
posed by the allocation of value to the conversion privilege
where recognition would be given to a computed value as
opposed to an imputed o n e i n fact, the position the Board
has taken with respect to allocation

(and the implied use of

present value techniques to record convertible bonds)

is so

inconsistent with the use of present value for long-term
receivables and payables that there is special mention of the
fact that Opinion No. 14 was not altered by the new Opinion
(Opinion No. 21).

In each of the cases mentioned above a

single legal instrument was separated into two transactions.
Why, then,
ferent?

should accounting for convertible bonds be dif

Surely the separation procedures in a lease or non

interest bearing note cannot be less difficult than that of
valuing the conversion feature.
The situation is well summarized by Philip Defliese
in his position statement,

"Separability helps in the case

of warrants; lack of separability should not hinder
theory) in the case of convertible debt."**2

(in

[Italics not in

^ A c c o u n t i n g Principles Board, Accounting Principles
Board Opinion Number 21; Interest on Receivables and Pay
ables (New York:
American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, 1971).
62Ibid., p. 418.
63

Defliese, Addendum to letter to APB, op. cit., p. 3.
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the original.]

Thus, it would seem, the fact of insepara

bility is not sufficient,

in itself, to offset the theoreti

cal advantages of a l l o c a t i o n . ^

When the Board uses such a

factor as the main support for their position,

it creates

the natural question as to whether or not there was some
other reasons that were the real deciding factor.
Tax Effects
While somewhat unsettled at the time of the issuance
of Opinion No. 14, the tax regulations

that apply

to con

vertible bonds are now very specific.
. . . While the definitions of bond
discount and
bond premium are both based upon a comparison of the
redemption and issue prices, only the regulations
providing for the amortization of bond premium specify
that the premium attributable to the conversion fea
ture should be valued and excluded.
The regulations
providing for the amortization of bond discount con
tain no similar requirement, and there is no question
that the omission is deliberate.
In other words, the
amount allocable to a conversion feature cannot exceed
the value of the feature or the total premium, which
ever is lower.
Thus, when a convertible debenture is

^ T h i s same conclusion was reached by Imdieke and
Weygandt, but they approached it from a different point of
view.
They reasoned that "the only real distinction between
them [the conversion privilege and warrants] is that the
additional payment made when the equity instrument is formally
acquired takes different forms.
The warrant holder pays
additional cash to the issuing firm; the convertible debt
holder pays for his stock by foregoing the receipt of inter
est from conversion date until maturity date, and the
receipt of the maturity value itself. Thus it is argued
that the distinction reduces to one of method of form of pay
ment only, rather than any difference in substance." See
Imdieke and Weygandt, "Accounting for that Imputed Discount
Factor," 57.
^ A c c o u n t i n g Principles Board, Opinion No. 1 4 , op.
cit., p. 207.
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issued at a premium price, it is possible that neither
discount nor premium will be recognized for tax pur
poses. 66
There was much speculation during the late 1960's regarding
how the Internal Revenue Service

(IRS) would treat the dis

count, and according to the current regulations the majority
proved correct, however,

several companies like J. P. Stevens

were allowed to deduct the discount as additional interest
expense.^7
Regarding this point, an interesting controversy
arose.

Many of those responding to the Board's exposure

drafts claimed they felt the IRS would not allow the deduc
tion and, therefore, this was some support for a similar
accounting treatment,
version feature.

i.e., no value allocated to the con

Miss Agger and Mr. Strout presented a

different approach with an attempt at "reverse psychology."
It was their contention that the repeal of paragraphs 8 and
9 of Opinion No. 10 would appear to the IRS as an acquies
cence on the part of the Board to the fact that a reasonable
value of the conversion feature could not be measured.

The

omission from the financial statements of this element of
paid-in capital would then, they felt, lead the IRS to a

^ T h e o d o r e
m. Asner, "Convertible Debentures— Tax
and Financial Accounting Treatment Today," The Tax Advisor.
I (January, 1970), 12.
See also Regulations, 1.61-12(c) (2),
(3) .

f% 7

Letter from Carolyn E. Agger and Arthur E. Strout
(representing Arnold & Porter, attorneys) to Philip L.
Defliese, September 13, 1967, p. 6.
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refusal of the deduction for tax purposes.

The extent of

the influence the actions of the APB had upon the subsequent
tax regulations is not known, but the possibility of this
"reverse thinking" does pose an interesting question.

The

thought of what "might have been" does not change the cur
rent position of the nondeductability of a discount created
by allocation of value to the conversion privilege, however,
given the tax rules, the question is to what extent should
this influence accounting procedures?
While the general consensus among accountants is
that tax provisions should not influence what is thought to
be the proper accounting treatment of an item, there were
some strong arguments that somewhat modified this approach.
In general,

some of the respondents felt that since alloca

tion was not proper in the first place, the IRS was supporting
their position,
amortization)

and to include allocation

(with concomitant

in the financial statements without a deduction

for the tax effect would magnify the distortion in the
statements.
As another approach to this idea of tax deductibility,
those opposing allocation felt that if the IRS allowed the
deductibility of the discount

(a premium is includable in

income— see above discussion)

it would result in ordinary

income to the holder under Section 1232 of the Internal
Revenue C o d e .

Under this approach the discount would

68Ibid., pp. 4-5.
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represent an "interest free" borrowing

(because of the

reduced coupon rate) and result in the constructive receipt
£L

of income to the holder.

Q

It was the position of this

group that the possibility of ordinary income on disposition
of the bonds would virtually "kill" their present use as a
financial instrument, especially when the corporation could
not take a tax deduction for the periodic amortization of
the discount.
Thus,

70

in summary, those opposing allocation felt that

"when there is a serious question as to whether the discount
accounting can be supported in theory,

the fact that the

Internal Revenue Service does not recognize the discount
compounds the difficulty of justifying the discount."

71

Still another approach is offered by Matthew Stephens:
. . . While it is generally inadvisable to have
accounting principles determined by the tax law, it
also seems inadvisable for the accounting profession
to establish an accounting principle that equates two
securities which differ with respect to a major
decision variable.
Since tax consequences are an
important element in valuation of security investments
and the decision as to the type of security to be
issued, the accounting profession should proceed very
cautiously before it prescribes a treatment for con
vertible bonds which essentially equates the accounting

Memorandum submitted to the APB by Standard &
Poor's Corporation (undated, approximately September, 1967),
p. 3. See also Financial Executives Institute, "Comments in
Support of the Reconsideration of Paragraphs 8 and 9 of
Opinion No. 10" (as submitted to the APB), September 18,
1967, p. 2.
^®See especially investment Bankers Association,
Memorandum to the APB, op. cit., pp. 13-14.
^Catlett,

Position Paper, op. cit., p. 7.
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valuation of these securities to bonds with
detachable warrants. . . .72
The position of those favoring allocation stated
simply was that tax considerations should not affect account
ing procedures— with no modifications.

The main support

here is that both the accounting and tax approaches are
based on completely different assumptions, and that, as a
result, they should not be confused as either supporting or
contradicting each other.73

After all, there are numerous

differences between the accounting and tax treatment of
items of revenue and expense.

Some of these cause permanent

differences and others are merely the result of timing.

The

fact that there is a difference does not necessarily make
one artificial, nor does it force the use of illogical pro
cedures .
The Problem of Measurement
A detail analysis of the mechanics of the measurement
question is contained in the next chapter, but because of
the frequency of mention in correspondence with the Board,
this point should be considered,

in general, as an argument

72

Stephens,"Inseparability and the Valuation of
Convertible Bonds," op. cit., 56.
73jt is generally felt that financial accounting
should be concerned with economic events for measuring the
progress of a business, whereas the central focus of tax
accounting is to develop an equitable base upon which the
tax is levied and to approach this from the view of ease
of collection.

against a l l o c a t i o n . ^

Therefore, the emphasis in this

chapter will be placed on whether or not measurement prob
lems should affect theoretical decisions and not an evalua
tion of specific measurement techniques.
One of the major reasons for the reconsideration of
convertible bonds after Opinion No. 10 was the objections of
the investment bankers— those on whom the accountants had to
rely to estimate the value of the conversion privilege.
Their main objection was related to objectivity.

More

specifically, they were concerned with having to estimate
the value of the conversion privilege " . . .

with sufficient

accuracy and objectivity to form the basis for accounting
entries."7-* Mr. Malin continues by summarizing the problems
There are two main impediments to objective or
sound valuation.
First, the absence of any market
benchmarks to permit direct separate valuation of the
conversion feature alone.
Second, the virtual absence
from the trading market of any debt instruments com
parable to the typical convertible debt instrument
minus only the conversion feature. . . .76
If any one argument had to be singled out as that

7^The problem of dealing with implementation of the
valuation concept was mentioned more than any other factor
as an argument against the acceptance of the principle of
allocation.
This is true for those against allocation
conceptually as well as those in favor of the principle, but
against acceptance because of the problems incurred in
measurement.
^ L e t t e r from Robert A. Malin (Vice-President, Blyth
& Co., Inc.) to Philip L. Defliese, April 11, 1968, p. 1.
Despite the fact that this letter was written after the sus
pension, it still reflects the opinion of the investment
bankers with respect to allocation.
76Ibid., p. 3.

130
which caused those analysts the most consternation,

it would

have to be the lack of a separate market for the conversion
feature.

The fact that there would be no independent con

firmation through the exchange procedure really placed them
in what they thought was an impossible position.
such as investment value are " . . .

Quotations

intended to be merely

general indications of the broad range of values that might
apply under current circumstances, are generally based on
yield tables without regard to comparability of issues, but
rather on the rating of issuer, and that they can and do
change materially within short periods of tame."

77

Tha.s

approach was also substantiated by the position taken by
Standard and Poor's and Moody's.

Thus, it seems these com

panies are willing to publish information for general usage
in comparing companies, but when it becomes a situation where
their estimates will be used in the financial statements

(and

subjected to the liability as prescribed under the Securi
ties Act of 1933) it becomes a different matter.
these circumstances,

Even under

it hardly seems that their estimates

are any more subject to liability them those of the appraisals
of the land and buildings previously mentioned,

and the

latter's estimates have been included in financial state
ments for y e a r s .
Standard and Poor's in their Memorandum even go so
far as to label their figures as a "grossly imprecise

77Loc. cit.
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estimation ."78

Their reasoning is there is such a high

degree of subjectivity entering into the calculation that no
one set of criteria can be established in some formula type
of format.
The pricing of a debt obligation rests on a number
of factors in addition to the credit of the issuer, [e.
g.,] . . . sinking fund provisions [and] redemption
features. . . . One issue may command a somewhat better
market than another of similar statistical character
istics because it is a good but "new" name, i.e., the
issuer has not for some time resorted to the public
capital markets, thus affording prospective retail
buyers of the bonds a further measure of diversification
in their portfolios.
In another direction, it can be
argued that a certain element of the appeal of con
vertible debentures for some investors lies in the fact
that they are able to obtain a hedge position while at
the same time reducing their tax liability by virtue of
the lower interest rate vis-a-vis straight debentures.
It is impossible to reduce the sum of these varying
considerations to a concrete figure.
The argument of many of the accountants opposing
allocation is to carry this position one step further by
indicating that because of the inability of the investment
bankers to come up with a specific formula,

"forced" alloca

tion would result in still another variation in accounting.
This, of course, would be the exact opposite of the charge
given to the Board at its inception, i.e., to narrow areas
of generally accepted accounting alternatives.

80

As such

78Standard & Poor's Corporation, Memorandum to the
APB, op. cit., pp. 3-4.
78Ibid., p. 4.
88Addendum to letter from Nelson G. Harris (ViceChairman, Committee on Corporate Reporting, Financial
Executives Institute) to Philip L. Defliese, September 18,
1967, p. 3.
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the results would lead to more complex footnotes and con
fusion among statement readers.
Those who favor allocation counter these measurement
problems with the fact that estimates are basic to accounting.
Quite often estimates of depreciable lives, collectability of
receivables and others in addition to those previously men
tioned, must be used because of the periodicity concept.
The underlying theory has always been that even if the
estimate is incorrect, as long as it is reasonable it would
be better than omitting the information entirely.

The very

nature of periodic accrual based financial statements is
supported by this presumption,

and now some want to deviate

simply because the data are difficult to obtain.
Granted Moody's and Standard and Poor's do vary
their estimates of investment value, however, by their own
admission, they do not present these data for any purpose
other than general statistical comparisons.

However,

if the

accountants depended upon them, the figures could be refined
to a point where the possibility of a material error would
be minimized.

Since both sides can offer examples of pub

lished values for a given group of companies that support
their contention, this factor must be considered irrelevant
until someone does a detailed analysis of the fact over a
span of time.

However, what would prevent the use of the

procedures followed by J. P. Stevens Co.?

In this case the

company solicited estimates from several investment bankers
of the value of the conversion option on bonds they were
issuing, and used the figure which seemed to be the most
realistic

(incidentally the three estimates they obtained
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varied only three percentage points from the lowest to the
highest).

Again, a reasonable estimate is better than no

information at all.

Another possibility would be to have

the investment bankers work together to determine a reason
able value of the conversion privilege for a particular
company.

Thus,

it seems these problems could be worked out

if the investment bankers would try to cooperate.
As previously mentioned the SEC required disclosure
in some form of the value of the conversion option during the
period of suspension of paragraphs 8 and 9 of Opinion No.
10.

81

Here the accountants and the investment bankers were

able to develop figures the Commission felt were suitable
for financial statement presentation.

The counter argument

to this is that all it proves is that the SEC has the power
to "command."

ft2

However,

it must be remembered that the SEC

has had this authority for over thirty years; and it has
used it sparingly, except where it was felt necessary for
proper financial statement disclosure.
Overall, measurement problems could prove to be a
serious impediment to implementing the valuation concept.
However,

it is the purpose of this chapter to review only

the theoretical approach and the preceding arguments do not
seem to be of such import as to negate the principle.

81 An analysis of the reporting practices of several
of these companies is included in Chapter 5.
82

Malin, Letter to the APB, op. cit., p. 3.
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Allocation for Convertible Preferred
Many of those opposing the allocation of value to
the conversion privilege of convertible bonds offer as an
argument for their position the idea of allocation for pre
ferred stock; or, in question format,

if it is appropriate

to allocate value to the conversion feature of convertible
bonds, then why would not the same procedures be applicable
to convertible preferred stock?88
there is little,
securities.

The assumption is that

if any, difference between these two

Those opposing allocation feel the lack of a

definite maturity date is irrelevant.
. . . few convertible preferred stock issues are
intended to be or will be outstanding indefinitely.
As with convertible debt, they generally have call
and/or sinking fund provisions. Most of the con
vertible debt issues probably will be called and/or
converted prior to maturity; and most of the con
vertible preferred stock issues also probably will
be called and/or converted within a comparable period
of time.
To say that there is an additional financing cost
(above the nominal rate of interest) in the case of
convertible debt which should be reflected in earnings
per share but not such a financing cost (above the
dividend rate) in the case of convertible preferred
stock is to let form prevail over substance and does
not reflect the business aspects of these trans
actions .84
The rebuttal proposed by those favoring allocation

83

See letter from George Catlett to Clifford Heimbucher (Arthur Andersen & Co., Subject File. Reference No.
CO 7020-01), May 31, 1967, p. 3; and the letter from Albert
Y. Bingham (Chairman, Financial Accounting Policy Committee,
The Financial Analysts Federation) to Philip L. Defliese,
September 13, 1967, p. 1.
84Catlett, Position Paper, op. cit., p. 6.
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emphasizes the fact that one of the purposes of allocation
is to separate the debt and equity portion of the package
that was issued.

To require the same accounting procedures

for convertible preferred stock would simply create an addi
tional equity element with dubious results.

Some go so far

ftS
as to say the division would even be "meaningless." J
Hampton and McClare contend that the results are "trivial."
. . . if, after such a division, a corresponding
charge were recorded as discount on stock, established
accounting principles would require that this newly
created discount be offset against the newly created
capital surplus— a meaningless "wash."86
Thus there seems to be no particular value in having
the issuance of convertible preferred stock refined to
include recording of the conversion option.

Since the pre

ferred stock would already be an element of equity, to
allocate would simply increase the detail in the financial
statements with no increase in the information presented.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In the beginning of the chapter it was indicated
that the controversy over
vertible debt lies in

the accounting treatment of con

the attempt to segregate the security

into two separate economic rights and that this discord is

85jmdieke and Weygandt, "Accounting for that Imputed
Discount Factor," 58;
and Hampton and McClare, Memorandum
submitted to the APB,
op. cit., p. 3.

APB,

86
Hampton and McClare, Memorandum submitted to the
ibid., p. 4.
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compounded when the measurement of each right is attempted.
It is generally agreed that both sides of the question have
developed rather detailed support for their position as well
as counter arguments against their opponents.
so highly contested that it took four Opinions

The issue is
(Nos. 9, 10,

12, and 14) to settle it from the point of view of the APB,
and there are still many who do not agree with the final
decision of the Board.
Those favoring allocation believe the substance of a
transaction should be presented in the financial statements
as opposed to the particular legal form it takes.

This group

contends the Board originally recognized the fact that
Opinion No. 9 would not sufficiently disclose the economic
results of issuing convertible bonds, and thus Opinion No. 10
was used to correct the situation.

Of course the central

point here is that the substance of the transaction involved
the issuance of two economic rights which should be valued
at the issuance of the debt-equity package.
The usual result of valuation is that the debt itself
would be issued at less than par.

This discount resulted

from a comparison of the lower interest rate on the bonds
and the yield rate of similar securities
version privilege).

(except for the con

Since the discount arises from a dif

ferent yield and market rate, this discount is like any
other discount and should be amortized over the life of the
security as additional interest expense.

Thus the "true"

interest rate yielded by the bonds would be reflected in the
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statements and the economic effects of the transaction would
be correctly recorded.

It was also suggested that if the

original issuance of the debt-equity package were recorded
in two separate transactions,

the distasteful imputed element

would be averted and the discount would become a computed
cost.

As such,

in an attempt to present a net income figure

that reflects the economic progress the business has made
during the period,

the valuation of the conversion feature

is necessary in order to obtain the cost of the funds used.
Allocation is also considered, by its proponents, to
represent accounting for management's intent upon issuance
of the security.

It was illustrated in Chapter 2 that one

of the major reasons behind the issuance of convertible
bonds is the intent of management to issue equity capital
(common stock) on a delayed basis at a price higher than the
current market value of the stock.

Therefore the recording

of the call on the common stock is necessary to reflect the
real reasoning behind the issue.

As a result, the prospect

of future conversion becomes a moot point because the pro
cedures prescribed by allocation are to record the economic
facts that exist at the date of issuance and not subsequent
economic events.
The conversion privilege is often referred to as a
call upon the common stock of the issuer.

In fact, this

economic right is the basis for the necessity of an alloca
tion to be recorded.

The right is definitely not a put

(and

thereby a right of the issuer that offsets the call) because
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the conditions upon issuance are not conducive to recogni
tion of the put.
While support for allocation came from various Board
members, the American Accounting Association, the Securities
and Exchange Commission,

and various independent accountants,

financial analysts, and attorneys, the Board decided against
it citing two major arguments,

i.e., inseparability and the

practical problems of measurement.

In the former the Board

felt that the lack of the ability to physically separate the
two economic rights required that the legal aspects of the
transaction should govern the accounting recognition.
the debt-equity package should be considered debt
legal form) until some event takes place

Thus

(due to its

(either conversion

or retirement) that would require recognition to be given to
some other method of disclosure.

Some even believe this

represents the recognition of substance over form.
Despite the fact that it is a generally accepted con
clusion that tax procedures should not affect accounting,
many of those opposing allocation use the lack of a tax
deduction for the additional interest created by the discount
as an argument against allocation.

They contend that re

quired allocation would "kill" the use of convertible bonds
as a financial instrument because of the high cost of use.
The position of the opponents is supposedly solidi
fied by the problems of measurement.

It is contended that a

weak theoretical approach which is almost impossible to
accurately measure should not be considered as acceptable.
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In fact in much of the correspondence and in many of the
rough drafts of Opinion No. 14 this factor was considered to
be a very prominent reason for the opposition to allocation.
It was felt that the inclusion of this "grossly imprecise
figure" in the financial statements would only serve to con
fuse the readers.

The primary reason for the inaccurate

measurement was the lack of any kind of benchmarks or guideposts as are present in the market value of detachable war
rants.

The representatives of Moody's and Standard and

Poor's who corresponded with the Board felt their figures
were unable only as a guide or estimate of the value of the
securities,

and, consequently, not of the accuracy mecessary

for recording in the financial statements.
Finally, the allocation of value to the conversion
feature of convertible preferred stock was indicated as a
similar technique as allocation for convertible bonds.

This

was supported by the fact that both securities are convertible
into common stock and each has a call provision.

Therefore,

they are substantially similar enough in so far as economic
attributes to require the same accounting treatment.
A review of these major arguments
ments were included in the above summary)

(no counter argu
should lead the

reader to the conclusion that those opposing allocation
really base their position on the problems involved in mea
surement.

It was clearly exhibited that there are two

economic rights in existence at the issuance of the debtequity package and even their inseparability cannot change
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this economic fact.

Good accounting theory must, therefore,

give recognition of this in the financial statements in
order to reflect the actual nature of the transaction

(i.e.,

reflect the "correct" charge for the use of the funds in the
financial statements,

and thereby, give recognition to the

substance of the transaction over the form).
However,

if one looks at the inseparability of the

elements of the transaction,

in so far as measurement,

a

different picture develops.

Here the lack of a specific pro

cedure that would apply in all cases and the lack of any
market figures to serve as guidelines do cast some doubt
over the validity of that aspect of allocation.

But since

this chapter deals with the theoretical aspects, the only
conclusion that can be reached is that the allocation of
value to the conversion feature of convertible bonds is the
correct procedure.

That this is true was admitted by some

of the most prominent critics.

Since allocation must be

assumed to be the proper method of accounting for this
debt-equity package,

it only remains now for the measurement

aspect to be examined, and this is the topic of the next
chapter.

Chapter 5
VALUATION AND REPORTING OF THE CONVERSION PRIVILEGE
It was determined in the preceding chapter that from
a theoretical approach valuation of the conversion privilege
is consistent with accounting for the substance of a trans
action as opposed to its legal format.

Therefore,

the use

of some form of valuation procedure is mandatory in order to
reflect the economic events that have taken place.

The

approach followed was strictly theoretical with measurement
being mentioned only in a generalized manner as it related
to the underlying concepts.

The reason for segregating the

measurement aspect was to clearly separate the practical
problems from those of a theoretical nature.
accomplished,

With this

it now becomes time to study the measurement

aspects of the problem.
The position of those against allocation has been
centered around the absence of any type of objective verifi
cation of the valuations developed by the investment bankers.
This lack of an independent confirmation of the investment
value of the bonds through a formal exchange mechanism has
worried not only the investment bankers, but also the
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accountants who stress the objectivity principle.^"
fore,

There

in order for the procedure of allocation to be

acceptable for actual use, some measurement method must be
proven to be satisfactory.
With this in mind, the purpose of this chapter is to
examine the measurement problem, develop an acceptable solu
tion, and to present a method of reporting this information
to the readers of the financial statements in a clear and
precise manner.
THE VALUATION PROCESS
There are four major approaches to the measurement
question that have been proposed from the initial appearance
of this problem in Opinion No. 9^
present time.

(December, 1966) to the

While some were developed primarily for the

measurement of earnings per share, they can easily be modi
fied to focus attention on the conversion feature.

During

the discussion of these methods it must be kept in mind that
in order to be acceptable, a method must provide for the
allocation of value to the two basic economic rights devel
oped in the preceding chapter.

Any approach that does not

achieve this objective must be rejected.

^Rough draft of the Exposure Draft of Opinion No. 14
dated August 26, 1968, p. 1.
2
^Accounting Principles Board, Accounting Principles
Board Opinion Number 9: Reporting the Results of Operations
(New York:
American Institute of Certified Public Account
ants, 1966).
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No matter how well a principle is supported in theory,
if the measurement problem cannot be satisfactorily solved,
there is no basis for inclusion in the financial statements.
To do so would only add numbers and not meaning to the state
ments.

Quantifiability must, therefore,

goal, but also as a limitation.

act not only as a

The profession has not yet

developed techniques for including items in the financial
statements that cannot be reasonably measured in terms of
the dollar.
The Traditional Method
The traditional method of accounting for the value
of the conversion privilege is to ignore it entirely, thus
assigning it a value of zero.

There is no attempt to record

anything upon the issuance of the debt-equity package other
than the bonds,

i.e., the only discount or premium that

would be recorded would result from a comparison of the
maturity value of the securities with the total funds pro
vided by the transaction.

The only possible recognition

given to the conversion feature would be disclosed through
footnotes.

In this situation a footnote is used to describe

the conversion privilege and to indicate the number of addi
tional shares of common stock that may have to be issued if
the bonds were converted.

Thus the debt-equity package is

treated as if it were solely debt and the conversion option
was simply another covenant like a required sinking fund or
a dividend restriction.
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The journal entry to record the issuance of $100,000
of convertible bonds for $98,000

(with the additional pro

vision that the conversion option was valued at $20,000)
would be as follows:
C a s h ...............................98,000
Discount on Convertible Bonds. . . 2,000
Convertible Bonds Payable.............

100,000

The balance sheet would contain the face value of the bonds
in the long-term liability section, and the discount would
either be reported as a deferred charge or a contra account
to the bond liability

(see discussion later in this chapter).

Thus, with the exception of a footnote describing the con
version privilege,

there would be no difference between this

issue and the issuance of ordinary bonds.
As a result of
3
Opinion No. 14 the accounting for these bonds would
directly follow the procedures used for "usual" bond dis
counts .

Based upon the information developed in the pre

ceding chapter, total liabilities would be overstated and
owners' equity would be understated.

This would result in

an overstatement of earnings during the outstanding life of
the bonds.
Therefore, the traditional procedure totally ignores
the substance of the transaction and concentrates disclosure
on a pure legal approach,

and since no recognition is given

3
Accounting Principles Board, Accounting Principles
Board Opinion Number 14: Accounting for Convertible Debt
and Debt Issued with Stock Purchase^Warrants (New York:
American Institute ot Certified Public Accountants, 1969).
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to the two rights that existed when the securities were
issued, this method cannot be deemed acceptable.

It should

also be emphasized that under this method no recognition is
given to the effect on earnings per share by the potential
dilution resulting from the sale of the call on the issuing
company's stock.
The Residual Security Method
Chronologically the next step was the issuance of
Opinion No. 9 and the formal introduction of the residual
security concept.

As presented in the Opinion, convertible

debt and other securities may be classified as residual,
and as such assumed to be common stock and not "senior
securities" in the computation of earnings per share.4 This
approach, then, would include in the statements the recog
nition of the possible dilution that could take place if the
bonds were converted into common stock.
The measurement aspect involves a comparison of the
estimated value of the equity portion of the security to the
actual market value of the security.

If the former consti

tuted a major portion of the total value of the security,
then for purposes of computing earnings per share, the

^The Opinion defines a situation requiring residual
security treatment as one where there is ". . . more than
one class of common stock . . . outstanding, or . . . [where]
an outstanding security has participating dividend rights
with the common stock, or . . . [where] an outstanding
security clearly derives a major portion of its value from
its conversion rights or its common stock characteristics.
. . ." Accounting Principles Board, Opinion No. 9 . op. cit.,
p. 120.
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security would be treated like common stock.

Therefore,

for

computations of earnings per share the bonds are treated on
either a converted or nonconverted basis depending upon
whether they met the test of a residual security.
Under this concept the entry to record the issuance
of the $100,000 par value bonds would be exactly the same as
under the traditional method.

The balance sheet presenta

tion would also follow the same procedures,

and even the

income statement disclosure would be the same.

The only

variation that would exist would be the earnings per share
presentation
charge

(assuming residual status) where the interest

(net of tax) would be added back to net income and

the denominator would be increased by the number of addi
tional common shares that could be issued under the terms of
the conversion option.
In so far as reporting earnings per share, the dis
closure is reasonably adequate in that there is some recog
nition given to the conversion option in the body of the
financial statements.

However, like the traditional method,

the residual method gives no acknowledgment to the two
economic rights that existed upon the issuance of the debtequity package.

And primarily because of this, the residual

approach must also be considered as unacceptable.

While

some progress was made with respect to the recognition of
the conversion feature in the financial statements,

it is

not enough to adequately satisfy the need for full disclosure
as discussed in the preceding chapter.
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In summary, the basic approach as developed by the
residual security concept is that the debt-equity package
is considered as debt for balance sheet purposes
conversion feature is valued at zero)
equity

(nonconverted or converted)

purposes.

(i.e., the

and either debt or

for earnings per share

While there are many different methods for deter

mining the residual nature of a security

(e.g., the invest

ment value test, the market parity test, and the cash yield
test)

they all have the shortcoming of the residual con

cept in general, and as such, neither can be considered as
adequately disclosing the true nature of the transaction.5
The Imputed Discount Method
The next development in the measurement of the con
version option was published in the same month

(December,

1966) as Opinion No. 9. As previously mentioned, Opinion
g
No. 10 marked the beginning of the controversy regarding
valuation of the conversion option of convertible debt.

In

actuality the Board prescribed that the value of the con
version option be recorded as debt discount with the credit
going to contributed capital.

5For a detailed analysis of each of these methods
see Henry W. Longfield, Jr., A Comparison of Methods for
Identifying those Convertible Bonds to be Included in Earn
ings Per Share (Ann Arbors
University Microfilms, Inc.,
1970).
6Accounting Principles Board, Accounting Principles
Board Opinion Number 10:__ Qroaibug. Opinion— 1966 (New York:
American institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1966).
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It has already been shown in the preceding chapter
that this method of recording the valuation of the conversion
privilege followed the dual economic rights concept, there
fore, the illustrative journal entry will be the same as
that recommended by Imdieke and Weygandt.

7

(The basic data

are the same as that which was used for the illustration of
the traditional method,

i.e., the issuance of $100,000 of

convertible bonds for $98,000, and a conversion option worth

$ 20,0 00 .)
C a s h ............................... 78,000
Discount on Convertible Bonds. . .22,000
Convertible Bonds Payable.............

100,000

C a s h ............................... 20,000
Contributed C a p i t a l...................... 20,000
The reason for recording the conversion privilege
was to place

the estimated value of the call in thefinancial

statements and to record the actual
debt portion of the package.

proceeds received

for the

Thus both economic elements are

valued at the issuance of the securities and income would
bear a net charge for interest based upon the actual cost of
the funds.

As a result of the timing of Opinions No. 9 and

No. 10, it should be clear that the Board felt the use of the
residual security approach

(and by implication the tradi

tional approach also) was not sufficient disclosure for the
effects of this type of transaction.

7Leroy F. Imdieke and Jerry J. Weygandt, "Accounting
for that Imputed Discount Factor," The journal of Accountancy.
CXXIX (June, 1970), 57.
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While the imputed discount approach does achieve a
major portion of the requirements as set forth to judge the
acceptability of these methods,

it does not specifically

provide for any adjustment of earnings per share other than
the inclusion of additional interest expense as a result of
amortizing the resultant discount.

Therefore, while it is

preferable to the other methods previously discussed,

it is

by no means a panacea.
The Dual Method
Dudley Curry has suggested what he has labeled the
"dual method" as the approach that would best present the
diverse characteristics of the convertible security in the
O
financial statements.
In essence the approach Dr. Curry
suggests is the presentation of the transaction as follows:
1.

The par amount of the CVD [convertible debt] issue
would be reported on the right side of the balance
sheet in an intermediate section between liabili
ties and stockholders' equity.

2.

Net income figures would be reported in the income
and retained earnings statements on the dual assump
tions of nonconversion and conversion.

3.

Per-share figures would be available for earnings,
dividends, and book value of stock on the dual
assumptions of nonconversion and conversion.

"In comparison with the conventional straight-debt method,
the dual method would require virtually no changes in

®Dudley W. Curry, The Financial Reporting of Con
vertible Debentures (Ann Arbor:
University Microfilms, Inc.,
1970), pp. 181-236.
9Ibid., p. 182-83.
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recording the usual CVD transactions. . . . It is in the
financial reporting of the resultant account balances that
the dual method would produce significant differences from
the conventional

[traditional] method."^®

The main criticism offered against this approach is
that Dr. Curry forces a conversion vs. nonconversion assump
tion upon the reader and therefore, he has not recorded the
two economic rights that exist at the issuance of the
securities.

As a result of this omission, the true nature

of the transaction is not presented in the body of the finan
cial statements.

Actually he circumvents the issue and

attempts to alleviate the problem by passing it on to the
reader,

i.e., present both converted and nonconverted data

and make the reader decide which is the best interpretation
for his needs.
A Partial Valuation Approach
James Katz has suggested a method of reporting con
vertible debt that would eliminate the need for disclosing
the discount.

In effect he would charge the period with

additional interest based on the difference between the
coupon rate and the rate of interest the bonds would have
had to carry if the conversion feature was absent from the
issue.^

The journal entry for the additional interest would

10I b i d ., p. 182.
^ J a m e s L. Katz, "A Look at APB Opinion No. 10— The
Omnibus Opinion," The Illinois C P A . XXX (Winter, 1967), 44.
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be similar to the following:
Interest Expense................... XX
Contributed Capital .............

XX

The amount of the additional interest would be computed by
applying "this difference
rates]

[the difference between interest

. . . on a weighted average of the outstanding

debentures during the period."

12

While Mr. Katz feels this approach would yield sub
stantially the same results as Opinion No. 10, he is ignoring
the main point of the reason for allocation.

By not pre

senting the full value of the conversion option initially,
the statements would be materially different than if the
method suggested by the Board were followed.

And by omitting

this element, his method does not present the economic
situation that exists when the bonds are issued.
There are many possible modifications of the above
procedures, however,

those discussed represent the major

approaches to the valuation of convertible debt.

The primary

criticism of each, with the exception of the imputed dis
count method,

is that there is no valuation placed upon the

conversion option at the issuance of the debt-equity package.
As a result, this method,

at least in principle, must be

chosen as the only acceptable procedure to present the
information that is required to fully disclose the true
nature of the transaction.

^L o c . c i t .
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MEASUREMENT OF THE CONVERSION RIGHT
The Board,

in Opinion No. 10, specifically stated

that "The discount or reduced premium,

in the case of con

vertible debt obligations, may ordinarily be measured as the
difference between the price at which the debt was issued
and the estimated price for which it would have been issued
in the absence of the conversion f e a t u r e . T h e

primary

argument against use of this procedure was that there were
no benchmarks that could be used in the process of developing
the value of the conversion option

(see Chapter 4).

a market value to act as a guidepost,

Without

as was present in the

case of warrants, the calculation had to be made from a
purely theoretical approach.

This, of course,

introduced

another element into financial accounting that could not be
objectively verified in the traditional manner,

and as such,

resulted in much confusion in the financial world.
However, the Board's method must be studied from a
logical approach in order to properly evaluate its merits.
The normal accounting procedures upon issuance of a type of
"package deal" requires allocation of value to each element.
The particular procedures followed usually depend upon the
circumstances.

If the fair market value of each element in

the transaction is known, then a relative market value
approach is used.

Here the total proceeds is divided

^ A c c o u n t i n g Principles Board, Opinion No. 1 0 , op.
c i t ., p. 148.
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between each component in the proportion that the fair
market value of that component bears to the total fair market
value of the package.
only one of the items
determined,

On the other hand, if the value of
(in a two-part package) can readily be

it is used and the other is valued at the

residual amount.
Since the latter approach is considered to be satis
factory, the problem reduces itself down to the selection of
a method of valuing either the bonds without the conversion
feature or the conversion feature itself.

To follow a rela

tive fair market value approach would require an estimate of
the value of both of the economic elements of the trans
action, and therefore, introduce an even greater possibility
of error.

And since those opposing valuation have a major

portion of their argument centered on this factor,

it is

only reasonable that the method which offers the least pos
sibility of error be used.
Direct Measurement of the Conversion Option
In order to directly measure the value of the con
version right several critical assumptions must be made.
First, a growth rate for the market value of the stock must
be assumed, and second, some future date must be chosen as
the time of conversion.

These two factors are necessary to

be able to estimate the future value of the stock.
this amount has been developed,

Once

a provision must then be

made for a rate of return to allow the purchaser of the
option an element of income.

Thus, the two critical points
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in the analysis involve the selection of a particular point
in time to use as an exercise date and some form of dis
counting or other procedure to allow for a return on the
money invested.

Both of these factors would vary a great

deal between investors:

e.g.,

some may be willing to hold

the option a long time in hopes of larger gains, while
others may feel a smaller gain over a shorter period of time
is more important.
Thus the value of the call option would be a very
"personal" type of computation that would show a consider
able variance from one investor to another.

Since those

purchasing the debt-equity package would have widely varying
investment goals, any attempt to value the call option
directly must include some assumptions about these factors,
and must therefore,
"averaging."

involve a considerable degree of

As such, the results, due to the highly

personal nature of the assumptions,

are likely to lose their

significance in so far as external reporting is concerned.
The widely diverse uses to which financial statements are
committed could hardly be satisfied through this procedure.
Direct Measurement of the Investment
Value of the Debt
It has been previously shown that the debt-aquity
package consists of two economic rights:
element and

(2) the call option.

reasonably measured,

(1) the debt

If the latter cannot be

then some method of valuing the bonds

(without the conversion feature)

is needed.

The actions of
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the Board indicate they must have felt an attempt to value
the call option brought in too many variables which could
not be satisfactorily estimated for financial reporting p ur
poses. ^

Therefore,

their conclusions seem to follow the

above conclusions and attention must now be directed to
valuing the debt instrument,

itself.

The overall approach that is involved in direct
measurement of the debt portion of the package is an estima
tion of the issue price
yield approach)

(through some form of present value

of the bonds without the conversion feature

and then the comparison of this figure to the proceeds with
the residual value being allocated to the conversion priv
ilege .
There are four factors that generally form the basis
for determining the investment value of a convertible bond:
. . . 1-bond quality; 2-maturity yields from nonconvertible securities of comparable quality and
equivalent maturity; 3-combination of differences in
coupon rates, call price, sinking fund provisions,
and other similar terms of the issue; 4-company's
earnings performance in its industry and latest

^The logic behind this assumption is based upon the
different methods of valuation suggested by the APB.
It has
been mentioned that the Board suggested a comparison of debt
with and without the conversion feature as the appropriate
method for valuing the conversion option.
However, when it
came to warrants, they prescribed a relative fair market
value allocation since the market price for the warrants was
readily determinable.
Thus, they must have felt this exchange
price was the best approach or else why wouldn't the same
procedure as determined to be acceptable for convertible debt
be used for warrants? The only conceivable reason must have
been that the Board felt the valuation of the call privilege
directly was not as reliable as a residual valuation under
the circumstances.
Loc. cit.
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forecast of general business conditions.^
It can easily be seen from this list that this approach to
valuation is very subjective.

The relative weights given to

each factor as well as the effects of the various combina
tions of covenants could easily vary from one estimate to
another.

However, any differences arising would result from

variations in the professional opinions of the investment
bankers studying the issue, and not differences in factors
that would depend upon personal rates of return and other
elements peculiar to the direct valuation of the call priv
ilege .
There is no doubt that in some instances estimates
of these figures prepared by various investment bankers
could conceivably vary materially, but this should not
negate the use of the techniques.

Appraisals of assets by

trained experts have been used for many years for allocating
value in package deals,

and it is a well known fact that

these appraisals could vary considerably.

It was suggested

in the preceding chapter that the effects of the variation
could be partially alleviated through the use of averages or
through the cooperation of several investment bankers in
developing a single estimate of the investment value of the
bonds.
Due to the nature of the task,

it is easy to under-

^ A l l e n Ford, "Should Cost be Assigned to Conversion
Value?" The Accounting Review. XLIV (October, 1969), 821
(Letter from Albert C. Esokait (Vice-President of Moody's
Investors Service, Inc.) to Allen Ford dated January 24, 1968).
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stand why the investment bankers are reluctant to supply the
information.

It is clear that the legal liability aspect

mentioned in Chapter 4 is a material factor.

However, the

basic reason for their lack of cooperation— the absence of
an exchange price to aid in valuation— should give the
analysts comfort.

Without any value to compare against

their estimates, how could the investment banker be proven
wrong?

The basis for the allocation is value

at the date of

issuance and the only way a question could be raised con
cerning the validity of the amount assigned to the conversion
privilege would be if it were given a sizable value,
there were no conversions

(or vice versa).

and

in all proba

bility the cause of such a situation would be economic
events subsequent to the date of issuance,and surely no one
would attempt to hold them liable for such events.
Another problem that seems to have been given too
much attention in relation to this calculation is what might
be termed "exactness."

No one should expect these financial

specialists to develop a value that could be defended like a
calculation of wages paid during a particular p e r i o d . ^

The

whole approach is that theoretically two rights are issued,
and to ignore one because of difficulty of measurement places
the profession in a precarious position.

Overall, a reason-

^ T h e American Accounting Association has supported
this position in relation to their discussion of the standard
of quantifiability, see American Accounting Association, A
Basic Statement of Accounting Theory (Evanstons American
Accounting Association, 1966), p. 13.
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able estimate is all that can be expected, and that is
better than no estimate at all.
BALANCE SHEET CLASSIFICATION
The Bond Liability and Discount
If no value is computed for the conversion privilege,
i.e., it is assumed to be zero, the balance sheet treatment
would be similar to the issuance of ordinary bonds.

A

premium or discount would be recorded by a comparison of the
maturity value of the bonds with the proceeds from the
issuance.

Theoretically the premium or discount account

should be presented on the balance sheet as a modification
of the par value of the debt— as an adjunct or contra
account, respectively.

However,

"it has been standard prac

tice for many years to show bond discount on the balance
sheet as a deferred charge and bond premium as a deferred
credit, with the bond liability account remaining at face
value throughout the life of the bonds."17
This form of presentation is clearly delineated in
the 1971 edition of Accounting Trends and Techniques where
it is shown that debt discount or expense represents the
most frequently mentioned item in the "Deferred Charges" and
"Other Asset" classification of the 600 reports that were

17Lee J. Seidler, "Liabilities," in Accountants'
Handbook, eds. Rufus Wixon, Walter G. Kell, and Norton M.
Bedford (5th ed.; New Yorks The Ronald Press Company,
1970),
p. 20.34.
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studied.

lft

The apparent support offered for this approach

was the definition of a deferred charge in Bulletin No. 43s
". . . deferred charges . . . [are] unamortized debt dis
count and expense, bonus payments under a long-term lease,
costs of rearrangement of factory layout or removal to a new
location, and certain types of research and development
costs."

19

Even though this method of classification has

70
become a tradition in financial reporting, w the theory
aspect of the situation indicates that such a procedure is
improper.

There is an implication of future benefit present

in an item classified as an asset, and it is difficult to
find any such benefit in a bond discount.

To the contrary,

it arises from a situation where the borrower must repay an
amount greater than that which was actually borrowed.
addition,

In

it can be reasoned that the premium or discount

should be reported in conjunction with the debt element in
order to fully disclose the facts concerning the issue.
origin

of

The

the premium or discount lies in a comparison of

the market rate of interest

(for similar securities)

and the

coupon rate on the bond; and an extension of this reasoning
would require the resulting valuation account be reported in

^■®Woolsey Carmalt (ed.), Accounting Trends and Tech
niques (New York:
American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, 1971).
19Ibid., p. 94.

20A review of several issues of Accounting Trends
and Techniques will support this conclusion.
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conjunction with the maturity value of the debt.
. . . the standard practice tends to breakdown the
integrity of the left-hand side of the balance sheet
as a showing of assets; it lends encouragement to the
tacking on of a catch-all section of questionable
deferred charges or "unadjusted debits." These titles,
along with deferred credits, are particularly objec
tionable, since they defy logical explanation inde
pendent of bookkeeping technicalities.21
Therefore,

it would seem the only logical classification for

bond discount would be as a liability contra account.

This

reasoning would apply to any situation where a discount
exists.

The fact that the discount arises as a result of

issuing two economic rights is irrelevant to the analysis,
once the proceeds for the debt portion has been determined,
then the recording of the bonds would follow the normal pr o 
cedures for debt issuances.
The Conversion Option
If value is allocated to the conversion privilege,
three items must be presented on the balance sheets

the

maturity value of the bonds, the discount on the bonds,
the value of the conversion option.

and

The classification of

the first two has already been discussed,

so it is now time

to turn to the conversion privilege.
The Board has specifically stated that the credit
should be ". . . accounted for as paid-in capital
by a credit to capital surplus).

22

(typically

And in accordance with

2^Seidler, op. cit., pp. 20*34-35.
22Accounting Principles Board, Opinion No. 1 0 . op.
cit., p. 147.
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the Opinion, most of the companies reflecting the value of
the conversion feature in their financial statements
followed this approach.

At that time the procedure was

consistent with that prescribed for warrants.24

The theo

retical support lies in the fact that the amount credited to
contributed capital represents the consideration given for
the right to obtain stock in the future.

This is considered

to be sort of a down payment on the issuance of the stock,
and therefore, additional paid-in capital.
One deviation from this approach can be seen in the
statements for J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc.

This company was

one of the first to adopt the procedure of allocation of
value to the conversion option even before it was introduced
in the Opinion.

However, the accountants for Stevens chose

to present the value of the call privilege as a deferred
credit rather than an element of paid-in capital in the 1965
statements.

This was adjusted in 1966 to bring the

22This statement disclosure (a credit to paid-in
capital) can be found in the 1967 annual reports for the
Armstrong Rubber Company; Airlift International, Inc.;
Television Manufacturers of America Co.; Components, Inc.;
and Bangor Punta Corporation.
It must be remembered that
paragraphs 8 & 9 of Opinion No. 10 were suspended before its
effective date (see Chapter 2), therefore, the only companies
that actually followed the allocation provisions were those
with fiscal years ending before December 31, 1967, and who
decided to adopt the Opinion before its effective date.
As
a result, there are only a few examples of this type of
reporting.
However, these examples are consistent with the
Opinion and the then current reporting practices.
24Accounting Principles Board, Opinion N o . 1 0 . op.
cit., pp. 147-48.
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accounts in agreement with Opinion No. 10.25
The Net of Discount Approach
It seems the accounting for the conversion feature
prior to its suspension was fairly well stabilized, however,
there are some alternative approaches to the suggested
financial statement presentation.
of them being that of Hector Anton.
suggested that bonds,

One of the more plausible
Actually Dr. Anton has

in general, be valued on the balance

sheet in a manner similar to the techniques that are used
for computing the present value of the securities.
a 50-year,
per cent

3 per cent,

Assuming

$100,000 bond issue sold to yield 5

(proceeds $63,385.89), he would disclose the

following information:
ASSETS
(none)
LIABILITIES
Long term liabilities
Bonds Payable— principal (face amount
$100,000, maturing January 1,
2022)
$ 8,464.73
Bonds Payable— interest (semiannual
payments of $1,500,000)

54.921.16
S63.385.8926

25pootnotes to the financial statements were used to
describe the initial recording of the value of the conversion
option and the subsequent adjustment.
See the Annual Reports
for J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc. for 1965 and 1966, p. 17.
26Hector R. Anton, "Accounting for Bond Liabilities,"
The journal of Accountancv. CII (September, 1956), 53.
In
actual practice this illustration would be modified to show
the current portion of the interest as a current liability.
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This procedure represents the reporting of the present value
of two liabilities and could be used for convertible debt
by applying a discount rate equal to the interest the bonds
would have to bear if there were no conversion feature.

This

would eliminate the need for reporting the discount, but,
unfortunately,

it would also fail to disclose the value of

the conversion option, and that has been determined to be of
utmost importance in the reporting of convertible debt.
Net of Tax Reporting
Another facet of the statement presentation problem
deals with the tax aspect of the situation.

While the posi

tion of the Internal Revenue Service had not been specific
ally set forth when the Board was reviewing convertible debt
accounting, there was considerable speculation that the
amortization of the discount would not be allowed for tax
purposes.

Despite this fact there were numerous references

in the Board's files regarding the use of a net of tax
reporting of the discount.

The consensus of those favoring

this approach seemed to be that " . . .

the resulting after

tax cost of interest plus discount amortization should be
the same as the net interest cost if a nonconvertible debenture had been issued with a higher interest rate."

27

The concept of net of tax reporting was supported by
many companies expressing an opinion on allocation including

^ " S u b j e c t File Rider," Arthur Andersen & Co.,
Subject Fi l e . Reference No. CO 7020-4, p. 1.
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the United Aircraft Corporation, however, their approach was
somewhat different.
. . . Since discount on debt issued with warrants
is deductible for tax purposes, then imputed discount
on convertible debt should also be so treated in the
accounts.
Since we would be imputing a discount in
the first place, there should be no theoretical diffi
culty in imputing a tax benefit a l s o . 28
The SEC had accepted this approach in at least one case, but
later reversed itself and refused to allow the hypothetical
tax reduction of the discount in the financial statements.^9
It is difficult to justify the recording of tax
effects where such effects do not exist.

If there is an

attempt to apply this procedure, then consistency would
require that all of the items in the financial statements,
where tax and accounting differ, would have to be adjusted
for this nonexistent feature, and needless to say, this
would not lead to an improvement in the quality of the state
ments.

Instead,

it would destroy the objective of reporting

economic effects.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The American Accounting Association has listed
quantifiability as one of the four basic accounting standards.

on

As such it ranks very high in importance among those

^ P o s i t i o n Paper submitted to the APB by the United
Aircraft Corporation (undated, approximately September,
1967), p. 4.
O Q

^ A r t h u r Andersen & Co., op. cit., pp. 1-2.
^ A m e r i c a n Accounting Association, A Basic Statement
of Accounting Theory, op. cit., pp. 11-13.
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studying accounting and those practicing it as a profession.
That this is true can easily be seen by reviewing the files
of the Board with respect to convertible debt.

The subcom

mittee studying the situation included the measurement
problem in a specific outline of items that must be resolved
before an Opinion on the subject could be issued.

As a

result, the correspondence, position papers, and other data
in the files of the APB are replete with references con
cerning the measurement problems associated with convertible
bonds.

The general approach that most of these references

take is that the lack of a separate market for the conversion
feature makes measurement a hazardous undertaking,

and this

has led to a situation where the investment bankers have
practically revolted against the accounting profession.
Despite this resistance there has been some progress
in refining the measurement process.

The actual valuation

procedure has developed from three major approaches:

(1) the

traditional and residual security approach of assigning an
arbitrary zero value to the conversion right;

(2) the imputed

discount approach of attempting to compute a value for the
right; and

(3) the dual method of presenting both conversion

and nonconversion data in the statements.

However, the two

economic elements that exist at the issuance of the debtequity package place a restriction upon the acceptance of an
approach that only the second method

(the computation of a

value for the option) successfully satisfies.

Thus, the

other methods either ignore or attempt to circumvent the
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substance of the transaction in favor of a strict adherence
to its legal form.
The traditional method treats convertible debt as if
it were an ordinary bond with the exception of a footnote to
the financial statements describing the conversion feature
and the maximum number of shares of common stock that could
be issued under the current circumstances.

The residual

security method goes one step further and modifies earnings
per share by assuming conversion

(under the condition that

the bonds draw a major portion of their value from the con
version feature).

On the other hand, the dual method

developed by Dr. Curry simply presents data with and without
conversion and, therefore,

forces the reader to make a

decision as to which is the most representative of the
actual situation.
Once the imputed discount has been accepted as the
best financial statement presentation of the debt and the
call privilege,

it then becomes necessary to place a dollar

value upon each element.

An examination of the direct valua

tion of the call option versus a valuation of the debt with
out the conversion option clearly indicates the latter has
less possibility of error and, therefore, should be used for
statement purposes.

As a result, the conversion option

should be measured as prescribed in Opinion No. 10, i.e., the
residual amount after deducting the issue price of the debt
without the conversion option from the total proceeds of the
debt-equity package.
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Since there is a great deal of subjectivity in this
measurement procedure, this approach is not without its
limitations.

However, the results should not produce

material errors in the financial statements.

This can be

attested to by those companies that elected to apply para
graphs 8 and 9 of Opinion No. 10 before they became effec
tive.

It seems apparent that if there was as much error in

the computations as those opposing allocation have claimed,
no one would have adopted it before the required date.
After the conversion option has been valued,
becomes necessary to report it on the balance sheet.

it then
Since

the proceeds allocated to the call privilege represent the
cost of the right to obtain common stock in the future, it
should be classified as part of contributed capital.

This

would be consistent with the procedure used for debt issued
with warrants.

However, the classification of the discount

on the bonds is somewhat questionable.

Traditionally bond

discount has been reported on the financial statements as a
deferred charge, but a liability contra account presentation
would illustrate the economic facts of the situation much
better.

Therefore,

be adopted,

it is suggested that the latter approach

in addition,

it seems to be more in agreement

with the current position taken by the Board in Opinion No.

■^Accounting Principles Board, Accounting Principles
Board Opinion Number 21:
Interest on Receivables and Pay
ables (New York:
American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, 1971), p. 423.
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Finally,

the application of a net of tax approach to

valuation of the conversion privilege was determined to be
in direct opposition to the economic facts of the situation
because the IRS does not allow such a discount to be deduct
ible for tax purposes,

and therefore, to impute this pro

cedure would not improve the data presented in the financial
reports.
Since the theoretical aspects of the valuation prob
lem have been discussed, the empirical feature must also be
studied in order to complete an analysis of this topic.
Questions such as the effect the inclusion of the call
privilege on the financial statements and the effective use
of the statements with allocation must be examined in order
to make a logical decision as to the applicability of valuing
the conversion option.

As such, the next chapter deals with

the allocation question from a practical or use oriented
approach.

Chapter 6
EMPIRICAL ASPECTS OF THE VALUATION OF
THE CONVERSION PRIVILEGE
"Accounting information is the chief means of
reducing the uncertainty under which external users
act.

. . .

The specific purpose served by the data will

vary depending upon the needs of the reader and the par
ticular decision model employed, however,

it is generally

accepted that a prevalent use of financial data lies in the
formulation of investment decisions.
a particular economic alternative
alternatives)

The final selection of

(or some combination of

for the use of investment funds will probably

rest on some form of published accounting information.
Whether these data are used directly or indirectly
in formulating a given investment portfolio has been the
subject of much controversy and a plethora of published
information.

The research usually follows one of the three

major approaches to the subject,
view or questionnaire,

i.e., the use of an inter

computer simulation, or an empirical

^American Accounting Association, A Statement of
Basic Accounting Theory (Evanston: American Accounting
Association, 1966), p. 19.
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study.

o

Despite this rather broad coverage in terms of

methodology, there is still considerable disagreement over
the extent of the influence of published accounting informa
tion on stock prices.

Several of the studies indicate that

the information published in financial reports has only a
slight direct effect on the price of stock of a given com
pany, while others take a completely opposite approach.
However, the purpose of this paper is to supply information
that will lead to an evaluation of the null hypothesis as
stated in Chapter 1:

that there would be no significant

difference for theoretical or predictive purposes under
alternative procedures of accounting for convertible bonds.
Since the theoretical aspects of the question have already
been examined,
the empirical

the purpose of this chapter will be to study
(or predictive) portion of the hypothesis.
THE MODEL

Selection of Companies
The overall approach to this study was to apply the
statistical technique of regression analysis to both the
unadjusted data

(as reported by the companies studied) and

the adjusted data, and then to determine whether or not a
significant difference exists between the coefficients of
determination of the two equations.

In order to accomplish

^For a review of the major works in each area see
George J. Benston, "Published Corporate Accounting Data and
Stock Prices," Journal of Accounting Research. Supplement.
V (1967), 1-2.
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this task a sample of ten companies was randomly selected
from a list of corporations having convertible debt out
standing in 1961.

This list was prepared from the July,

1969, edition of Moody's Industrial Manual.

The companies

selected had to meet two basic qualifications:

(1) that one

or more issues of convertible bonds were outstanding from
1961 to 1970, and

(2) that the companies conducted profitable

operations during this period.

Such a sample would allow for

an error in the prediction of less than 5 per cent at the 95
per cent confidence level.

Thus from this sample the effects

of allocating value to the conversion privilege can be pro
jected to all companies using convertible debt with an
acceptable level of confidence.
While there was no conserted effort to bring about
dispersion of the companies studied, they varied in size
(based on total assets in 1970)

from Thriftimart,

million, to Union Oil Company of California,

Inc., $65

$2,515 million.

Included also were many varied industries from sales of food
items to natural resources,

and from surgical instruments to

companies specializing in leisure-time products.

Specifi

cally the companies were:
AMF incorporated
Brunswick Corporation
Combustion Engineering, Inc.
Copperweld Steel Company
FMC Corporation
Fruehauf Corporation

Manual

^Moody's Investors Service, M o o d y 1s Industrial
(New York: Moody's Investors Service, Inc.).
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Scott Paper Company
Sybron Corporation
Thriftimart, inc.
Union Oil Company of California
It can easily be seen that there is a wide variety
of corporations included which will allow the conclusions to
be extended to any type of industrial corporation.

Neither

from the span of the sample nor from data found while com
pleting the study was there any reason found that would
restrict the applicability of the projected conclusions pro
vided by the study.

In addition, none of the companies

selected had convertible debt outstanding in 1961 of less
than 20 per cent of the total long-term debt, and in four
companies it was in excess of 50 per cent.

Thus these com

panies were representative of those corporations that had a
significant portion of convertible debt outstanding.

This

is an important factor in applying the results of this
study to any company with convertible debt, because if the
findings are applicable to companies with a large quantity
of convertible debt, they certainly will apply to those with
a small portion.
The accounting data used in the calculations were
taken from the annual report (s) published by each company.
In those instances where the company could not or would not
supply reports for a particular year, the information was
obtained from M o o d y 1s industrial M a n u a l .

This procedure was

adopted in an attempt to use as nearly as possible the
same data that was made available to the stockholders and
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prospective stockholders.

Where necessary,

appropriate

adjustments were made to the data to make all years com
parable.

These adjustments are explained in detail below.

The Regression Equation
As previously indicated many factors influence the
level of the stock market.
eight independent variables.

Initially this study contained
These were selected because

they are those that are most commonly mentioned throughout
accounting and financial literature.

In addition, they

measure the major features of an investment in common stock—
namely risk,

income through dividends, and capital apprecia

tion through the earnings of the firm.

An active attempt

was made to include data from both the balance sheet and the
income statement.

Recent criticism of the exclusion of the

former is evident in the writings of Chambers, W. A. Paton,
Jr.,

and others.

It seems that the emphasis currently being

placed on the income statement has been subjected to a great
deal of disagreement by many accounting theorists, thus this
study has attempted to bridge this gap by employing data from
both statements thereby utilizing each to its fullest in
analyzing the movement of stock prices.
An additional factor that often influences the move
ment of stock prices is that of the general level of the
stock market.

In many instances this item can be more impor

tant than any other piece of information, witness the two
major stock market declines in the 1960's.

Therefore the

inclusion of this statistic should add an element of
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stability and give the study a broader base.
With these factors in mind, the following equation
was used:

pjtL /

+ W

-

i

+

+

+ DSjt/°S jt-l + C jt/C jt-1 +

DO j^/ d O j

j. +

where:
Pjt_ /Pjt,.
"
T j-1

= t^ie stock price of a share of common stock
of company j in period tjj divided by period
tr_i.
Here L is a lag factor to allow for
the delay after the end of an accounting
period before the financial information is
released to the public,

D-:t/D-;t_jL

= the long-term debt-owners ' equity ratio of
company j in period t divided by period t-1,

E j t/Ejt-l

= the earnings per share of company j in period
t divided by period t-1,

Ijt/ljt_1

= the times interest earned ratio of company
in period t divided by period t-1,

M-;t /M-;^
L
T j-1

= the general level of the stock market in
period tL divided by period tL_]_,

DS^t/DS^t_^

= dividends per share of common stock for com
pany j in period t divided by period t-1,

Cjt/C-jt-l

= the ratio of convertible debt to long-term
debt for company j in period t divided by
period t-1,

DOj ^/DOj t-1

= the dividend payout ratio for company j in
period t divided by period t-1, and

Ajt/Ajt-1

= the asset to owners' equity ratio for company
j in period t divided by period t-1.

j
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Stock Price
The calculation of stock price is based on the
closing stock quotations on whichever market the stock is
traded for five trading days following the release of the
accounting information.

The release date was assumed to be

the date of the president's letter.

In those instances

where the president's letter was not dated, the date of the
auditor's opinion, appropriately adjusted by the average
time between the date of the opinion and the president's
letter for those periods where the information was available,
was used.

The effect of computing the stock price at the

projected release date of the financial statements was to
build into the study a lag feature.
should be apparent,

The necessity for this

i.e., the price of the stock immediately

after the end of a particular period cannot reflect the
effects of that period until the financial information can
be compiled and released to the investing public.^

in those

few instances where no financial reports were available, the
average release date from the other years was used in pro
jecting the issuance of the reports.
In selecting the period of time to be used to measure
the price of the stock an average of five days was used

^There is the distinct possibility that this infor
mation was anticipated in advance and already discounted by
the market, however, this factor would be considered through
the use of the time lag.
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because Benston^ found that a period as long as a month was
probably too long, and he suggested that future research try
weekly or even daily stock price data.

Since the latter was

deemed too short a period of time, weekly data were used.
The percentage relationship used from one period to
the next required that an adjustment be made to some of the
years so that period t and period t-1 were both in the same
terms.

Therefore, adjustments were necessary for large

stock dividends and stock splits.

No changes were deemed

necessary in those instances where small stock dividends
were issued.

It was felt that a small increase in the

number of shares outstanding would not affect market value.
If additional shares were issued in other than a stock
dividend or stock split there was no adjustment as long as
there was compensation to the corporation involved.
Since the market tends to react to the ex-dividend
date with a reduction in the price of the stock, it can
reasonably be assumed that the stock price included the
amount of the dividend up to the time when it went "exdividend."

Therefore, whenever a dividend was declared

during the period of time that was used for the measurement
of the stock price the amount of the dividend was deducted
from the market quotation.

This allowed the analysis to

consider the "pure" price of the stock without any distor-

^Benston, "Published Corporate Accounting Data and
Stock Prices," op. cit., 28.

177
tion resulting from declared, but unpaid, dividends.
Long-Term Debt-Owners1 Equity Ratio
The long-term debt-owners' equity ratio was calcu
lated by dividing the long-term debt outstanding by the total
stockholders' equity.

Since most companies report any debt

discount and/or issue expense as an other asset

(or in a

deferred charge category),^ the maturity value of the long
term debt was used in the calculation.
Earnings Per Share
Basically the earnings per share figure used was that
which was presented to the stockholders in the annual
reports.

In an attempt to relate stock price to earnings,

however a modification was used in some instances.

The

intent was to use a figure for net income that approached
the old current-operating approach.

Under this concept net

income is essentially a normal, recurring type of figure,
i.e., all extraordinary items were excluded from the calcu
lation.
It was felt that this approach to income would be
more relevant to the reader for measuring the economic
progress made by the company during the period under calcula
tion.

It would also serve as a more stable base for predict

ing future operating results.

This approach supports the

6see the preceding chapter for an analysis of this
point and a discussion of the balance sheet classification
of all items included in this study.
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theory that the knowledgeable investor will use a measure of
income for investment purposes that bears a reasonable com
parison in terms of causation and trend analysis, and not
simply one that has occurred this year as a result of some
nonrecurring transactions.
to APB Opinion No. 9,
base for net income.

In addition,

in those years prior

it put all companies on a similar
Actually, though, there were only a few

instances where any change had to be made to the reported
figure, and in these instances, except as mentioned below,
the difference was very minor.
The virtual plague that encompassed the bowling
industry in the mid-to-late 1960's created some accounting
problems for Brunswick and AMF.

Both of these companies

included in income, and rightly so according to accounting
definitions, the write-down of receivables and inventories
resulting from the slump in activity.

The obvious nature

and nonrecurring aspect of this item led to the conclusion
that income would better reflect the results of operations
if the write-off was eliminated from the calculations.
Since the regression analysis was performed with the
current year
year

(t) expressed as a percentage of the preceding

(t-1) in every instance where there was a change in the

base it was taken into consideration.

This occurred where

the preceding year was restated for some reason

(especially

7Accounting principles Board, Accounting Principles
Board Opinion Number 9: Reporting the Results of Operations
(New York:
American Institute of Certified Public Account
ants, 1966).
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in mergers), or a stock dividend or stock split occurred.
Actually this type of adjustment was made for several of the
variables where the current year was not comparable to the
preceding year because of some event other than normal
operations.
Again an attempt was made to use the data as it was
presented to the readers of the financial statements in
order to tie as closely as possible any reaction that would
result from the relative change from year to year, and at
the same time eliminate any distortion that could result
from comparing figures that did not have a comparable b a s e .
Whenever a computation of earnings per share was
necessary,

it was prepared in accordance with the theoreti

cal procedures that were applicable at that time.

Since the

period of time covered by this study spanned three major
pronouncements with respect to earnings per share this
latter point is especially important to preserve the accu
racy of the analysis.
Times Interest Earned
The calculation for times interest earned is that
which is proposed by most textbooks and security analysts in
that income, after adding back interest expense, is divided
by the periodic charge for interest as reflected in the
income statement.

Basically this plus the long-term debt-

owners' equity ratio and the asset-owners1 equity ratio
later discussion)

(see

reflect a popular measure of risk involved

in a particular investment from both the balance sheet and
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the income statement point of view.
Level of the Stock Market
The price of a particular security does not exist in
a vacuum.

Therefore, the mere existence of a major trend in

the stock market, either upward or downward, can account for
some of the change in the price of a given stock.

In many

instances this "drag" or "pull" effect exerted by the general
level of the market will offset the effects that accounting
data or any other information would have on the price
fluctuations of a share of stock.
In an attempt to measure the movement of the level
of the stock market the selection of an indicator became a
problem.

There are several averages that are available,

namely the Dow Jones Industrial Average

(DJIA) , the Standard

& Poor 500, and the measure prepared by the New York Stock
Exchange.

A good argument could be made for any one of

these, however it was felt that because of the extent of the
general knowledge on the part of the investing public, and
the vast amount of publicity directed toward the DJIA,
together with the fact that all of the companies used in the
study are broadly classified as industrial corporations,
made this a suitable indicator of investor temperament in
the market.

Of course there are many arguments against the

theoretical accuracy of the DJIA as a general measurement
device, however, the benefits as previously mentioned were
felt to overshadow these arguments, and the criticisms were
not felt to be of the nature that would affect this particu
lar study.
The actual computations that were made paralleled
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those for computing the stock price for each year,

i.e., the

closing level of the DJIA was averaged for five trading days
following the release of the financial statements.

This

placed both measures of stock prices in the same time period
and should account for the "push" or "pull" effect exerted
by the general level of the market.
Dividends Per Share
Like earnings per share, the figures used for divi
dends per share were as close to those actually reported by
the company as possible.

In this instance the only changes

that were necessary resulted from events which made the data
of the current year
year

(t-1).

(t) not comparable with the previous

Thus adjustments were made for events such as

stock dividends and splits where the basis for comparison
was disturbed without any receipt of compensation.

The

actual figure used was the cash dividends paid to the common
stock

(or residual security) holders.

Again, most of this

information was historical in nature and taken directly from
the annual reports.
Convertible Debt to Total Debt
This variable was used in the study in an attempt to
determine whether or not the change in the quantity of con
vertible bonds in relation to total long-term debt influenced
the price of the stock.

This could also be included as a

measure of risk in that it indicates there is some possibi
lity of dilution with regard to earnings resulting from the
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issuance of debt that could be converted into common stock.
Dividend Payout
Another variable that was used to indicate a form of
income was dividend payout.

This differs from the other two

measures of income in that it represents the percentage of
income available to common stockholders that was paid out in
the form of dividends, thereby indicating to investors the
maximum possible increase in dividends that could be paid
and the thinking of management with respect to the financing
of the business.
Asset-Owners' Equity Ratio
The final measure of risk was the asset-owners'
equity ratio.

In this calculation total assets were divided

by owners' equity.

Even though this ratio measures just

about the same factors as the debt-owners' equity ratio,

it

was included in the analysis because of the fact that most
companies report any discount related to debt as an other
asset rather than a contra account,

and it was felt that

this factor should be represented in the regression equation.
The Adjustment for Valuation of
the Conversion Feature
Theoretically the market value of a bond represents
the present value of the principal plus the present value of
the periodic interest payments discounted at the market rate
of interest for similar securities.

A premium or discount

on the issuance will result if this market

(yield) rate
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differs from the stated

(nominal) rate.

Mathematically this

can be stated as follows:

where:
V

= the

present value of the bond,

M

= the

maturity value of the bond,

I

= the

stated interest payment in dollars per period,

i

= the
and

market rate of interest per interest period,

n = the number of interest payments over the life of
the b o n d s .
Since the premium or discount is based upon the dif
ference between the market rate of interest and the stated
rate, an alternative and often simpler, computation may be
employed:

(Each symbol in the preceding equation has the same meaning
as that used in the original equation.)
Simply stated,

this formula indicates that the present

value of a bond is equal to the maturity value plus or minus
(as the case may be) the difference between the stated
interest in dollars per interest period and the yield interest

®This method is based upon a calculation for deter
mining the discount or premium on the issuance of a bond as
used by Meigs, et al. in their advanced accounting textbook.
See Walter B. Meigs, Charles E. Johnson and Thomas F. Keller,
Advanced Accounting (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1966), p. 622.
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discounted at the yield rate.

Therefore, eliminating the

maturity value of the bond, the discount or premium would
be:
Y =

[TT x M) - (i x

11 + .,
4)!?

where:
Y = the amount of the premium or discount, and the
remainder of the variables are the same as
previously indicated.
This equation can then be modified to produce the
dollar value of the conversion privilege by a few simple
changes:
1 X = Q
I (ic
(if: x M^j
M) I x
T S x M) - (if

(1 + if )n
----- :-----£

where:
X = the dollar amount of the discount,
M = the maturity value of the bonds,
is = the market rate of interest for similar securi
ties without the conversion privilege,
if = the yield rate in terms of the issue price of
the convertible bond under consideration, and
n = the number of interest payments over the life of
the bond.
As indicated in a previous chapter "X" will almost always be
a discount figure because the conversion feature is usually
set at a level that will allow the issuance of the bonds at
par.
In general the above equation means that the dollar
amount attributable to the conversion privilege is the dif
ference between the actual issue rate and the rate of
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interest on similar securities without the conversion privi
lege discounted at the latter interest rate.
The theory behind this procedure is that if the con
version feature were not present in the bond it would have to
sell at a higher rate of interest, and therefore, the value
of the conversion privilege is attributable to the difference
between this rate and the actual yield rate.

The actual

yield rate and not the nominal rate was used because there
could have been some discount or premium attributable to the
bond itself, and it would be incorrect to include that in
the valuation of the conversion privilege.
Application of the Valuation Procedures
There is basically no difficulty involved in applying
this formula once the yield rate of similar securities with
out the conversion feature is determined.
Aaa to Baa

For bonds rated

(using Moody's rating scheme) monthly yield rates

for corporate industrial bonds are presented in the blue
insert pages of each edition of Moody's Industrial M a n u a l .
These rates date back to January,

1919.

However, a problem

arises when bonds rated below Baa are used.
In this study approximately half of the bonds were
rated Ba and B, therefore a variation of the valuation pro
cedure was used.

Actually this procedure consisted of

developing the relevant yield figures similar to those pub
lished by Moody's, except they were for the Ba and B levels.
The information came from reviewing the nonconvertible bond
issues recorded in M o o d y 1s Industrial Manual for several
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issues from 1962-1971
for 1961).

(the 1962 manual covers the reports

These figures were then used for the yield of

the nonconvertible bonds in the discount calculations.
Accounting Effects of Valuing the
Conversion Privilege
Once a dollar valuation has been placed on the con
version feature, the effects upon each of the independent
variables must be determined.

The general approach was to

amortize the discount created over the life of the bond on a
straight-line basis.
effective yield

There was the possibility that the

(or constant rate) method was used by a

company, but not probable.

In fact, Andrew Barr, Chief

Accountant of the Securities and Exchange Commission, wrote
to the Accounting Principles Board indicating that unless
the Board overtly made the yield method acceptable, the lack
of use by reporting companies would preclude it from being
classified as a generally accepted accounting principle.9
This plus the fact that the difference between the two is
usually not material makes the use of the straight-line
method acceptable.
As previously indicated the discount was treated as
an other asset
sheet.

(or possibly a deferred charge) on the balance

The amortization of the asset was included in the

definition of net income, as is the amortization of any

9The APB subsequently included a special provision in
Opinion No. 12 (paragraph 16) that approved the use of the
compound interest method of amortization.

other discount,

as an addition to interest expense.

The

credit created by valuing the conversion feature was set up
as part of contributed capital.
The tax aspect of the amortization of the discount
attributable to the conversion feature was not very clear
during part of the time covered by this s t u d y , ^ however,
the government eventually settled it in that

. . n o por

tion of the cost of a convertible debenture, attributable to
the conversion privilege,

is to be treated as amortizable

bond discount under Sec. 163 or original issue discount under
Sec. 1 2 3 2 . " ^

This approach was not consistently applied

during the time span covered by this study, nor between
companies,

so in an attempt to achieve uniformity and to be

as accurate as possible, no consideration of income tax was
used on the conversion privilege.

The point was finally

cleared up in 1969 with Sec. 1232 of the Internal Revenue
Code.
Since there were almost constant changes

(reductions)

in the quantity of convertible bonds outstanding for each
company,

some allowance had to be made to account for these

changes.

No exact information is available on a company by

company basis,

so it was assumed that all conversions and

other reductions took place at mid-year.

The effects of

*■0Arthur Andersen & Co., Subject F i l e . Reference No.
CO 7020-4, p. 2.
^ R a n d o l p h W. Thrower, "Conglomerates and Convertibles,
The Tax Advisor. I (January, 1970), 7.
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using this period should cause the least possible deviation
from what actually took place.
The overall approach of these procedures, then, is to
treat the difference between the actual cash yield rate on
the security and the cash yield rates on similar securities
without the conversion feature to be the valuation of the
conversion privilege,

and this amount was then amortized

over the life of the security as additional interest expense.
The ratios previously indicated were then regressed against
the price of the stock

(with each expressed as a percentage

of the preceding year)

in both the unadjusted and adjusted

forms.
RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Regression analysis is a statistical tool for deriving
the relationship between a dependent variable and one or more
independent variables,

it is based upon a mathematical

equation that expresses the functional relationship which
exists between the dependent variable and the independent
variable(s),

i.e., it measures the cause and effect relation

ship that exists between phenomena.
Correlation analysis measures the degree of associa
tion between the dependent and the independent variable(s).
The coefficient of correlation, commonly referred to as "r,"
measures the closeness of the relationship between the
dependent and independent variables, and the coefficient of
determination

(r^) indicates the percentage of the variation
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that is measured by the independent variable(s).

In this

study the information derived from the regression analysis
was used to measure the correlation between the movement of
stock prices and the data studied.
The Original Equation
The results of the original equation are summarized
in Table 2 and Table 3.

From the former it can be seen that

there is a significant relationship between stock price and
the accounting ratios and other data selected at the .01
level.

This means that there is less than a 1 per cent

chance that a coefficient of correlation and determination
could be that large by a pure chance relationship between
the variables.

In addition,

it is evident that there is

little difference between the unadjusted and the adjusted
data.

A difference of only .014 (for r^) is not significant

at the .95 level.

Thus it would seem that the null

hypothesis would have to be accepted in regard to the pre
dictability of the data after a value has been assigned to
the conversion privilege.
Table 2
Statistical Results of the Regression Analysis Using
the Original Equation— Correlation Results
Item
Coefficient of correlation (r)
Coefficient of determination (r^)
Standard error of the estimate

Unadjusted
.519a
.269a b
.205

aSignificant at the .01 level.
^Difference not significant at .95 level.

Adjusted
.504a
.255a b
.207
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However a close examination of Table 3 indicates
that the variables which have the most significant relation
ship regarding the price of the stock are the general level
of the stock market,
per share

the dividend payout ratio,

and dividends

(the former two at the .001 level and the latter

at the .02 level).

The other variables were significant at

the .30 level or lower which is not acceptable from a
statistical point of view.

Thus two of the variables ex

plaining most of the stock price variation had nothing to do
with the question of determining whether or not the alloca
tion of value to the conversion privilege produces better
information for predictive purposes.
The Modified Equation
Since the results of the analysis indicates there is
virtually no difference between the two sets of figures, the
original equation was altered to include only those variables
that would be affected by valuing the conversion privilege.
The purpose of this modification was to eliminate those
variables that were included in order to add an element of
completeness to the study, and to focus attention on those
accounting variables that would be affected by the alloca
tion procedures used.

This would eliminate any interrela

tionships between the variables that would be affected by
allocation and those that would not be changed.

In addition,

due to the lack of a significant difference between the two
original equations,

this procedure would help isolate any
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Table 3
Statistical Results of the Regression
Analysis Using the Original
Equation— By Variables

Variable
Constant

Coefficient
U nadj. A d j .

Standard
Error
Unadj. A d j .

T-Ratio
U nadj.
Adj.

.191

.439

.442

.810

.432

Long-term debto w n e r s ' equity
ratio
-.099 -.057

.073

.073

-1.359

- .790

Earnings per
share

.001

.004

.003

.629

.396

-.136 -.101

.076

.080

-1.802

-1.265

Times interest
earned

.356

.003

General level of
the stock
market

.732

.738

.189

.191

3.870a

3.870a

Dividends per
share

.356

.330

.129

.129

2.765b

2.555c

Convertible debt
to long-term
debt
-.008 -.008

.020

.020

- .399

- .392

Dividend payout

.074

.074

-4.606a

-4.363a

.314

.315

Asset-owners1
equity
ratio

-.342 -.323

.162

.247

S i g n i f i c a n t at the .001 level.
^Significant at the .01 level.
S i g n i f i c a n t at the .02 level.

.516

.783
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differences that may exist between the two groups of data.
There was also the possibility that since there was such a
significant contribution to the coefficient of correlation
made by the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the other
variables that did not change with the allocation process,
the results of the analysis could have been clouded and any
difference that did exist between the adjusted and unadjusted
data would not stand out as much as it would if these vari
ables were eliminated.
The results of the modified analysis are presented
in Tables 4 and 5 (see page 193) .

From Table 4 it can be

seen that there is no direct significant relationship
between stock price and the variables used, however they did
contribute something in explaining the movement of stock
prices.

Since it is not the purpose of this study to produce

an equation that will predict the market price of common
stock, the lack of a significant relationship
wise)

is irrelevant.

ference,

(predictive

The important result lies in the dif

if any, between the relative predictive ability of

the two equations.
As in the original equation, the modified equation
shows that there is little difference between the predictive
ability of the unadjusted and the adjusted data.

In fact,

the spread between the two coefficients of determination is
less— .008 as opposed to .014 for the original equation.
This difference,

as in the original equation,

is not signifi

cant at the .95 level, and therefore, the null hypothesis
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Table 4
Statistical Results of the Regression
Analysis Using the Modified
Equation— Correlation
Results

Item
Coefficient of correlation

(r)

Coefficient of determination

(r^)

Standard error of the estimate

Unadjusted

Adjusted

.327

.315

.107a

.099a

.226

.227

aDifference not: significant at the .95 level.

Table! 5
Statistical Results of the Regression
Analysis Using the Modified
Equation— By Variables

Variable
Constant

Coefficient
U n adj. Adj .

Standard
Error
Unadj. Adj .

T-Ratio
U nadj.
Adj .

1.304

1.176

.409

.403

3.188

2.917

Long-term debto w n e r s ' equity
ratio
-.081

-.049

.080

.080

-1.015

- .608

.001

.000

.005

.003

.164

Times Interest
earned

-.073

-.037

.081

.084

- .906

-\068
'
i
- .'444

Dividend payout

-.275

-.259

.076

.076

-3.613a

-3.419a

.180

.222

.342

.344

Earnings per
share

Asset-owners *
equity
ratio

S i g n i f i c a n t at the .001 level.

.526

.644
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must be at least partially accepted.

This result is sup

ported by an analysis of the means and standard deviations
of the variables in the modified equation, where, except for
earnings per share, there is virtually no difference between
the adjusted and the unadjusted data

(see Table 6).

Table 6
Comparison of Mean and Standard Deviation
of Variables in the Modified
Equation
Standard
Deviation
UnUn
adjusted Adjusted adjusted Adjusted
Mean

Variable

Long-term debt-owners'
equity ratio

1.043

1.034

.367

.360

Earnings per share

1.792

2.132

6.465

9.694

Times interest earned

1.055

1.042

.423

.407

Dividend payout

1.023

1.025

.345

.353

.996

.996

.077

.077

Asset-owners' equity
ratio

The closeness of the relationship between the two
sets of data is also illustrated by the simple correlation
coefficients,

i.e.,

the correlation between each variable

and the other variables on an individual basis
and 8, pages 195 and 196, respectively).

(see Tables 7

In practically

every case the difference between the correlation coeffi
cients is .02 or less.

It can also be seen from these

Table 7
Statistical Results of the Regression Analysis Using the Modified
Equation— Simple Correlation Between Variables—
Unadjusted Data

Variable

Stock price

Stock
Price

Long-Term
Debt-Owners'
Equity Ratio

Earnings
per
Share

Times
Interest
Earned

Dividend
Payout

AssetOwners'
Equity Ratio

1.000

- .147

- .045

.080

- .366

.085

Long-term debt-owners'
equity ratio

- .147

1.000

.039

- .433

.150

- .327

Earnings per share

- .045

.392

1.000

.466

- .038

- .258

.080

- .433

.466

1.000

- .371

- .026

- .366

.150

- .038

- .371

1.000

.030

.085

- .327

- .258

- .026

- .030

1.000

Times interest earned
Dividend payout
Asset-owners1 equity
ratio
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Table 8
Statistical Results of the Regression Analysis Using the Modified
Equation— Simple Correlation Between Variables—
Adjusted Data

Variable

Stock
Price

Long-Term
Debt-Owners'
Equity Ratio

Earnings
per
Share

Times
interest
Earned

Dividend
Payout

AssetOwners'
Equity Ratio

1.000

- .128

- .048

.112

- .368

.093

Long-term debt-owners'
equity ratio

- .128

1.000

.040

- .403

.148

- .328

Earnings per share

- .048

.040

1.000

.474

- .029

- .256

.112

- .403

.474

1.000

- .391

.014

- .368

.148

- .029

- .391

1.000

.008

.093

- .328

- .256

.014

.008

1.000

Stock price

Times interest earned
Dividend payout
Asset-owners' equity
ratio

196
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tables that multicollinearity is not a relevant factor in
this situation.
Other Results
The lack of a significant direct relationship between
stock price and accounting information should not be start
ling.

It must be remembered that the results of this

analysis can only measure direct relationships,

and there is

a distinct possibility that accounting data has an indirect
relationship on stock prices.

Results similar to the above

were found in several studies, especially that prepared by
Benston.

12

However, most of the authors ignore the possi

bility of an indirect relationship where the accounting
information is used in a supportive manner.
It may very well be that the cause of the low correla
tion between stock price and accounting data lies in the two
major declines that took place in the market during the
1 9 6 0 's.

It is quite possible that they had an effect on

stock prices which exceeded that of the other data.

This

seems to be born out by the results indicated in Table 3.
However,

as it was indicated in Chapter 1 of this study, the

conclusions drawn must be considered in light of the inherent
limitations,

and here it is apparent that not all of the

data available in the accounting statements was used.
rather,

But

since the study was limited to the effects of

12

Benston, "Published Corporate Accounting Data and
Stock Prices," op. cit., 22-54.
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allocating value to the conversion privilege, only those
variables that would have been effected by this procedure
were used.

In addition, it is quite possible that W. A.

Paton, Jr.,

is correct in his position that short-term price

changes are probably not linked to accounting data. J
No matter what approach is taken, no real conclusions
can be drawn as to the effectiveness of accounting informa
tion in general for predicting the movement of stock prices
from this study.

To do so would overstep the scope as out

lined in Chapter 1.

Since this study was not designed to

explore this question fully, any results in that area should
be interpreted with this limitation in m i n d . ^

Here the

point at issue is not the absolute effectiveness of the two
groups of data, but rather, the relative effectiveness of
the adjusted data vs. the unadjusted data.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
As previously indicated, one facet of the null
hypothesis of this study dealt with the allocation of value

13W. A. Paton, Jr., “Discussion of Published Corporate
Accounting Data and Stock Prices," Journal of Accounting Re
search. Supplement. V (1967), 20.
l^This particular topic has been explored in many dif
ferent forms by numerous research techniques, and no one
answer acceptable to even most of the researchers has yet to
be advanced.
Future research will undoubtedly narrow the
areas of difference, however, at the present time there is a
general acknowledgment that accounting information does
effect decisions of investors, but exactly how is still
unknown.
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to the conversion feature of convertible bonds and the effect
this had on the use of accounting information for predicting
movements in the price of common stock.

From the preceding

analysis it can be seen that by regressing the stock price
(expressed as a percentage of the preceding year) against
several accounting ratios dealing with risk, dividend income,
and capital appreciation
the preceding year)

(also expressed as a percentage of

there is no significant difference

between the unadjusted and the adjusted data at the 95 per
cent confidence level.

In addition to the support for this

conclusion found in Tables 2-8, a simple percentage analysis
of earnings per share points out this same result.

Table 9

shows that the percentage change between unadjusted and
adjusted earnings per share is greater than 2.4 per cent in
only 8 per cent of the observations studied,

i.e., in 92 per

cent of the cases studied the allocation of value to the con
version privilege would cause less than a 2.4 per cent
reduction in earnings per share.

In approximately 20 per

cent of the observations studied there was no change in the
earnings per share figure.
This same conclusion was reached by those companies
who used the footnote form of disclosure for the valuation
of the conversion privilege prior to the issuance of APB
Opinion No. 14.

15

In each case management saw fit to include

15Accounting Principles Board, Accounting Principles
Board Opinion Number 14: Accounting for Convertible Debt and
Debt issued with Stock Purchase Warrants (New York:
American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1969).
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Table 9
Percentage Change in Earnings Per Share
After Valuing the Conversion
Privilege

Percentage Change

Per Cent of
Observations*

Cumulative
Percentage

No change

21

21

Up

19

40

.5% to 1.4%

36

76

1.5% to 2.4%

16

92

2.5% to 3.4%

3

95

Over

5

100

to

.4%

3.4%

♦Total number of observations was 100.

a notation as to the immaterial affect on income that an
allocation procedure would create.
Thus it seems that the evidence tends to require the
acceptance of the null hypothesis in so far as the predic
tive aspect is concerned,

i.e., there is no significant

difference for predictive purposes under alternative pro
cedures of accounting for convertible bonds.

Chapter 7
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH
The Purpose of the Study and
Research Methodology
The purpose of this study was to determine whether
there would be any significant difference for theoretical or
predictive purposes under alternative procedures of
accounting for convertible bonds.
In order to test this hypothesis the study was
designed from a theoretical approach

(1) to examine the con

cept of a liability as distinguished from owners' equity,
(2) to scrutinize the positions of those favoring allocation
of value to the conversion privilege as well as those
against allocation, and

(3) to determine whether or not a

satisfactory procedure for measuring the value of the con
version feature could be developed.
The empirical aspect involved a test of the effects
of allocation on the "predictive ability" of the financial
statement data through the use of multiple correlation
analysis.

The procedure involved two regression analyses

(one with allocation of value to the conversion privilege
and one without allocation) of the market price of the
201
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common stock of each company against financial accounting
ratios that would be affected by valuation

(and the con

comitant amortization) of the conversion feature.

The coef

ficients of determination for the regression analyses of both
sets of data were compared in order to determine if they
were significantly different at the 95 per cent level of
confidence.
The Problem and Its Significance
Before one can properly analyze the accounting for a
security as complex as a convertible bond, it is very impor
tant that the instrument,

itself, and the circumstances

surrounding its use be thoroughly understood.
use of these securities

The extent of

(over $1.5 billion each year since

1965 and as much as $4.1 billion in 1967)

substantiates the

fact that they are not merely a whimsical fad of the financial
world.

Convertible debt is being used by all types of com

panies engaged in practically every form of business
possible.

And when this use factor is combined with the

absolute lack of a consistent, workable definition of a lia
bility that is sufficient to properly describe the complex
environment that exists today, it is no wonder the convertible
debt problem has never been settled,

instead of developing

acceptable concepts that distinguish between liabilities and
owners' equity, the profession,

as a whole, has been content

with attempting to solve the problems as they arise in a
sort of "brush fire" fashion.

Thus, this area of accounting

theory is in need of serious research from a conceptual level.
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Scope and Limitations
This study is intended to examine the theoretical
and the empirical aspects of the valuation question.

In

order to accomplish this goal, many areas had to be included
that could,
studies

in themselves, represent topics for similar

(e.g., warrants and specific valuation procedures),

however, they are covered here only in the depth necessary
to satisfactorily discuss convertible bonds.
The use of an empirical study requires a thorough
understanding of the conditions under which it was developed
before any meaningful inferences can be drawn.

Therefore,

it

is important to remember that the model used to examine the
relative predictive ability of the adjusted data
cation)

and the unadjusted data

(with allo

(without allocation) was not

designed as a complete model for forecasting the movement of
common stock prices.

As such, the major point of emphasis

was to determine if allocation of value to the conversion
feature

(together with the amortization of any resulting

premium or discount) would produce a better basis for the
prediction of stock price.
Therefore the variables included in the equations
were selected with the purpose of

(1) illustrating some

factor in the valuation of common stock price movement,
at the same time,

and,

(2) representing an element that would be

affected by the overall allocation procedure.
As with any study of this nature, there is always the
possibility data other than that selected would affect the
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dependent variable and it is also possible that other com
binations of data would produce different results.

However,

these limitations are no different from any other empirical
study, and they will not have a serious impact on the
findings.
Reasons for the Use of Convertible Bonds
The purpose of Chapter 2 was to place convertible
bonds in their proper perspective in the financial world.
This was necessary because proper accounting for the debtequity package would require an understanding of the
security and the events leading up to the present position
of the Board.
Two major reasons are usually offered for the use of
convertible debt:

(1) the issuance of debt securities at a

reduced interest rate and

(2) the desire on the part of

management to obtain equity financing on a delayed basis.
In the former, an analysis of Moody *s Convertible Bonds^
indicates that these securities carry an interest rate that
is below the "norm" for similar securities.

This conclusion

is supported through the findings of several independent
research studies and has been an accepted fact for quite
some ti m e .
Presently,

there seems to be a trend toward the use

of convertible bonds as a temporary substitute for the

York:

^Moody's investors Service, M o o d y 1s Bond Survey
Moody's Investors Service, Inc.).

(New
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issuance of equity capital.

Several studies document this

trend and indicate that it has become the major reason for
the use of these securities.

One possible reason for the

delayed issuance of equity is that the conversion price is
usually set above the current market value of the common
stock, and therefore, the use of the conversion option would
generate more funds on a per share basis

(assuming conver

sion) than would otherwise be obtainable through the
immediate issuance of common stock.

The delayed issuance of

stock can also work to management's advantage by allowing
the funds to become revenue generating before the stock is
issued and by providing flexibility in the financial struc
ture of the firm.

To a great extent management can manipu

late these securities by wisely setting the conversion price
and making strategic use of the call provision.
Investors usually purchase convertible bonds because
these financial instruments hold the key to financial
security in that they offer the protective element of an
equity and the protection of a debt instrument.

Since the

price levels of equity securities have a high correlation
with inflation trends, the convertibility feature offers
some protection against the perils of inflation.
there is no such thing as perfect protection.

However,

During the

last five years this protective element has not functioned
successfully, but the general trend should prevail
equity prices should, over the long run,

(i.e.,

follow the movement

of the general price level), and the exception that has been
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witnessed in recent years should not be expected to continue.
Thus, while equity protection against inflation is not per
fect, at present, there seems to be no better means avail
able .
Since bond prices vary inversely with the interest
rate, the value of the pure debt feature will fluctuate, but
it, too, provides an element of security— the degree of which
will vary with the business risk of each company.

In addi

tion, there is the "guaranteed return and redemption"
feature of debt that also has some aspect of security.
Thus these financial instruments seem to offer an
investor as much protection as is presently possible,

and

this, alone, has been an important factor in the growth in
the use of convertible debt.
In addition, an artificial leverage factor is built
into this security by the Federal Reserve System.

As of

April 21, 1972, the margin requirement allowed the purchase
of convertible bonds through financing 50 per cent of the
total price as compared to 45 per cent for common stock.
This, of course, would allow the investor to finance a
larger portion of the purchase price and, therefore, provide
for a greater return on the initial investment.
Convertible bonds have also been used in mergers and
acquisitions.

In these types of situations convertible debt

is issued in exchange for a company whose stock has a high
dividend yield.
The investor can also find protection through an
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antidilution clause and a wider market for possible sale.
The antidilution clause protects the original investment in
relation to the common stock outstanding at the time of the
purchase against future stock splits and dividends.

A wider

market exists for these bonds because many institutional
investors who are prohibited from purchasing stock are
allowed to buy convertible bonds.
Warrants
The use of debt with warrants has often been mistaken
as practically the same thing as convertible debt.

However,

a close analysis of these two investment packages indicates
there are a great many differences, one of which is the gen
eral circumstances under which each is used.

The warrant is

usually included in a situation where the issuer is pri
marily interested in debt financing rather than the issuance
of additional equity capital.
However, the principal difference lies in the separa
bility aspect.

Most warrants can be physically separated

from the bond and even develop a separate market.

And, it is

this factor that has generally caused most of the problems
for convertible debt.

Accountants can easily measure the

value of the warrant because of this separate market, and
they then use the separability factor as a basis for con
cluding that value should not be allocated to convertible
debt.

As such, the argument is purely one of ease of computa

tion rather than inherent logic.
Other differences exist between these two types of
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securities, but with the exception of the tax treatment,
they are of minor significance.

The Internal Revenue Service

has further complicated the situation by allowing the amorti
zation of a discount created by valuing warrants, but not
allowing a similar discount for convertible debt.

This

action has supplied additional support for those who use the
argument of inseparability as the principal reason for not
valuing the conversion privilege.
The Current Position of the APB with
Respect to Convertible Debt
To date the APB has had considerable difficulty with
gaining general acceptance for some of the Opinions that have
been issued.

Probably the most notable of these being the

investment credit controversy.

However, this difference

between acceptance by the Board and general acceptance of
Opinions again came up with regard to the original require2
ment for allocation of value to the conversion privilege.
Paragraphs 8 and 9 of Opinion No. 10 required alloca
tion for both the conversion privilege and warrants.
time of issuance of the Opinion

At the

(December, 1966) there

seemed to be very little opposition to the procedure.

It

was not until several months later that the Investment
Bankers Association and a few members of the Board began to
complain that any significant disfavor was shown.
2
Accounting Principles Board, Accounting Principles
Board Opinion Number 10: Omnibus Opinion— 1966 (New Y o r k :
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1966),
pp. 147-48.
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After several unsuccessful attempts,

the Board

finally voted to reconsider the issue and suspended para
graphs 8 and 9 of Opinion No. 10 until a final decision
could be reached.

During the suspension period the Board

received a considerable quantity of correspondence regarding
the allocation question and a subcommittee was established
to formally study the topic.

The subcommittee held a sym

posium on January 14, 1969, to consider the issue and the
results were published as Opinion No. 14.

The final

decision was to require allocation for detachable warrants,
but not for convertible bonds.

Thus the Board had, again,

reversed itself from a previous position and it is this
reversal that has led to the current situation.
The Concept of a Liability
The concept of a liability is particularly important
to the convertible debt question because allocation is con
tingent upon the existence of two economic elements— one a
liability and one part of owners' equity.

As such, the

situation can be reduced to the conflict between the entity
and the proprietary approaches to corporate equity.
The entity theory centers on the separate existence
the firm has apart from the owners and other equity holders.
The problem is not that liabilities are ignored, but rather,

3

Accounting Principles Board, Accounting Principles
Board Opinion Number 14: Accounting for Convertible Debt
and Debt Issued with Stock Purchase Warrants (New Y o r k :
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1969).
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that the distinction between liabilities and owners' equity
is not specifically emphasized.
For almost forty years the AICPA has relied upon an
entity approach in defining a liability, and as such there
was no particular distinction between liabilities and o w n e r s 1
equity.

As a result, there seemed to be no urgent need to

develop an independent concept of a liability.
The proprietary theory approach to equity places the
owner at the center of all enterprise activities,

i.e.,

everything is viewed in relation to its effect on owners'
equity.

Thus there is a sharp distinction between the con

cept of a liability and o w n e r s ' equity— one that is further
emphasized in the importance this approach places on the
balance sheet for financial statement disclosure.

The

ultimate change in o w n e r s ’ equity is more important than the
detail items that comprise the net change.
The theoretical problem that inhibits the acceptance
of the proprietorship approach lies in the separate existence
a corporation is assumed to have.

Since a corporation is a

legal entity, many accountants cannot force themselves to
accept the apparent paradox.

Despite this fact, the proprie

tary theory has achieved wide acceptance in influencing
accounting procedures.
Other approaches to corporate equity

(the residual

equity theory, the social enterprise theory, and the com
mander theory) have not gained wide acceptance to date, and
therefore, have had very little effect on corporate
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accounting.

In addition they seem to be modifications of

the entity or proprietary theories.

However, the funds

theory has gained wide acceptance for nonprofit organiza
tions, but as such has not had a material effect on
accounting for profit-making organizations.
The effect of these approaches can be seen by con
trasting the accounting procedures used to record the con
version of bonds.
value of the bonds

Under the entity theory the carrying
(par value plus premium/minus discount)

is assumed to be the proceeds of the issuance of the common
stock, as such no gain or loss is recorded,

instead, the

book value of the bonds becomes the recorded value for the
stock issued.

On the other hand, the proprietary theory

requires that the issuance of the stock be recorded at the
fair market value of the bonds
the stock).

As a result,

(or the fair market value of

if the fair market value of the

bonds was greater than the book

(carrying) value,

the cor

poration would record a loss on the conversion.
The influence of the entity approach can easily be
seen in the book value approach because with the corporation
as a separate entity, both creditors and owners are viewed
as suppliers of funds.

In fact, a strict interpretation of

the entity concept would view payments to each as a distribu
tion of profits.

However, the emphasis on owners' equity can

clearly be seen in the "new accounting" that is required
under the proprietary concept.
A review of the approaches to corporate equity is
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important in defining a liability in this study'because of
the need for a distinct separation between liabilities and
owners' equity.

This separation is necessary in order to

properly account for convertible debt, and it seems only a
proprietary approach achieves the required degree of dif
ferentiation.

Therefore, a proprietary approach will be

used as a basis for defining a liability in this study.
On the other hand, separation is not the only prob
lem that arises.

The actual definition that has been used

in the past was heavily influenced by the legal implications
involved.

As such there has been considerable difficulty in

developing a workable definition for the complex transactions
that modern corporations enter into daily.

And, it is clear

that such a narrow approach is not sufficient to properly
account for liabilities.
While every author has a preferential list of char
acteristics which an item must meet to be classified as a
liability, certain of these characteristics predominate:
(1)

that it results from transactions entered into by the

entity and

(2) that it requires future satisfaction through

the disbursement of assets.
With these factors in mind, the concept of a lia
bility,

for purposes of this study,

is defined as follows:

Liabilities . . . [are] economic obligations of
an enterprise that are recognized and measured in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principples.
Liabilities also include certain deferred
credits that are not obligations but that are recog
nized and measured in conformity with generally
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accepted accounting principles.^
This definition seems to accomplish the necessary distinction
between liabilities and owners' equity while at the same time
provide a workable concept.

It also has the added feature of

official support of the Institute.
Measurement of Liabilities
Once the concept has been defined,
sary to measure liabilities.

it becomes neces

In general, the approach has

been to discount both principal and interest at the market
rate of interest for similar securities,

and to amortize any

resulting premium or discount over the life of the securi
ties.

This seems to be acceptable from a historical cost

point of view, and while there has been some interest shown
in recognizing changes in interest rates in the financial
statements,

it currently represents such a deviation from

standard practice that further study is needed before it
could be considered for acceptance.

As a result, at the

present time, the use of the market rate of interest for
similar securities at the time the bonds were issued is suf
ficient for accounting purposes.
The Case for Allocation
Those favoring the allocation of value to the con
version privilege base their argument upon the premise that

^Accounting Principles Board, Accounting Principles
Board Statement Number 4: Basic Concepts and Accounting
Principles Underlying Financial Statements of Business Enter
prises (New York: American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, 1970), p. 50.
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this procedure reflects the true nature of the transaction
by emphasizing the economic substance of the transaction,
recognizing the intent of management upon issuing the securi
ties, and recording the actual cost of the funds.

Additional

support for allocation also can be found through the original
position of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
American and New York Stock Exchanges.
Emphasis of the economic substance of the trans
action .

The recognition of the substance of a transaction in

the financial statements results in reporting the economic
facts of the situation instead of the legal format used.
This approach is necessary for full disclosure in order to
contend with the complex tax and other legal restrictions
that form the environment for modern business transactions.
The application of this approach to convertible bonds
requires the separate recognition of the two economic ele
ments that exist in this security:

(1) the debt element and

(2) the conversion privilege.
A considerable degree of misunderstanding has arisen
over the relationship of these two rights.

Part of this

problem has resulted from the normal procedure to record the
issuance of the bonds where the conversion privilege is
recorded as part of one journal entry.

instead, a separa

tion of the proceeds into the amount paid for the bonds and
the amount paid for the conversion right

(with separate

journal entries) would help clarify the circumstances under
which the transaction arose— the issuance of bonds and the
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sale of a call on common stock.
The lack of recognition of the conversion right is
also inconsistent with the conclusions of Opinion No. 15.
In this Opinion the Board has devised a specific test for
determining whether or not a convertible bond should be
included in primary earnings per share.

The rebuttal

offered by those opposing allocation is the problem of
implementation.

However, the test used for computing earn

ings per share is not any less difficult to implement than
such a test
feature.

(or calculation)

for valuing the conversion

Therefore, the problem of implementation is not of

the magnitude as to negate the validity of the concept of
allocation.
As a result of the dual economic nature of the con
version right, some of the critics of allocation feel there
is a put element that exists concurrent with the call option,
and that the put has greater value because of the ability of
management to force retirement or conversion.

A careful

study of the economic circumstances that exist upon the
issuance of the debt-equity package will clearly indicate
that they are not conducive to recognition of the put, and
therefore, this argument should not affect the allocation
question.
Additional support for allocation can be found

5Accounting Principles Board, Accounting Principles
Board Opinion Number 15: Earnings Per Share (New Y o r k :
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1969).
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through an examination of the conversion right and warrants
as economic rights,
element.

i.e., without consideration of the debt

As such, each represents the right to obtain

common stock in the future and should be accounted for
accordingly.

Since most authorities agree that detachable

warrants issued with bonds should be valued and recorded as
contributed capital,

then it only seems reasonable to follow

the same procedures for the conversion option.
Management intent.

Presentation of the

lege on the financial statements recognizes the
management in issuing these securities.

call privi
intent of

As indicated in

Chapter 2, one of the basic reasons for the use of con
vertible debt was to issue common stock on a delayed basis.
The purpose for the delay is not relevant here, and neither
is the ultimate result— the degree of actual conversion.
The intent present in the concept of allocation is to
recognize the two economic elements that exist when the
securities are issued.
debt-equity package,

Thus the corporation is selling the

and the buyer is paying for both of the

rights involved irrespective of whether or not the conversion
right is exercised.

Failure to record the conversion

privilege because of future expectations would serve only to
deviate from the cost basis of accounting.
Actual cost of the funds.

There is a general trend

in accounting to emphasize the income statement over the
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balance sheet.

if this reasoning is carried over to the

convertible debt problem,
significance.

then allocation takes on even more

The procedures required to recognize the con

version right also record the debt element in terms of its
actual issue price.

As a result, normal amortization pro

cedures of the resulting discount

(or possible premium)

charge revenues of the period with the actual interest cost
of the debt.
The normal argument against the actual interest cost
approach is that unless there is conversion of a material
portion of the bond issue,
coupon rate.

the interest cost remains at the

In addition, the opponents to allocation argue

that the only "cost" to the corporation is the possible loss
of an opportunity to issue common stock at a later date at a
price greater than the conversion price.

Since accounting

has not yet attempted to record this type of cost, those
opposing allocation feel there is no need for recording any
thing except the issuance of the bonds.
In an attempt to further cloud the actual interest
cost issue, the opponents of allocation claim that if the
true interest cost is to be determined, then all of the
covenants in the indenture should be given recognition on
the financial statements.

This has even been supported by

some of the advocates of valuation.

However,

there is one

^Donald A. Corbin, "Financial Statements— Income
Statements and Balance Sheets," Handbook of Modern Account
i ng. ed. Sidney Davidson (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Com
pany, 1970), p. 3-3.
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major factor that is ignored by this approach— the conver
sion privilege is an element of owners' equity, whereas the
other covenants would simply be additional detail presented
in the liability section.

Also the opponents seem to forget

that the other provisions are normal to most bond issues,
although they may vary somewhat for convertible bonds; but
then, there is some variation between nonconvertible bonds
also.

On the other hand, the inclusion of the conversion

privilege is not normal to a bond issue, and therefore,

it

should be given separate recognition in the financial state
ments .
Therefore, in order to properly match the actual cost
of the funds against the revenues of the period, allocation
of value to the conversion privilege is mandatory.
Position of the Securities and Exchange Commission
and the major stock exchanges.

The Securities and Exchange

Commission supported the allocation concept, and has done
everything in its power to force adoption.

In fact, during

the period of suspension of the requirement for allocation,
the SEC required disclosure of a value that could be attri
buted to the conversion privilege and the resultant effect
upon income.

However, as a result of the "difficulties

involved," the Commission decided to support the conclusions
of the Board.

The only other governmental agency to express

an opinion on this question was the Civil Aeronautics Board
and they deferred a decision on the acceptability of alloca
tion procedures until after Opinion No. 14.

Their final
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decision supported the position taken by the APB.
The New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock
Exchange both supported the original position of the Board
favoring allocation, but the New York Stock Exchange later
changed its position to a "no preference" approach.
The Case Against Allocation
The opposition to allocation is developed from four
points of view:

inseparability,

the position of the Internal

Revenue Service,

the measurement problem,

and the relation

ship between convertible preferred stock and convertible debt.
Inseparability.

The major point in the case against

allocation lies in the inseparability of the conversion
right and the debt element.

The lack of physical separation

and a separate market value for the conversion option has
caused many accountants and financial analysts to take a
position against the concept of allocation.

This type of

thinking reverts to a strict legal interpretation of the
situation and, as such, ignores the substance of the trans
action.

If this approach were taken in the case of leases

there would be no provision for capitalization of any leasing
agreements.

In addition if substance is ignored, there

would be no need for recognition of interest on long-term
receivables and payables.

The fact that the lack of physical

separability complicates the situation is accepted by both
sides of the question, however, those favoring allocation
believe it should not negate the theoretical considerations.
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Position of the Internal Revenue Service.

The

Internal Revenue Service has added support to the position
of those against allocation by not allowing the amortization
of the resulting discount as a deduction in determining tax
able income.

This position evolved after much inconsistency

in treatment on the part of the taxing authorities.

However,

there is a general presumption that tax regulations should
not affect accounting procedures.

Since each has a dif

ferent purpose for the figure labeled as income, it is only
logical that the two figures will not agree.

Therefore,

neither should be taken as support or contradiction of the
other.
Measurement.

The measurement question permeates the

arguments against allocation.

It is generally held by those

against the valuation of the conversion feature that a pro
cedure of questionable validity should not be placed in the
financial statements when the problems of measurement are as
great as that which exist for valuing the conversion privi
lege .
The lack of an exchange value for the right is deemed
by the investment bankers to be a major factor in their
position against allocation.

The investment services even

go so far as to contend that the data published regarding
the investment value of the pure debt element is a "grossly
imprecise estimation" intended only for use in comparing com
panies and not for financial statement disclosure.

In their

argument the fear of liability under the Securities Act of

1933 is an influential factor.
Estimates have been used in accounting for many
years both before and after the 1933 Act, and it is diffi
cult to understand how the present case differs from past
instances.

In addition,

in order to offset some of the

problems that could occur, combines of investment banking
firms could be formed to determine the value of a particular
issue, or some form of average could be used

if there are

variances in the estimates of individual firms.

in any

event some form of reasonable estimation for the value of
the conversion privilege

could be determined if those

involved would cooperate

with the accountants.

Relationship between convertible preferred stock and
convertible b o nds.

Many of those opposing the allocation

concept attempt to force consideration of convertible pre
ferred stock on the assumption that there is little if any
difference between the two securities.

The rebuttal offered

against this position lies in the basic nature of preferred
stock.

The allocation of value to the conversion privilege

is to provide for the recognition of the debt and equity
elements present in convertible bonds.

If this same logic

were applied to preferred stock, the effect would simply
create an additional element of contributed capital.

Since

the preferred stock would already be am element of equity,
allocation would only increase the detail in the finamcial
statements with no increase in the information presented.
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Valuation of the Conversion Privilege
Due to the possible limitations created by the pro
cedural problems of allocation it is imperative that this
question be resolved before implementation of the concept in
the financial statements.
to this problem:
rity method,

There are four major approaches

the traditional method, the residual secu

the imputed discount method,

The traditional method.

and the dual method.

The traditional method

ignores the conversion privilege entirely.

The recording of

the issuance of the convertible bonds would be exactly the
same as if they were nonconvertible bonds.

The only recog

nition that is given to the conversion aspect is a footnote
describing the provisions of the indenture and the addi
tional number of shares of common stock that could be issued
if the bonds were converted.
The residual security meth o d .

The residual security

method improves the accounting only very slightly.

While

the recording of the issuance of the bonds and the financial
statement presentation would be the same as under the tradi
tional method, the procedure specifies that earnings per
share be adjusted by assuming conversion if the bonds clearly
derive a major portion of their value from the conversion
privilege or the common stock characteristics exhibited in
the security.

The adjustment involves adding back to net

income the charge for interest

(net of tax) and inclusion of

the additional common shares in the denominator.
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The imputed discount method.

The imputed discount

method is in actuality the approach originally prescribed by
the Board for recognition of the value of the conversion
feature in the financial statements.

As such the proceeds

from the issuance of the bonds are divided between the con
version right and the bonds.

Following this procedure the

conversion option is recorded in the accounts separate from
the bonds and the resulting discount is amortized as addi
tional interest expense.
The dual m e t h o d .

The dual method was developed by

Dr. Dudley Curry and requires a recording of data similar to
that set forth under the traditional method.

The major dif

ference is that the par amount of the convertible bonds would
be reported between liabilities and owners' equity and net
income and earnings per share figures would be reported on
the assumption of conversion and nonconversion.

The theory

Dr. Dudley has is that the reader should make the decision
as to whether the bonds should be considered as debt
(unconverted) or as common stock

(converted).

A partial valuation approach.

Another approach that

has received some attention was prepared by James Katz.

It

involves the recognition of the value of the conversion
option through a charge to interest expense and a credit to
contributed capital each period.

This charge would be based

on the difference between the coupon rate of the bond issue
and the rate the bonds would have had to bear if there were
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no conversion privilege.
A comparison of methods.

An analysis of each of these

approaches with the exception of the imputed discount method
clearly indicates a complete disregard for the valuation of
the conversion privilege when the bonds are issued.

And

since this was previously determined to be a significant
feature of the debt-equity package they must be considered
as unsatisfactory and rejected.

The only fault with the

imputed discount method is that it does not adjust earnings
per share except by the additional interest resulting from
the amortization of the discount.

However, this is not an

inherent weakness in the method, and, therefore,

the imputed

discount method should be employed in order to properly
reflect the circumstances that exist at the issuance of the
debt-equity package.
If it is decided to use the imputed discount approach,
the conversion option must be valued.

Any attempt to deter

mine the value of the conversion right directly would involve
selecting a future date for conversion, estimating the future
growth rate of the stock, and some form of discounting pro
cedure must be employed in order to allow the purchaser an
element of income.
It is also possible to value the conversion option
by determining the price the bonds would have yielded if
there were no conversion right attached.

As such the option

would be valued at the residual amount of the proceeds after
deducting the estimated investment value of the bonds.

A
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review of the circumstances involved indicate this approach
would be easier to apply, and less susceptible to error than
direct valuation of the conversion privilege.
Financial Statement Presentation
The balance sheet classification is an issue where
there was considerable agreement.

The par value of the bonds

would be reported as a long-term liability and the conversion
option would be classified as an element of contributed
capital.

However, there was some controversy concerning the

reporting of the discount.

Historically this account has

been classified as an asset

(other asset/deferred charge).

The current theoretical approach is to place it on the
balance sheet as a contra account to the bond liability.
This procedure seems to present the circumstances of the
issuance of the bonds in a clearer manner.
It would also be possible to record the present value
of the principal and the interest elements of the bond issue
on the balance sheet using the yield rate of interest the
bonds would have had to bear if there were no conversion
feature as the discount rate.

However,

this procedure

ignores the value of the conversion option and therefore was
deemed unacceptable.
A modification of the presentation of the conversion
value as an element of contributed capital was suggested by
some of the companies corresponding with the APB concerning
the convertible debt problem.

This procedure provided for

the imputation of a hypothetical tax effect and thereby
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reporting the discount net of tax.

Since this is definitely

against the current tax regulations, it seems to be too much
of a deviation from accounting for the economic effects of
the transaction to be acceptable.
The Empirical Aspects of Valuation
The final chapter in the body of this study involved
an analysis of the effects of allocation upon the usefulness
of the accounting data.

One of the ways in which external

reports are used is to provide information for investors and
prospective investors.

In order to measure the usefulness

of the adjusted data a test was devised to correlate the
price of the common stock at the time the annual reports
were released against certain independent variables.

Since

the objective was to determine if there was a significant
difference between data with and without allocation of value
to the conversion privilege, the coefficients of determina
tion of the two sets of data were analyzed as a final step.
The companies used were randomly selected from those
listed in Moody's Industrial Manual7 that

(1) had one or

more issues of convertible bonds outstanding from 1961 to
1970, and

(2) conducted profitable operations during this

period.®

The sample allowed an error in the prediction of

7Moody's Investors Service, Moody's Industrial Manual
(New York: Moody's investors Service, Inc.).
®The companies used in the study were:
AMF Incor
porated? Brunswick Corporation? Combustion Engineering, Inc.?
Copperweld Steel Company? FMC Corporation? Fruehauf Corpora
tion? Scott Paper Company? Sybron Corporation? Thriftimart,
Inc.? and Union Oil Company of California.
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less them 5 per cent at the 95 per cent confidence level.
The accounting data were taken directly from the
annual reports of the companies used, and where the reports
were not available the data came from Moody's Industrial
Manual.

This procedure was adopted in an attempt to use as

nearly as possible the same data that was made available to
the readers of the financial statements.
The independent variables used in the original equa
tion were:

long-term debt-owners' equity ratio, earnings

per share, times interest earned, dividend payout, and
asset-owners' equity ratio.

These were selected because

they represent the more popular ratios reflecting the basic
elements of risk evaluation and income, and because they
would be directly affected by allocation of value to the
conversion privilege and the concomitant amortization of the
bond discount.
Additional variables added to complete the original
equation included:

the general level of the stock market,

dividends per share, and convertible debt to long-term debt.
These were initially included in the calculation in order to
achieve as broad a base as possible for the analysis.
The conversion option was valued in accordance with
paragraphs 8 and 9 of Opinion No. 10.

As a result the

actual yield interest rate was compared to the yield rate
for similar securities as published in M o o d y 1s Industrial
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Ma n u a l .9

The actual yield rate was used in order to separate

any original discount from the valuation of the conversion
option.

After the value of the conversion feature was deter

mined, the resulting discount was amortized on a straightline basis and recorded as an other asset on the balance
sheet^® with appropriate recognition given to any retirements
or conversions of the bonds.
Results of the Analysis
The results of the study indicated both the adjusted
and unadjusted original equations were significant at the .01
level, however, there was not a significant difference be
tween the two at the 95 per cent confidence level.

In an

attempt to further refine the results, a modified equation
was used whereby the second group of variables mentioned
above was eliminated because they were not directly affected
by the allocation procedures.

However, the results did not

produce a significant difference between the two sets of
data

(at the 95 per cent confidence level).
As a result it can only be assumed that the alloca

tion of value to the conversion privilege would not signifi
cantly affect the use of the financial statements in so far
as using the information as a device for predicting the move
ment of common stock prices.

g
Where the yield rates were not available in M o o d y 's
- Industrial Ma n u a l , tables similar to those presented by
Moody's were developed.
^ H i s t o r i c a l l y this has been the traditional method
of reporting bond discounts.
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A Summary of the Results of this Study
The evidence presented in this study indicates there
is a definite need for allocation of value to the conversion
option in so far as accounting theory is concerned.

However,

from the use approach it would not make the information more
effective for predicting stock prices.

Thus the null hypoth

esis as set forth in Chapter 1 must be partially accepted
and partially rejected.

Since the theoretical aspect should

be considered as the overall guiding factor, it must be
reasoned that the conversion privilege should be valued upon
the issuance of convertible bonds.
CONCLUSIONS
Financial statements must communicate the results of
thousands of transactions that transpire over a given period
of time.

These statements must present the economic sub

stance of each transaction as it relates to the reporting
entity.

Accordingly, the null hypothesis that there would

be no significant difference for theoretical or predictive
purposes under alternative procedures of accounting for con
vertible bonds must be, at least, partially rejected; from a
theoretical approach the evidence indicates allocation is
necessary to present the true nature of the transaction.
The recognition of the substance of the transaction,
i.e., the existence of two economic elements at the issuance
of the bonds, requires that allocation procedures be used.
Otherwise, there is no recognition given to the call option
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purchased by the issuer, as such,

the entire proceeds from

the transaction are assumed to have been received for the
debt element.

Inherent in this assumption is the concept of

a zero value for the conversion option,

and of course, this

could not reasonably be the situation.

If this right had no

value, then the bonds would not have generated the same
amount of funds at issuance.
Allocation is also required if any attempt to account
for the actual cost of borrowing is made.

The inclusion of

a conversion right allows the bonds to be issued at an
interest rate that is lower than that of similar securities
without the conversion feature.

As a result of allocation,

a discount is usually recognized and the amortization of this
discount increases the net cost of the funds obtained to a
level consistent with the issuance of debt without the con
version privilege and the same coupon rate as is present on
the convertible bonds.
The procedures used for allocation result in the
recognition of the bond liability as a separate element from
the call option.

This is consistent with the definition of

a liability as developed in this study.

This definition

specifically limits liabilities to "economic obligations"
and "deferred credits," and does not allow the recognition
of an element of contributed capital as part of the obliga
tion.

This conclusion is also supported by the fact that

the proprietary approach to corporate equity should be used
in interpreting the definition of a liability.

An analysis
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of both the proprietary and entity theories revealed that
the former places more emphasis on the distinction between
liabilities and owners' equity, and therefore,
used in defining a liability.

it should be

If this is done, the two

economic rights that exist upon issuance of the bonds must
be segregated in the financial statements.
As such,

it is imperative that an allocation of funds

be made at the issuance of the debt-equity package in order
to comply with the liability restriction.

To do otherwise

would result in a backward movement toward the entity con
cept,

and it is clear that under this approach there is not

the distinct separation between liabilities and owners'
equity that is necessary for proper recognition of liabili
ties .
The actual valuation process can be accomplished
through consultations with investment bankers and other
financial analysts.

These experts are capable of measuring

the investment value of the debt portion of the package as
it relates to similar securities without the conversion
feature.

However,

it must be remembered that the dollar

value placed on the conversion option is an estimate and
neither the accountants nor the investing public should
place an unreasonable demand for "exactness."
Therefore,

it has been shown that valuation of the

conversion option of convertible bonds is mandatory in order:
(1) to account for the economic elements present in the debtequity package,

(2) to charge the operations of the period
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with the actual cost of the funds used, and

(3) to comply

with the distinction between a liability and own e r s ' equity
necessary for proper reporting.

The study also indicates

that the valuation problem could be solved with the coopera
tion of the financial analysts and the investment bankers.
The only segment of the study that does not strongly
support allocation is the use of accounting data for pre
dicting the movement of stock prices.

However, the results

of this test indicate there is no significant difference as
a result of allocation, therefore, even the empirical
approach does not negate the overall conclusions.
The evidence also indicates that the discount
resulting from allocation should be classified on the balance
sheet as a liability valuation account, and the value of the
conversion privilege,

itself, should be classified as part

of contributed capital.

This balance sheet presentation

discloses the economic effects of the transaction and clearly
describes the effects of the conversion feature on the debt
element.

In addition, a footnote will be necessary to fully

explain the conversion option.
The process of allocation of value to the conversion
right of convertible debt will result in the need to adjust
the earnings per share computation.

Opinion No. 15 requires

an "if converted" treatment for convertible bonds if the
cash yield of the security is less than two-thirds of the
prime interest rate at the time of issuance.

The procedure

recommended in this study must supersede this provision and
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allow primary earnings per share to be influenced only by
the amortization of the resulting discount.

However,

it

would be necessary to continue the fully diluted computation
as it presently stands— the assumption of the conversion of
all convertible debt.
One advantage from this procedure will be the elimina
tion of the arbitrary test for convertible debt that currently
exists for earnings per share.

In addition, it would also

allow primary earnings per share to be "more representative"
of the "actual" situation that exists at the end of the
period,

and fully diluted to be a pro forma computation.
This allocation procedure would allow the effects of

issuance of convertible bonds to be recognized in both
figures, whereas the current procedure

(the two-thirds test)

generally excludes most convertible debt from any considera
tion in primary earnings per s h a r e . ^
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The results of this study clearly point out several
major areas of consideration for future analysis.

The most

important of these in so far as convertible debt is concerned
is the measurement of the conversion option.

While it was

concluded that investment bankers could develop an acceptable
figure, it was generally conceded that there is a great deal

i^Henry W. Longfield, Jr., A Comparison of Methods
for Identifying those Convertible Bonds to be Included in
Earnings Per Share (Ann Arbor:
University Microfilms, Inc.,
1970), pp. 99-130.
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of subjectivity in the analysis.

Since this was one of the

major arguments against valuation of the conversion option,
more research is needed in this area in order to quantify
the procedures as much as possible.
The need for more research in the area of liabili
ties in general was mentioned in Chapters 1 and 3.
definition prescribed in Statement No. 4

10

The

should be viewed

as a temporary measure until the concept can be studied in
detail for all items in that classification.

This definition

fulfills the requirements for convertible bonds, but there
was no attempt to apply it to other problems in this area.
Therefore, additional research is needed in order to develop
a workable definition of a liability as a balance sheet
classification in general.
It was also mentioned in Chapter 3 that the valua
tion of a bond using the market rate of interest in existence
at the time the bonds are issued has been accepted as a means
of implementing the historical cost concept, and therefore,
use of the term structure of interest rates, by implication,
is a deviation from the cost approach.

However,

since other

areas of deviation from cost have been explored in recent
years,

it is suggested that some research be directed toward

the implementation of this concept.
Another area in need of future study lies in the

^^Accounting Principles Board, Statement No. 4 . op.
cit., p. 50.
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actions of the Board.

There is currently a great deal of

research into the area of the development of accounting
principles, and in some instances the future of the Accounting
Principles Board, as it is known today,

is in jeopardy.

How

ever, no matter what form of leadership is used, some pro
vision for the future study of a problem, in depth, should
be made before any definitive position has been taken.

In

several instances the Board has had a great deal of diffi
culty implementing its decisions, and part of this has
resulted from the lack of independent study.

Of course there

is also the part that has been the result of yielding to
external pressure as was the case of convertible debt.

Thus

something needs to be done in this area, and it should not
be implemented without a concentrated effort at objective
study.
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